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ABSTRACT 
 
MELISSA M. CALDWELL: The Outlines of Skepticism: The Problem of Moral Authority 
in Early Modern England 
(Under the direction of Reid Barbour) 
 
 
In this dissertation, I examine the value of skepticism to writers interested in what 
were competing and even contradictory projects: reform and orthodoxy. Focusing on the 
work of Thomas More, Richard Hooker, Thomas Nashe, and John Milton, I examine how 
these writers engaged with skeptical thought in order to respond to the decentering of moral 
authority caused by the Protestant Reformation. Writing within a context in which moral 
certainty could no longer be located dogmatically, and in which the individual interpretation 
of texts in a new era of print culture further destabilized moral authority, these writers 
reassess the moral value of language and test its potential to regulate the experience of 
reading.  I argue that it is their engagement with skepticism rather than their denial of it that 
allows these writers to stabilize moral authority by generating didactic texts to replace 
dogmatic ones as a source of normative moral knowledge. By expanding current critical 
formulations of early modern skepticism, this dissertation offers a fuller account of 
skepticism’s history and examines the relationship between epistemology and ethics in the 
early modern period. More largely, this dissertation suggests that the reconstitution of ethical 
iii 
value through literary modes represents complex responses to epistemic growth and 
limitation.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: SKEPTICISM IN ENGLAND AND THE PROBLEM OF EALRY 
MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
We need to reckon with the fact that thinking is an effortful activity, 
not simply a manipulation of a kaleidoscope of mental images. The 
attempt to think out problems, as a matter of common introspection 
and observation, does not seem to take the form of, or be reducible to, 
a patterned or even a uniformly purposive activity. Rather we engage 
in an often intolerable wrestle with words and meanings, we spill over 
the limits of our intelligence and become confused, and we often find 
that our attempts to synthesize our views reveal conceptual disorders at 
least as much as coherent doctrines. 
 
--Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History 
of Ideas”1 
 
 
I. The Problem of English Moral Philosophy  
 In her own attempts to inspire interest in Renaissance intellectual history among 
philosophers and historians of philosophy, Jill Kraye has noted the general disregard for 
Renaissance philosophy in existing narratives of its history.2 I would add to her observation 
that this neglect is even more the case for English philosophy, and is particularly true of 
English moral philosophy.  In narratives of the history of ethics, English moral philosophy is 
conspicuously absent prior to the mid-seventeenth century.  Typically, the contributions of 
                                                
1 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and the History of Ideas,” Visions of Politics, Volume 1: Regarding Method, 5th 
ed.  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 79. 
 
2 Jill Kraye notes that the “caricatured view of Renaissance humanism,” which sees humanism as a movement 
that “produced narrow-minded pedants, more concerned with the style of a philosophical argument than with its 
substance and more interested in the classification of philosophical positions than in their concrete and detailed 
analysis,” may be partly to blame for the degree to which Renaissance philosophy has been overlooked 
(Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Jill Kraye and M.W.F Stone [New York: Routledge, 2000] xii). 
See also Charles Schmitt, “Towards a History of Renaissance Philosophy,” Aristotelismus und Renaissance: In 
Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt (Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz, 1988) 9-16. 
2 
English writers to the history of ethics prior to the Cambridge Platonists go unacknowledged, 
with the exception of the occasional mention of Richard Hooker, Francis Bacon, or Edward 
Herbert.3 Volume one of the Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, 
which focuses on moral philosophy, includes only one English work, a portion of John 
Case’s commentary on Aristotle.4 Although it is true that this is a collection of translated 
works, even this volume’s admittedly abbreviated bibliography of Renaissance moral 
philosophical texts available in English includes only the works of two other English writers 
(Joseph Hall’s works and Thomas More’s Utopia).  This conspicuous absence from the 
critical radar across multiple disciplines leads us to important questions both about the 
location of English moral philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and its 
exclusion from studies of early modern moral philosophy today. 
The problem in part has to do with the character of English moral philosophy which 
in some ways is very different from its Continental counterparts. By and large, there is no 
comparable figure in early modern English history to Montaigne, Charron, Primaudaye, 
Lipsius, Bodin, DuVair, Ficino, Bruno, Pico della Mirandola, Suarez, Sanches, and the list 
goes on and on.  Though many of these figures were related to the church or wrote texts that 
are in some sense religious, their writings are often more ethical or philosophical than 
                                                
3 Richard Popkin’s first edition of The History of Scepticism did include half a chapter devoted to Herbert of 
Cherbury, though he follows Descartes’s unflattering view that in his engagement with skepticism Herbert 
“failed to comprehend the basic problem at issue” (128). In his most recent revised edition, Popkin also includes 
a very brief discussion of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (The History of Scepticism From Savonarola to 
Bayle [New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], 174-180).  Other examples of this tendency to ignore 
English writers include: Michael B. Gill, The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular 
Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Matthew L. Jones, The Good Life in the Scientific 
Revolution: Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and the Cultivation of Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006); The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Elmar J. Kremer and Michael J. Latzer (Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001);  Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral 
Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed.  (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1998); Basil Willey, The English Moralists (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1964).  
 
4 Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, Volume 1: Moral Philosophy, ed. Jill Kraye 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
3 
religious—that is to say, they can be understood, at least to some degree, without respect to 
religious context. The same cannot be said of the works of writers like Thomas More, 
William Perkins, Joseph Hall, Richard Hooker, or Jeremy Taylor, whose works significantly 
depend upon the religious context—indeed often the polemical context—that encouraged 
their production. This is, of course, a generalization to which there are exceptions, for 
example works like Thomas Elyot’s Of the Knowledge which Maketh a Wise Man, William 
Baldwin’s Treatise of Moral Philosophy, or William Cornwallis’s Essays, which represent a 
more secular strain of English ethics in the period. But these figures hardly make it into 
histories of ethics or moral philosophy, and it is perhaps not a coincidence that countries that 
remained Roman Catholic in the face of the Reformation were precisely countries that 
produced a form of moral philosophy that was less tied to religious conflict and less a 
product of a polemical culture.5 [cf Cavell, disowning knowledge] 
Much of the problem here also has to do with terminology. Terms like morality and 
ethics utterly fail to communicate the interlacement between religion and moral philosophy 
in early modern England. This is perhaps why Continental figures, whose works are so much 
easier to comprehend at the level of a purist ethics, have fit more comfortably into grand 
narratives about the history of ethics. The term moral theology perhaps works in some 
instances, assuming one is in fact talking about theology, but clearly not for the subjects of 
this dissertation. Indeed, it is hard to discuss early modern English texts such as Richard 
Hooker’s Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie as moral philosophy since they were religious, 
particularly since they were religious at a time when religion was not a discipline of objective 
study, but an area of knowledge that implicated belief.  
                                                
5 Stanley Cavell speculates in a similar vein when he compares how early modern Continental philosophers 
engage literature as opposed to English philosophers in Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 2.  
4 
Moreover, in addition to their inaccuracy, terms like morality and ethics are often 
intentionally or unintentionally polemical and political, as critics feel compelled to use their 
studies of the relationship between ethics or morality and early modern literature as a means 
to justify the study of literature in general. One recent example of this tendency is Marshall 
Grossman’s Reading Renaissance Ethics, an edited volume of essays on the ethics of reading 
early modern texts both then and now.  The collection seeks to revise the cultural and 
historical specificity of New Historicism by taking into account what he terms the “resistance 
of the signifier.”6 In Grossman’s view, “material history itself is already inhabited and 
colonized by literary form” in a way that allows texts to be not just or even primarily 
purveyors of history, but also ethical agents.7  Indeed, in a concluding section that records an 
exchange between Grossman and Sharon Achinstein, a self-styled “political critic,” the two 
debate whether (as Grossman would have it) ethics (“what should I want”) is necessarily a 
precondition of a political act (“how do I get what I want”) or whether (as Achinstein would 
have it) ethics and politics are indistinguishable “because the conditions in which we are able 
to do ethics…are indeed political.”8  But despite their disagreement over how ethics is related 
to politics, both sides of the question use ethics more broadly to justify the study of literature.  
So too is the case for E. Armstrong’s recent elegiac account of the undermining of 
early modern theories of education grounded in the moral philosophy of Ciceronian 
oratorical theory by the more sterile Ramist approach.  Armstrong laments the harsh truth of 
Grafton and Jardine’s argument that Ramism “‘is the version of liberal arts teaching that 
                                                
6 “Introduction,” Reading Renaissance Ethics, ed. Marshall Grossman (New York: Routledge, 2007) 5. 
 
7 Grossman, “Introduction” 6.  
 
8 Achinstein and Grossman, “Ethics or Politics?: An Exchange Passing through the Areopagitica” 263.   
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‘caught on’ and left its indelible trace on western European thought.’”9 For him, interpreting 
“poetic practices” in the context of the “history of rhetoric” may be one way to reaffirm the 
importance of “public action as a necessary and material end to both academic prose and the 
texts such prose examines.”10 
I find that the value of the study of early modern ethics derives from the way in which 
the epistemic instability of the period made normative ethics all the more important.  The 
history of ethics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is significant because it is a 
moment in intellectual history that can tell us much about how the human mind responds to 
its own growth and how it compensates for its limitations.  In his recent book, How Skeptics 
Do Ethics, Aubrey Neal has argued that ethics has not kept apace with the moral dilemmas of 
our own contemporary world.11 While it is true that this problem may be a particularly 
compelling one as the speed of change makes us continually aware—increasingly undeniably 
so—of our ethical shortcomings, I believe that the ways in which human epistemic change 
outpaces ethical thought would not seem to be unique to the twentieth or twenty-first 
centuries. Rather, history shows that ethics is often a step behind changes in the human 
intellectual condition. Certainly there are some ethical discourses that are fundamentally 
anticipatory. A good example of this in the early modern period is the discourse of casuistry 
which seeks to resolve hypothetical moral dilemmas before one encounters them. But 
normative ethics is more often a fundamentally defensive kind of discourse. Many of the 
subjects of this dissertation allow for the suggestion that normative ethics in early modern 
                                                
9 Edward Armstrong, A Ciceronian Sunburn: A Tudor Dialogue on Humanistic Rhetoric and Civic Poetics 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2006) 183. 
 
10 Armstrong 185. 
 
11 Aubrey Neal, How Skeptics Do Ethics: A Brief History of the Late Modern Linguistic Turn (Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press, 2007).  
6 
England is defined by its struggle to respond to the epistemic dilemmas occasioned by the 
Reformation and by print culture.  
The subject of this dissertation is the value of skepticism to English writers interested 
in normative moral value and religious knowledge.  Beginning with Thomas More and the 
birth of printed English religious polemics during the Reformation, I trace the value of 
uncertainty through later renegotiations of the identity of the Church of England and the 
moral identity of its subjects in the works of Richard Hooker and Thomas Nashe at the turn 
of the sixteenth century, and finally to the more volatile reinvention of the parameters of a 
national church in the early polemical works of John Milton and the parliamentarian Lord 
Brooke. While they are all writing within a polemical context, each of these writers seeks 
moral value that is compromised by their linguistic situatedness.   
This dissertation initially began as a study of the effects of skepticism on early 
modern aesthetics. It has evolved into a discussion of the relationship between skepticism 
and ethics in part because of the strong tie between aesthetics and ethics in the period. In the 
literature studied in this dissertation, at every turn, aesthetics gets mediated through the 
ethical and epistemological ramifications of genre and style. These writers are in constant 
conversation with themselves about their literary choices and the moral authority—or lack 
thereof—implicit in these choices. One form of this kind of ethical-aesthetic trade off 
encouraged by skepticism has been studied by Victoria Kahn. In her examination of the 
influence of skeptical thought on rhetoric and prudence, she argues that early humanists 
became mired in the ultimately counterproductive rhetorical and epistemological tendencies 
of skepticism.  Although humanists were attracted to the Academic skeptic’s discursive 
practice of in utramque partem, the efficacy of this rhetorical dexterity was destabilized 
7 
significantly by the epistemic critique of language found in Pyrrhonism.  In her view this 
conflict contributed to the loss of the “practical and political significance” of the linguistic 
act.12 In other words, skepticism is embedded in the humanist concept of decorum, which is 
upheld largely at the expense of universal truth.13  
I argue that the engagement with skeptical methodology by More, Hooker, Nashe, 
and Milton is a response to the uncertainty unearthed by the advent of religious experience—
that is, by the interiority and subjectivity of religious knowledge.  After the Reformation’s 
challenge to orthodoxy, dogma lost its status as a guarantor of religious or moral certainty.  
The rise of print culture only augmented the impact of this decentering of moral authority. As 
print culture allowed more people access to religious and moral texts, and as Protestantism 
encouraged the individual interpretation of those texts, language was invested with a new 
moral power—a power that was as potentially stabilizing as it was destabilizing in the quest 
for a normative ethics. What we see in these writers is a tension within the impulse for 
reform between the religious and polemical on the one hand, and the moral and humanist, on 
the other. This is not to say that these represent contrary spheres of influence—clearly 
humanists could be polemical and religious—but it is to emphasize that the writers I study 
are all the keenly aware of the fissure between rhetorical savvy and moral authority because 
of the exigency of the polemical and religious contexts in which they write. Moreover, the 
question of aesthetics has become all the more urgent and pressing for many of these writers 
as they hasten to formulate an adequate ethical response to religious uncertainty in the midst 
of the epistemic crisis resulting from a print culture that makes belief an increasingly textual 
                                                
12 Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1985) 21. 
  
13 Kahn 25.  
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phenomenon.  To varying degrees, each of the writers covered in this dissertation responded 
to this disjunction and to the failure of language more largely by calling into question the 
relationship of language to moral authority.  I would not suggest, as Kahn does, that language 
has lost its significance, but that in the struggle to invest language with moral value these 
writers appeal to uncertainty rather than dogma.  
Publishing within this context, More, Hooker, Nashe and Milton face an aesthetic and 
ethical crossroad as writers interested in producing texts that promote reform without 
overthrowing orthodoxy altogether. I argue that because certainty could no longer be located 
in dogma, these writers turn their attention to language and its potential to regulate the 
experience of reading. However, the subjectivity of reading practices caused these writers to 
reassess the capacity of language to communicate a normative ethics; in the process of doing 
so, they test the value of different literary modes for both reform and orthodoxy.  I argue that 
these writers deployed these modes in order to reconstitute the normative moral value 
threatened by the epistemic upheaval of the Reformation. Surprisingly, it is their engagement 
with skepticism rather than their denial of it that allows them to stabilize moral authority by 
generating didactic texts to replace dogma as a source of normative moral knowledge.  
Clearly, given the diversity of the writers covered in this dissertation—beginning with 
a doubtful Catholic and ending with a near Puritan—we will encounter vastly different 
definitions of normative moral value in the course of this dissertation.  But despite their 
differences, it remains crucial that all of these writers are struggling to reconstitute moral 
knowledge in the context of religious uncertainty.  Moreover, in all cases, these writers look 
to didacticism rather than dogma to invest their texts with moral authority. Normativity, then, 
aims at certainty that can be located not in dogma—for after the Reformation pluralizes 
9 
dogma, it can no longer be a guarantor of moral authority—but in human experience that is 
regulated by language. I am concerned here entirely with figures who are interested in 
establishing or reinforcing normative moral values related to a centralized, national church. 
These writers are often less interested in how theology or ecclesiology defines moral codes 
than they are in how to communicate and reinforce normative moral value. As Debora 
Shuger has argued, the writings of orthodox thinkers are often the sites of some of the most 
conflicted and heterogeneous thought, suggesting the inadequacy of polar categories such as 
orthodoxy and radicalism.14 These are not radical reformers, but they are reformers. 
Moreover, their reform has less to do with changing the nature of the church—indeed, in 
almost all cases, they believe the sovereignty of the church to be nonnegotiable—than with 
mentoring the individual’s moral identity within that church.  
The way these writers employ genre and literary modes in order to reconstitute moral 
value make their texts not moral philosophy, but moral philosophy in action. By this I mean 
two things. First, these texts represent a moral philosophy in the making as these writers 
attempt not to theorize, but to test out the limits of the relationship between normative moral 
value and language. The text then—and the subjective experience of reading these writers are 
so attuned to—becomes the meeting place of ethics and experience. In other words, the text 
is ethical because it is experiential.  Secondly, because these texts are normative, they are a 
pragmatic moral philosophy or a moral philosophy in execution in that—even as they express 
doubts and test boundaries—these writers are confident of the necessity of normative moral 
belief and behavior. The relationship between these two enterprises is dynamic in that it 
would seem that sometimes the testing reinforces normative value and sometimes it threatens 
                                                
14 See the introduction to Debora Shuger, Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and 
the Dominant Culture, rpt. ed. (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1997).  
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to undercut it altogether. By and large, this literature focuses not on theology or ecclesiology, 
though these writers sometimes use arguments about these elements of religion in order to 
recalibrate what Paul Cefalu has called “moral identity.” In other words, what we see in the 
figures considered in this dissertation is a kind of double consciousness—indeed, a kind of 
dueling consciousness.15 And I would argue that this duality only reflects the duality inherent 
in the Church of England itself, which staked a claim for its identity both on reformation and 
orthodoxy. In writing within a polemical and religious context these writers reinforce belief 
in orthodox religion, but at the same time, in writing about religion they are implicitly 
studying, in some cases in a nearly proto-disciplinary fashion, its limits and jurisdiction. 
This dissertation comes out of my interest in, yet ultimate dissatisfaction with, the 
work of intellectual historians like Richard Popkin. Popkin claims that “scepticism plays a 
special and different role in the period extending from the religious quarrels leading to the 
Reformation…due to the fact that the intellectual crisis brought on by the Reformation 
coincided with the discovery and revival of the arguments of the ancient Greek sceptics.”16  
Popkin’s argument for the revived interest in skepticism seems to some degree tautological. 
He explains that “the problem of justifying true knowledge does not arise as long as there is 
an unchallenged criterion. But in an epoch of intellectual revolution such as that under 
consideration here, the very raising of the problem can produce an insoluble crise 
pyrrhonienne,”17 which seems tantamount to saying that because philosophers and 
theologians of the sixteenth century were interested in skepticism, they were affected by 
                                                
15 In his biography of Shakespeare, Stephen Greenblatt suggests a similar kind of “double consciousness” to 
explain Shakespeare’s uncertain attitude towards Catholicism and Protestantism in many of his plays. See 
Greenblatt, Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004) 
102-103.  
 
16 Popkin xix-xx. 
 
17 Popkin 5.  
11 
skepticism. Popkin illustrates how Luther’s devaluing of religious authority echoed the 
Pyrrhonist problem of the criterion leading to an infinite regress of questioning, but he leaves 
unanswered the question of why Luther’s criticism became such a destabilizing force and 
such a compelling argument in the early sixteenth century.  Indeed, so compelling was the 
Lutheran case that the English church undertook a strategy of self-definition by way of 
contradistinction to Lutheran heresy and its various and unwieldy permutations, a strategy 
that it would reemploy throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In that way, 
orthodoxy becomes a kind of negative moral identity.  
 As he tries to strike a satisfactory balance between intellectual and cultural history, 
Popkin traces ideas in texts and follows their intellectual pathways, but other motivations for 
these ideas are largely ignored. When I began working on this dissertation, I was initially 
motivated by my interest in the transmission of Skeptic thought through translations, such as 
the partial Latin translation of John Wolley and the partial English translation of Ralegh. The 
pioneering works of Popkin, Charles Schmitt, and Luciano Floridi all suggest a rich history 
of manuscript translation, yet in a study of the effects of skepticism on the constitution of 
moral identity, following the fault lines of translation and transmission, while still important, 
to some degree misses the point.18 Our understanding of the exchange between Luther and 
Erasmus about whether or not the Holy Spirit should be categorized as a Skeptic really does 
not depend upon whether or not either one of them had read Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, Diogenes Laertius’s Life of Pyrrho, or Cicero’s Academica.  Ideas are not 
circumscribed by the mind; rather, their shape and power are determined not just by their 
                                                
18 Charles Schmitt, Cicero Skepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1972); Luciano Floridi, Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
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ideational commerce, but also by how, why, and in what context they are developed, used, 
and revised. 
Moreover, intellectual historians like Popkin have a penchant for classifying skeptic 
thought in the early modern period into overly neat categories. While Popkin’s breakdown of 
the skeptical tendencies of the period into the “the quest for faith—pure fideism—and the 
quest for reasonableness—or a ‘mitigated skepticism’” are certainly useful ways of thinking 
about skepticism, particularly from a pedagogical standpoint, they are also misleadingly 
limiting.19 A similar problem arises in the critical tendency to think about skepticism as a 
kind of early modern version of atheism, for example Don Cameron Allen’s dichotomy that 
divides early modern skeptics into “practical atheists, who lived intemperately and were 
careless of their salvation” who were more or less harmless “rogues” and “speculative 
atheists, who often lived decorous lives but who tested every religious notion and were, 
consequently, very much to be feared.”20   
Such classifications lead to an inaccurate picture of the significance of skepticism to 
early modern culture in at least three ways.  First, they do not adequately demarcate the very 
important differences between skeptic belief and skeptic methodology. In the case of 
                                                
19 Popkin 15. 
 
20 Don Cameron Allen, Doubt’s Boundless Sea: Skepticism and Faith in the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1964) 8. This tendency is apparent in many early studies touching early modern skepticism.  For 
other examples of the tendency to define skepticism in terms of classes of belief or to simply define it as the 
early modern version of atheism, see Ernest A. Strathmann’s taxonomy of Elizabethan atheism including but 
not limited to “religious skepticism, agnosticism, unitarianism, deism, and unethical conduct” (Sir Walter 
Raleigh: A Study in Elizabethan Skepticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951) 96); Geoffrey 
Aggeler’s dichotomy between “fideistic skeptics” and “freethinking atheists” in Nobler in the Mind: The Stoic-
Skeptic Dialectic in English Renaissance Tragedy (Newark and London: University of Delaware Press 1998) 
37.  Margaret Wiley does better in following Louis Bredvold’s sense that “skepticism in the seventeenth century 
cannot be appreciated as a historical force if it is narrowly defined as a philosophical system. It was protean in 
nature, as much a group of tendencies as a system” (Louis Bredvold, The Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden 
[Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1934] 16) quoted in The Subtle Knot: Creative Skepticism in 
Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952) 63. However, despite this 
flexibility, Wiley considers only the usual suspects of the seventeenth century and develops an intellectual 
history based on what she perceives to be lineages.  
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Montaigne, for example, form and content, methodology and belief, align relatively easily. 
But this does not account for someone like Thomas Nashe, for whom skeptical form 
frequently threatens to endanger his normative moral beliefs.  Skepticism, as a method as 
opposed to a belief, by its very nature is unwieldy in its openness to a variety of uses and 
interpretations.  This is particularly true in a world in which the boundaries between the 
normative and the non-normative are constantly being renegotiated, as they are amidst the 
religious turmoil in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England.   As a methodology, then, 
skeptical indeterminacy can prove a powerful ally to those interested in a more flexible 
normative moral value, as it can expand and contract to encompass and limit, to allow the 
religious liberty that is the hallmark of post-Reformation religious identity and to rein it in.   
Another problem with overly neat categories is that they tend to encourage the 
production of intellectual lineages. Margaret Wiley, for example, draws lineages such as 
Nicholas of Cusa begot Cornelius Agrippa, who (translated to English in 1568) begot Fulke 
Greville, and so on in her attempt to document the various philosophical reincarnations of 
skepticism.21  For her, English skepticism is a point in a process beginning in classical 
Greece extending at least into the Enlightenment, but also reaching as far as Existentialism.  
Her approach to skepticism identifies broad patterns but downplays important distinctions 
related to historical context and intentionality.   
A third and perhaps most important problem with such classifications is that they tend 
to highlight some of the most renowned skeptics of the period without giving much thought 
to what skepticism might mean for those writers we would never actually call skeptics or 
perhaps even skeptical. Richard Hooker and Thomas More, for example, are two writers 
                                                
21 Wiley 43-47. This is just one example of Wiley’s tendency to understand skepticism in terms of specific lines 
of influence. 
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whose works are very much concerned with whether or not there are any resources of faith 
that can lead to normative moral value outside of the church. More often than not, even 
though they are polemical, their works are not prescriptive; and even though their works are 
in some sense didactic, they are skeptical. The intellectual history of early modern England 
has suffered from this tendency in particular, as most studies of early modern skepticism 
either exclusively focus on the more famous Continental figures of the period or ignore 
skepticism in England until the middle of the seventeenth century when its presence become 
more palpable as a secular ethics emerges.22  
Taken together, these tendencies illustrate what Quentin Skinner has called the 
“mythology of doctrines” that encourages a dangerous kind of reductionism in the history of 
ideas.  If the concept of the “history of ideas” is a kind of equation, such mythology assumes 
the preeminent value of “ideas” over and above “history.” When ideas are studied at the 
expense of their context, it becomes relatively easy to produce intellectual lineages that stress 
anticipations and influences or closed and orderly intellectual systems that adhere to their 
own internal logic without exception.  But such coherent narratives often simply reflect the 
wishful thinking of the scholarly imagination and neglect a deeper engagement with authorial 
intention and historical context.23   
                                                
22 The exception to this is the considerable literature on skepticism in early modern English drama: William 
Hamlin’s Tragedy and Scepticism in Shakespeare’s England (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Stanley 
Cavell’s Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), Millicent Bell’s Shakespeare’s Tragic Skepticism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), Mathew R. 
Martin’s Between Theatre and Philosophy: Skepticism in the Major City Comedies of Ben Jonson and Thomas 
Middleton (Newark: Unviersity of Delaware Press, 2001), Michael Srigley’s The Probe of Doubt: Scepticism 
and Illusion in Shakespeare’s Plays (Uppsala: Uppsala State University,2000), Geoffrey Aggeler’s Nobler in 
the Mind: The Stoic-Skeptic Dialectic in English Renaissance Tragedy (1998), Graham Bradshaw’s 
Shakespeare’s Scepticism (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1987), and Sukanta Chaudhuri’s Infirm Glory: 
Shakespeare and the Renaissance Image of Man (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1981), William R. Elton’s 
King Lear and the Gods (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1966).  
 
23 On the “mythology of doctrines,” see Skinner, 59-67; on the “mythology of coherence,” see 67-72.  
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In looking at the importance of skepticism to normative moral value and to 
definitions of orthodoxy in early modern England, I have been tracing a kind of intellectual 
borderland—pace Popkin, not the lines of skepticism, but the outlines of skepticism.  By 
outlines of skepticism I mean not how skepticism is transmitted, but both how it exposed the 
epistemic limits and possibilities of the human mind and thereby elicited a kind of ethical 
response as well as how in this enterprise it is ultimately outlined or limited by that response.  
These writers represent an area of early modern intellectual consciousness where the 
concerns of orthodoxy and skepticism meet, and instead of destroying each other, they shape 
each other. Skepticism initiates these writers’ uncertainties about language, but it also helps 
them to address these same uncertainties.  
 
II. The Value of Uncertainty to the English Church 
 The English church of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was an institution in its 
adolescence that, from its very outset, capitalized on areas of moral vacuity.  Uncertainty was 
a powerful ally in the struggle to define Protestant religious identity, to strengthen the 
legitimacy of a national, reformed church, and to transmit normative moral value. Bernard 
Verkamp has shown the importance of the concept of adiaphora, things indifferent to 
salvation, to the definition of the sixteenth-century English church.24 Since adiaphora could 
be any practice or belief not prescribed by the Bible, the English church had the freedom to 
develop and revise moral value in the interest of a national unified religion. Though this 
strategy ended up being the English church’s undoing in the seventeenth century, in the 
                                                
24 Bernard J. Verkamp, The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554 (Athens, OH: 
Ohio University Press, 1977).  
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sixteenth century adiaphora allowed it to maneuver itself deftly around the threats of 
sectarianism and religious diversity more generally.  
Adiaphora is just one example of the ways in which uncertainty offered an unscripted 
moral space that could be used to direct religious belief and moral behavior. So too, looking 
largely at literary texts, Paul Cefalu highlights the tensions between early modern ethical 
theory and practice that arise from the uncertainty implicit in the doctrine of the Church of 
England. He views the English church’s search for normativity as a result of the inherent 
“murkiness” of important soteriological concepts like justification and sanctification.25  
Although by looking at literary texts as places that “test [the] working of salvation in 
practice” he is left with a much more “syncretistic” picture of early modern ethics than 
Popkin’s neater dichotomy of fideism and mitigated skepticism, it may be a picture that is 
also more textured, provocative, and illuminating.26 In many ways, Cefalu’s study, like Reid 
Barbour’s work on Caroline religious culture, is an ambitious reworking of the ways we 
think about early modern moral uncertainty.  Barbour’s study of the Caroline religious 
imagination expands the parameters of the subject of early modern moral philosophy by 
bringing all the players—literature, philosophy, and religion—to the table.  In his assessment 
of the influence of skepticism on the early modern calculus of moral value, he contends that 
“English Protestant orthodoxy certainly generated its own versions of dogmatism, but its 
main tendencies leaned toward the intensive, probing scrutiny of the matrix of religious 
experience.”27 Both Barbour and Cefalu echo Shuger’s sense that orthodoxy is an intellectual 
                                                
25 Paul Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 2.  
 
26 Cefalu 189. 
 
27 Reid Barbour, Literature and Religious Culture in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 1. 
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space filled with conflicts and contradictions that work to define the values and movement of 
early modern religious culture.  
In this dissertation, I trace a chronological arc that defines three points at which 
orthodoxy was challenged and revised: the period of the Reformation in England in the early 
sixteenth century, the challenge to the Elizabethan Settlement at the end of the sixteenth 
century, and the period leading up to the English Civil War. In the first two chapters I seek to 
contextualize what Richard Popkin has called the “crise pyrrhonienne” in the early fiction 
and polemical works of Thomas More. In the first chapter, I consider how More used the 
concept of equity in order to scrutinize and stabilize the relationship between reform and 
orthodoxy. Looking at the Utopia and the polemical exchanges between Martin Luther and 
Desiderius Erasmus, I examine how More’s interpretation of equity comes to define his 
preference for a skeptical, provisional method of reform over and above Lutheran notions of 
reform that rest on assertions of epistemic and moral certainty. Moreover, I show how More 
and Luther’s hermeneutics indicate their contrasting methods of reform, which become 
apparent in the ways they employ the mode of paradox for either didactic or dogmatic ends. 
Here we are introduced to a problem related to equity, the Stoic concept of the parities of 
good and evil. It is a point of moral uncertainty that preoccupies the minds of those interested 
in both harnessing and containing moral uncertainty, and one that haunts Protestant 
determinations of normative moral value in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We will 
have cause to revisit this moral uncertainty in slightly different forms in chapters three and 
five.  
In chapter two, I examine More’s appeals to fiction within his polemical works of the 
1520s, a crucial decade during which printed polemic emerged as a visible and powerful 
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representative of religious knowledge.  More responds to the uncertainty caused by this 
textualization of belief with a skepticism defined by his reliance on probability and the 
normative fictions that support orthodoxy. More’s uses of fiction—for example, the 
epistolary frames of his Responsio ad Lutherum—go hand in hand with his skepticism as 
they test the role of printed polemic in formations of religious belief. I read these frames, and 
the problematic relationship they narrate between printer, author, and reader, as an indication 
of More’s distrust of the printed text as a container for moral value. I also argue that More’s 
shift from traditional polemic in the Responsio at the beginning of the 1520s to fictional 
dialogue in the Dialogue Concerning Heresies at the end of that decade reflects a transitional 
period and More’s uncertainty about whether didactic fiction may be more effective than 
dogmatic polemic for fighting the threat of heresy.   
In chapter three, I turn from the birth of the English church to its adolescence in the 
late sixteenth century and Richard Hooker’s struggle to steer between the Church’s orthodox 
and reformed identities in his Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. Though often read by modern 
critics as a dogmatic assertion of Elizabethan orthodoxy, in this chapter I take seriously the 
accusation by Hooker’s adversaries that the Lawes contained “speculative doctrine” that 
sought to make “all religions equal.”  I argue that this accusation of skepticism is linked to 
Hooker’s preference for a reform and orthodoxy that privileges a language and method of 
edification over codification. Unlike Thomas Cartwright and others who sought to define the 
Elizabethan church by contrariety—that is, polemically and in direct opposition to the 
Church of Rome—Hooker proffers a more rationalist strategy for reform that emphasizes the 
importance of doubt. For him, orthodoxy relies upon the relationship between reason and the 
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senses, the relativity of custom, and a taxonomy of moral certainty.  In his view, conformity 
to orthodoxy is not a dogmatic position but a dynamic means of reform. 
In chapter four I examine some of the moral pamphlets of the 1580s and 90s that were 
inspired by a Calvinist hermeneutic that interpreted preternatural phenomena as an index of 
divine providence. Skeptical of the moral efficacy of language, Thomas Nashe challenges the 
validity of the analogical thinking that Calvinist interpretations of nature and many of these 
moral pamphlets depended upon. Looking specifically at his consideration of preternatural 
phenomena in Christ’s Teares over Jerusalem, I argue that Nashe mediates between his 
skepticism about analogical thinking and his commitment to decorum and moral reform. 
While at times skepticism guides Nashe’s own sense of hermeneutics, at other times it 
threatens to undermine his hope of moral reform.  
In the final chapter, as I move from the definition of English Protestant orthodoxy to 
the site of its ultimate breakdown, I consider a single but crucial point of linguistic failure.  I 
examine how the concept of adiaphora, or things indifferent to salvation—a concept whose 
moral neutrality once allowed the English Church to define its orthodoxy—became a much 
contested topic on the eve of the English Civil War. Because of its moral indeterminacy, 
adiaphora was deployed by both royalists and parliamentarians to defend religious dogma 
and liberty respectively, making it anything but the morally neutral category it was purported 
to be. In response to this increasingly dogmatic category of moral knowledge, a young John 
Milton at the very beginnings of his polemical career offers an alternative guide to reform 
and orthodoxy: satire. I argue that Milton replaces adiaphora and the artificial, dogmatic 
moral value that offered conformity and peace at the expense of the liberty of individual 
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conscience with a non-dogmatic satire that allowed both for religious liberty and normative 
moral value.  
Examining writers that fall outside the boundaries of Popkin's notions of early 
modern skepticism, this dissertation offers a fuller account of the history of skepticism and 
reveals how this philosophy influenced literary strategies. These case studies also enable 
larger discussions of the relationship between epistemology and ethics in the early modern 
period in England and the ways in which formulations of ethical values constitute attempts to 
respond to epistemic growth and to compensate for epistemic limitation. I am not a historian, 
and this dissertation does not claim to be writing even the beginnings of the history of 
English skepticism. I am more interested in exploring how skepticism as a methodology 
influenced notions of normative moral value and religious knowledge in early modern 
England. To a large degree this dissertation falls between disciplinary cracks, and that has 
been intentional because, like Skinner, I would emphasize the value of incoherence in 
intellectual history as much as coherence. At various points in my study of ethics and 
epistemology, I have found it important to take into account social history, the histories of 
science, medicine, philosophy and law, religious studies, classics, and of course, literary 
criticism and analysis. I have invested in all of these fields because it is precisely at the 
boundaries of disciplines—both in early modern texts and our studies of them—the places 
where disciplinary methodologies and discourses overlap and compete, that the moral and 
epistemic values and vexations of a culture become most apparent.  
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE “CRISE PYRRHONIENNE” AND EARLY TUDOR DETERMINATIONS OF 
NORMATIVE MORAL VALUE 
 
I.  Equity and the Problem of the Criterion  
 In his foundational chapter on the “intellectual crisis of the Reformation” that begins 
The History of Scepticism, Richard Popkin notes that “the problem of justifying a standard of 
true knowledge does not arise as long as there is an unchallenged criterion. But in an epoch 
of intellectual revolution [such as the Reformation]…the very raising of the problem can 
produce an insoluble crise pyrrhonienne.”  Once a criterion of judgment is challenged, as the 
Roman Catholic Church was challenged by Martin Luther, evidence for orthodoxy or 
normativity loses all value because it no longer has an authority to substantiate it.28  The 
implications of the Lutheran redefinition of a criterion from a normative to a subjective one, 
Popkin suggests, changed the intellectual landscape of early modern Europe. I would argue 
that this decentering of moral authority was doubly felt in England, in particular by those 
interested in both orthodoxy and reform.  Initially in the early 1520s the English church was 
given the task of defining itself in response to Luther’s attempts to undercut a normative 
criterion of judgment.  As it broke away from Rome and evolved into a reformed and 
independent church itself, it had to defend its own moral and religious existence and recreate 
the normative criterion it had just discarded itself. This struggle to reconstitute, justify, and 
                                                
28 Popkin 5.  
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enforce a normative criterion of moral value and religious knowledge was to become the 
legacy and the burden of the English Church for the duration of the sixteenth century.    
The work of Thomas More is one of the first examples of the Tudor response to this 
“crise pyrrhonienne” in England.  More is a particularly complex example because of his 
competing moral identities as a humanist and a polemicist whose considerable intellectual 
and rhetorical talents were appropriated by Henry VIII to defend the Church of England 
against Lutheran heresy in the 1520s. As a humanist, More was called upon to write fiction 
and to theorize reform, while as a defender of the Church, he was compelled to write 
religious polemic and reconstitute normative moral value.  Over the course of the next two 
chapters, we will see that More never fully sacrifices either one of these roles to the other and 
that there is a constant tension in his work between his interests in reforming and 
reconstituting moral value.   
In the next chapter we will turn to More’s evaluation of fiction, polemic, and the 
evidence for belief in the context of a newly emerging culture of printed polemical literature. 
In this chapter we will focus on the importance of the unstable moral category of equity to 
More’s notion of reform beginning with his humanistic engagement with the term using the 
genre of fiction and the literary mode of paradox in the Utopia.   Equity is an important focal 
point for our discussion because it becomes the cornerstone for the debate over the right 
method of reform—indeed, the very possibility of reform—among More, Luther, and 
Erasmus in the 1520s. I will argue that equity reveals the value of uncertainty to 
determinations of normative moral value and religious knowledge in the context of the 
proliferation of dogma occasioned by the Reformation. As reformers within the Church of 
England often walked the line between reforming and stabilizing religious and moral value, 
23 
the moral uncertainty of equity and its ability to shore up or undermine moral value provides 
a logic behind many strategies important to the reform agendas of the English Church in the 
sixteenth century such as things indifferent and the decorum of religious rhetoric and 
epistemology.  The instability within equity derives from the fact that it is premised upon a 
recognition of the limitations of human moral knowledge.  But at the same time, equity 
negotiates the value of human experience and judgment in a way that manages the dangers of 
a more radical skepticism that dismisses the possibility of a criterion of judgment altogether.  
The question of equity—how to interpret it, how to determine its value, and how it 
transforms the relationship between human and divine law—is, to put it mildly, one of 
utmost importance for early modern determinations of normative moral value.29  A legal and 
philosophical term in its origin, equity often acts as a guide to formulate provisional 
standards of judgment when no clear criterion of truth exists. But competing interpretations 
of equity in the early sixteenth century made the nature of that provisional standard complex 
and controversial. Part of equity’s instability is inherent in the very different definitions we 
find in Roman and Greek philosophy; both of these definitions made their presence felt in the 
law courts of the sixteenth century as well as in the religious climate of the Reformation. 
Though in his recent study of the early modern “culture of equity” Mark Fortier is right to 
underline its pervasiveness across the cultural spectrum, it was by no means undisputed, and 
it was not easily assimilated into all areas of Renaissance thought.30  For reasons that shall 
become apparent, equity was much less contentious in legal categories than it was in the 
realm of religion and religious discourse; this is particularly true during the Reformation 
                                                
29 Mark Fortier, The Culture of Equity in Early Modern England (Ashgate: Burlington, VT, 2005) 2.  
 
30 Fortier 1-2. 
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when the question of equity became important for the reconstitution of a criterion of moral 
judgment.   
The linguistic roots of the term “equity” go far towards providing an explanation for 
the uncertainty surrounding it. In the Hebrew Bible, the word for equity is mesarim, which is 
defined by one Renaissance writer as both “mishor, uprightness, or streightnesse” and 
“plainness or an equal, even, and plain place.”31  But in the Old Testament, the term has no 
fixed meaning.32 Perhaps even more influential in the dispute over the nature of equity in the 
Renaissance is the significant difference between the Greek and Latin roots of the term.  The 
Greek root epieikeia implies “appropriateness, pliancy, exceptionality, justice, kindness, 
leniency,” while the Latin root aequitas implies “evenness, equality, sameness, justice and 
fairness.”33 Hence, depending on whether one preferred the Greek or Roman formulation of 
equity, the concept potentially could have normative or non-normative value.  
In law, equity could urge the right application of the law, or it could be advocated as a 
kind of law superior or even antithetical to positive law. According to Aristotle, the terms 
“just” and “equitable” belong to the same genus, but the equitable is superior because it is a 
modification of legal justice; it bends the law, which is universal, to fit individual cases.34  
Equity is just, but it is not justice; instead, it is “a correction of law where it is defective 
                                                
31 The quotation is taken from William Robertson’s Key to the Hebrew Bible (London, 1656) (cited in Fortier 
31). Religious equity is specifically linked to “mishor,” which is defined as “rectitude” by Edward Pockocke 
(Commentary on the Prophecy of Malachi [Oxford, 1677] 26).  
 
32Looking at sixteenth-century translations of the Psalms, Fortier has noted a “general unfixedness” in uses of 
the term (35). 
 
33 Fortier 3; Arnaldo Biscardi, “On Aequitas and Epieikeia,” Aequitas and Equity: Equity in Civil Law and 
Mixed Jurisdictions, ed. Alfredo Mordechai Rabello (Jerusalem: Hamaccabi Press, 1997) 7.  
 
34 Biscardi 4.  
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owing to its universality.”35  But in replacing or amending the injustice of the law’s blind 
universality, equity creates many problems for the stability of moral law.  Because equity 
cannot oppose goodness, it licenses a variety of moral options: “it seems strange if the 
equitable, being something different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for either the just or 
the equitable is not good, if they are different; or, if both are good, they are the same…they 
are all in a sense correct and not opposed to one another.”36  But Aristotle quickly qualifies 
this lack of distinction, arguing that the equitable, “though it is better than one kind of justice, 
yet is just, and it is not as being a different class of thing that it is better than the just. The 
same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior. 
What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but a correction 
of legal justice.”37   
In practice, the principle of equity diversifies to house gradations within fixed moral 
categories—levels of goodness are encompassed by an abstract principle of good without 
ever becoming the good itself. A new ideal necessarily develops in place of an unattainable 
one to prevent the stasis of skepticism and to allow for a judgment to take place that can be 
held right only insofar as it attains the replacement that stands in for the universal right. In 
the Aristotelian view, then, equity represents a standard of good that is meant to compensate 
for human moral and epistemological limitations.   
In Roman law, equity has the potential for similar, problematic moral implications.  
Its two roots, aequus and aequitas, evoke the idea of a level field, which allow for an 
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understanding of equity as both essence of the law and the antithesis to positive law.38  For 
Cicero equity indicates the right application of positive law rather than the necessity of 
developing a law superior to it, and in one instance he defines equity as “equal laws in equal 
cases.”39   Considered by some to be the founder of the term aequitas, Cicero reversed “the 
traditional Roman formulation respecting justice, bonum et aequum,” replacing goodness 
with equality.40  Cicero tended to downplay the “defective nature of law” preferring instead 
to focus on the “strict and rigid…nature” of the law.41  Though Cicero’s views of equity can 
be hard to pin down precisely, in this instance at least he does provide a contrast to the 
Aristotelian view of equity.   
In other words, while in the Roman sense equity can be understood either as “the 
substance and intrinsic justification of the existing legal norms,” in the Greek sense it is “an 
objective ideal to which the law aims, determining the creation of new norms and the 
modification of those that do not yet conform to the sense of justice felt in the social 
conscience.”42  These two versions of equity were inherited by lawyers and theologians in the 
sixteenth century, and both versions of this concept had specific implications for the reform 
and reconstitution of moral value.  In the Aristotelian view, equity would seem to demand 
increased vigilance of judgment—it requires one not to follow the law, but to diversify the 
law’s universality by applying it with circumstances taken into account.  Such a view 
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39 Cicero, Topica, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) IV.23.  
 
40 Andrew Majeske, Equity in English Renaissance Literature: Thomas More and Edmund Spenser (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) 19.   
 
41 Majeske 19.  
 
42 This latter point is linked to an idea important to More’s Utopia—that in some circumstances the greatest 
justice may be the greatest injury (Biscardi 8).  
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admitted hope for the perfection of the law while recognizing the imperfection of existing 
law.  But in the Roman view equity equalizes crimes, which to many—including More and 
Erasmus—suggested a lack of discretion leading inevitably to human error.  The 
interpretation of equity betokened different approaches to man’s rationality as well as the 
problem of how to create moral value that responded to human epistemic limitation by 
promoting an approximate, not arbitrary, justice.  
In practice in the sixteenth century, both interpretations of equity could lead to 
skepticism, for both the Aristotelian and the Roman definitions of equity invested 
considerable moral value in circumstance. Yet the variability of circumstance ultimately 
produces the notion of custom, which undermines the sense that a single normative moral 
law could exist. In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus describes the tenth mode 
that leads Skeptics to a suspension of judgment. This mode is “mainly concerned with Ethics, 
being based on rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic 
conceptions.”43 Sextus records how these different ethical codes can be juxtaposed against 
each other; for example, law and custom can come into conflict, which calls the moral value 
of both of them into question.  So too, the same concept can work against itself when the 
laws or habits of one nation are shown to be remarkably different from those of another. 
Diogenes Laertius paraphrases Sextus’s discussion of law in the tenth mode by describing it 
as a mode that is “derived from customs” and “laws” and noting that “the same thing [can be] 
regarded by some as just and by others as unjust, or as good by some and bad by others.”44  
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44 Diogenes describes it as the fifth mode, rather than the tenth mode like Sextus (Diogenes Laertius, “Life of 
Pyrrho,” Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1995] IX.83-86).  
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Because it could be linked to custom and opinion, at best the principle of equity could only 
be a provisional criterion of moral judgment.  
More was concerned with equity as a means of reform for most of his career. It is a 
prominent concept in his early work Utopia, as it is in his later critique of Luther, and in the 
culmination of his public career as the Lord Chancellor of England, a post he took up in 
1529. According to one of More’s earliest biographers Thomas Stapleton, the chancellor’s 
position was “supreme” with “no appeal from it…allowed, not even to the King himself.” As 
Chancellor, More gave “judgment not so much according to statute law as according to 
natural justice and equity.”45 In his study of More’s public career, J.A. Guy has noted the 
important shifts in early modern legal culture reflected in the development of the court of 
Chancery and the Star Chamber. These courts had expanded their jurisdiction under Henry 
VI, Edward IV, and Richard III to become “flexible courts which responded swiftly to 
changing patterns of public need,” which made the other courts in England seem archaic and 
obsolete by comparison.46 The result of these new courts was the redrawing of jurisdictional 
boundaries.47   
For some, including More, equity was considered a judgment that reflected a sense of 
wisdom and mercy that was superior to the common law.  In his influential legal text Doctor 
and Student, More’s rival Christopher St. Germain defines equity as “a right wiseness that 
considereth all the particular circumstances of the deed, the which is also tempered with the 
sweetness of mercy.”48  Revising the Aristotelian concept of epieikeia for a Christian legal 
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culture, Germain defines equity as “an exception of the law of God, or the law of reason, 
from the general rules of the law of men, when they by reason of their generality, would in 
any particular case judge against the law of God or the law of reason…and so it appeareth, 
that equity taketh away not the very right, but only that that seemeth to be right by the 
general words of the law.”49 As it demands that justice be determined in the light of 
circumstance, and as it exposes the disjunction between the appearance and reality of justice, 
it is the place where the law of men comes in conflict with the law of reason and the law of 
God.  Equity sought to remedy the common law, which “had become settled in an age of 
force rather than of cunning…was conspicuously underdeveloped by 1529 in respect of 
fraud, perjury, [and] the rules of evidence.”50   
Chancellors prior to Thomas More, including Wolsey and Morton, had worked to 
increase the influence of equity in the legal system of England.51  The number of litigants 
coming to the Star Chamber and the Court of Chancery rose under Wolsey because “his 
ministerial policy had aimed first at strict and impartial enforcement of existing law upon all 
the king’s subjects, irrespective of social status and private power.”52  But More recognized 
the special role of judges and the opportunity they had to make law accord with conscience 
and reason. Hoping for a “marriage between equity and common law”—if not the overthrow 
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of the latter by the former—he argued that judges were to follow their consciences.53  More 
“applied rigorously the traditional Chancery procedures of surety, security and scrutiny, 
cultivating in the process a distinctive policy of self-involvement, scrupulousness and 
discretion.” Such an application helped “to rejuvenate the ancient theory that judges had a 
personal duty in conscience to see right done by all whose business was entertained in the 
courts they directed.”54 Pursuing a pragmatic rather than an idealist approach to legal reform, 
“More began instead to rationalize and extend the partnership between Chancery and 
common law which had distinguished Wolsey’s term of office.” However, More’s attempt at 
collaboration caused considerable conflict with “professional lawyers” when he began using 
“injunctions [to restrain] litigation at common law.”55  In his own defense More claimed that 
“injunctions would be unnecessary if the common-law judges would ‘upon reasonable 
considerations… mitigate and reform the rigour of the law themselves.’”56  
But despite his interest in increasing the role of equity in the law, More was wary of 
too much flexibility in the law.  Even prior to his work as Chancellor, More had recognized 
the critical need for a distinction between an equity based on rational principles and one 
based on arbitrary opinion.57  Although More was criticized for requiring justices to mitigate 
the rigor of the law when necessary under the threat of injunctions, he did so because he 
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equated the rigor of law with injustice. However, according to More “this rigor does not 
reside primarily in the law’s formal or general character as rule,” and so consequently the 
law’s “reformation…does not consist of introducing a certain flexibility in its application.”58  
Even though More continued the judicial reforms that Wolsey had begun, his attitude 
towards equity was different from Wolsey’s.  More hoped to mitigate the rigor of the law, but 
he did not intend to undercut or call into question its force.  More had a “strict attitude” that 
“gave substance to the concept of finality in equitable decrees,” whereas “Wolsey had often 
been tentative, sometimes even resolute, hoping that parties would agree to settle their 
differences in a spirit of fair compromise.” Quite opposite from Wolsey, More “favoured the 
severity of common-law theory of the ‘final’ end, an approach which was attractive to 
plaintiffs seeking restraint of obstructive defendants.”59 
Even though proponents of equity hoped that its increased role in the judicial system 
could make the law more accurate and fair, because it admitted competing jurisdictions it 
also introduced a kind of chaos into the legal system in that it seemed to open the door for a 
new questioning of legal judgment.  One problem with the expansion of jurisdiction of the 
court of Chancery was the creation of overlapping jurisdictions which litigants could use to 
their advantage. The expansion of Chancery’s jurisdiction was a prescription for legal 
pandemonium in that it created a moral space in which many judgments could take place 
without any judgment being final. Moreover, the complexity of the judiciary system may 
have been a response to the “increasingly sophisticated” criminal culture of that period.60  
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With this development came a new challenge to the legal system, namely a “new-style 
litigant, bent less upon asserting a right than not forgoing an advantage, less on winning than 
not losing in court, and always questing for another court in which to continue battle with his 
adversaries.”61   
Nevertheless, even though equity was intended to allow the legal system to keep up 
with new kinds of criminals, in some ways equity threatened to weaken the judicial system 
by its potential for arbitrariness and its admission of multiple jurisdictions. In the absence of 
a final decision-making criterion, the English legal system inadvertently became much more 
provisional.  These “unregulated competitions” which arose “between parallel jurisdictions 
raised, as it seemed, a truly awful prospect of perpetual litigation, especially in real property 
suits.”62  St. Germain, in particular, defined the problem with the court of Chancery as an 
“element of overlap which would introduce uncertainty into the legal system.”  Like More, 
St. Germain was wary of the implications of the increased powers of Chancery. “Whatever 
[the court of Chancery and the Star Chamber] were allowed to do,” he contended, they “must 
never be permitted to rock the foundations of common law, whatever the equities of 
individual cases or however indefensible in conscience the maxims of law were as rational 
principles.”63  Equity provided the hope of a more rational law even as it threatened to call 
into question the very rationality of law.  
Equity addresses the uncertainty of moral reforms because it acts as a kind of 
provisional moral code in the absence of a more stable one, and it emerged as a force in 
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English law with a new cogency in the early sixteenth century, just as the increasingly 
pervasive Lutheran heresy demanded a revised standard of evidence for religious belief.   
These competing notions of equity were important in the early sixteenth century because, as 
we will see in the pre-Reformation writings of More, Erasmus, and Luther, equity has a 
complex relationship to skepticism, the constitution of normative moral value, and the nature 
of individual reform.  In the hands of Luther and More, equity is made to serve two 
masters—both a pragmatic or skeptical and a dogmatic or idealistic reform agenda.  Luther’s 
interpretation of equity translates into the possibility of a dramatic and instantaneous reform 
that allows for the epistemological and ethical purity that defined his true Church. Luther’s 
demand for perfection is evident in his attitude toward language and the style of his 
polemical works in his debate with More and Erasmus between 1521 and 1526.  In More’s 
view, equity could indicate a choice between evils—in other words, the choice of an 
imperfect good. But as Aristotle indicates, an imperfect good may be just, but it is not justice.  
For More, equity offers the possibility of effecting reform without undermining the 
normative standards of judgment; it allows for a gradual program of reform that hinges on a 
more generous view of a polemical language that seeks to accommodate human faults while 
moral progress takes place. Ultimately, More sees a fair and expedient trade off between 
epistemic uncertainty and moral and religious stability.  Because of their different 
interpretations of equity, both More and Luther agreed on the nature of their opponent: both 
accused each other of unnecessarily introducing doubt into moral value and religious 
knowledge.  
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II. Equity, the Third Stoic Paradox, and the Language of Reform in Utopia 
Though Thomas More was not directly involved in the practice of equity until 1529 
when he assumed the post of chancellor after Wolsey’s demise, the concept was central to 
More’s understanding of normative moral value and orthodoxy as early as Utopia (1518), 
where it receives prominent treatment.  As we shall see, More’s somewhat playful, humanist 
dialectic of equity in the Utopia gives way in the 1520s in his Responsio ad Lutherum (1523) 
to a more serious, polemical engagement with the concept and the problems it poses to the 
constitution of normative moral value in the face of religious reform.   
Utopia is a text that confronts, first and foremost, the need to balance a mixed, 
pragmatic good with a more abstract, idealistic principle of good.64  It is a text that opens up 
questions that plagued More his entire life, but no more so than in the 1520s, when he was 
forced to balance in practice his humanist interest in reform with his belief in normative 
religious and civil codes.65  Raphael Hythloday represents More’s idealist, and it is with 
perhaps an eerie prescience that More created a character who in some ways sounds very 
similar to the Martin Luther that will be the nemesis of stable moral value in the following 
decade.  However, even as certain utopian aspects of Raphael’s attitudes towards reform, 
such as his strict dichotomy between categories of good and evil, seem to forecast Luther’s 
views, in the Responsio ad Lutherum, More will go so far as to use many of Raphael’s 
arguments against Luther. In his own views of reform that he will advocate actively in the 
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1520s, More will both accept and reject aspects of Raphael’s reformist attitudes. In this way 
Utopia examines not simply the customs of a place but a whole methodology.   
For Raphael the liabilities of equity are manifest in the structure of the courts and in 
the philosophy of law in England.  In his examination of questions of conscience that are 
experienced on a day to day basis by both England’s lower class and its ruling class, Raphael 
confirms the existence of a “new-style litigant” who endangers the moral certainty and 
efficacy of Tudor criminal law.  But according to Raphael, the increased complexity of the 
criminal landscape is in fact caused by the law itself. In book 1 of Utopia, Raphael contrasts 
the policy of the Utopians and the limits they put on legislation with “the many nations 
elsewhere ever making ordinances and yet never one of them achieving good order—nations 
where whatever a man has acquired he calls his own private property, but where all these 
laws daily framed are not enough for a man to secure or to defend or even to distinguish from 
someone else’s the goods which each in turn calls his own, a predicament readily attested by 
the numberless and even new and interminable lawsuits.”66  Far from recognizing the 
reforming capabilities of the English court of Chancery, Raphael sees a system that creates 
not justice but social and moral chaos.  
Equity appears in book 1 of Utopia in two critical places: in Raphael’s critique of 
England’s justice system and in his critique of the court culture of the early sixteenth century.  
In both of these contexts, the character of “More” offers Raphael an equity that is defined as 
an imperfect justice—an equity of the lesser of two evils.  But equity appears in a third 
crucial place, this time in book 2, where Raphael discusses Utopian law.  Looking at the 
criticisms of equity in books 1 and 2 offered by Raphael, we find the absolutism of Raphael’s 
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idealism is often at odds with his understanding of the function of true law, which is based on 
humanist principles of education.  More importantly, in More’s view Raphael’s methods of 
undertaking reform are compromised by this absolutism.  
Raphael’s bold criticisms of the injustices within the social and legal culture of 
England serves as a call to legal reform. According to Raphael, law should not simply uphold 
an abstract principle of justice, but should work actively to reform the individual. England’s 
social system has produced involuntary criminals, and capital punishment has been 
ineffective despite—indeed, because of—its severity. Raphael condemns what he terms 
England’s “Stoical ordinances [that] count all offenses equal so that there is no difference 
between killing a man and robbing him of a coin when, if equity has any meaning, there is no 
similarity or connection between the two cases.”67  Raphael argues that, as it stands, the 
English justify punishment as payment for breaking the law. But because penal law addresses 
neither the intention of the thief nor the consequence of the act of theft, the penalty for theft 
neither attempts to reform the individual nor does it work for the common good.  It is a law 
based on philosophical principle, rather than practical ethics. 
Raphael alludes both to the rigid dogma characteristic of the Stoics generally, and to 
the third of the six paradoxes that make up Cicero’s Paradoxa stoicorum specifically. This 
Stoic paradox, which posits the equality of all virtues and vices, is fundamental to the 
skepticism that influences Protestant determinations of moral value. Despite its alliance with 
Stoic dogmatism, in the context of the Reformation it is viewed as a principle that undercuts 
the value of moral judgment based in reason.   
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First printed in 1465, the Paradoxa stoicorum was one of the earliest printed texts and 
the most frequently printed of Cicero’s works in the sixteenth century.68  There has been little 
to no consensus on whether or not Cicero’s stoic paradoxes were meant to be read as a 
serious exposition of Stoic philosophy or whether they were simply a display of rhetorical 
skill. 69  Within the sixteenth century, the text was praised for its value as an example of 
superior rhetoric while it was also read as moral philosophy. The presence of the third 
paradox in the writings of More, Luther, and Erasmus amidst very heated debates about the 
right method of reform would seem to demand that we take philosophical worth of at least 
the third paradox very seriously indeed.  
Critics who have examined this work, even in passing, tend to overlook the problem 
that the third stoic paradox poses to normative moral value in early modern culture.  
Elizabeth McCutcheon has argued for the influence of the Paradoxa on Utopia as well as the 
complex relationship between the Paradoxa and its famous counterpart with which it was 
nearly always printed, De officiis.70  In particular she notes the stylistic affinities between the 
texts, characterizing More’s Utopia as a “mercurial work, at once comic and serious, 
entertaining and engaged, addressing serious moral issues, albeit not always in a wholly 
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serious way, and daringly using moral paradoxes.”71  But in her interpretation of More’s use 
of the Paradoxa’s content, McCutcheon’s analysis is less precise.  In McCutcheon’s view, 
More “literalizes what are only tropes in Cicero,” making “Hythlodaeus reassembl[e] the 
moral commonplaces of Western thought and belief, already paradoxes insofar as they 
challenge the ordinary view of things and the way that human beings live, and reanimate[e] 
them by distancing himself, his immediate audience, and us from the actual world, showing 
us ourselves in a new light.”72  McCutcheon is right to recognize that many of the six 
paradoxes included in Cicero’s text would have been unquestioningly permitted by the 
religious culture of the early sixteenth century. The first two paradoxes, for example—the 
idea that only what is morally noble is good, or that virtue is sufficient for happiness—found 
an easy reception into mainstream Christian doctrine. McCutcheon’s argument falters, 
though, when it comes to the third paradox, which is by no means a moral commonplace of 
Christian thought.  
So too, Rosalie Colie has remarked that in defending the stoic paradoxes Cicero 
“appear[s] to be defen[ding]…the obvious.”73  This may be true for the other five paradoxes, 
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but I would argue that the leveling of virtue and vice could hardly have been an obvious truth 
in the religious culture of sixteenth-century England.  It was the moral rigor embodied in this 
very paradox that caused later Stoics to modify their ethical system and to develop a more 
“palatable” version of ethics by introducing the category of adiaphora, or things 
indifferent74—a moral category that would become a focal point of the debate over religious 
reform in England in both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
The first English translation of the Paradoxa did not occur until 1534, and it reflects 
the embarrassment with which Renaissance philosophers and theologians must have viewed 
this paradox.  The third paradox is anomalous in itself in that it is the only one of the six 
which originally does not seem to have been given a Greek subtitle at all. Moreover, when a 
Greek subtitle finally did appear for the third paradox, it was the one most often manipulated 
by translators, often mistranslated or left without a translation altogether.75  But what is even 
more striking is that its first English translator Robert Whittington thought it fit to omit the 
third paradox without warning or comment on this omission to the reader.76  
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Though it takes us a bit far afield from the early sixteenth century, it is worth noting 
briefly that the text’s second English translator, Thomas Newton, provides another instance 
in which we can detect the discomfort caused by the version of equity offered in this paradox 
in the sixteenth century.  Newton’s text was published twice, once in 1569 and once in 1577, 
and although he does include the third paradox in both editions, he sets it apart from the other 
paradoxes.  To appreciate the distinction, I will list the paradoxes as Newton writes them:  
The first conclusion or Paradoxe, wherein is proved that nothinge is good and 
laudable but only that which is honeste and virtuous. 
 
The second Paradoxe, wherein is deciphered that in whomsoever virtue is, there 
lacketh nothing els to bring him to lead an happy life.  
 
The third Paradoxe wherein according to the opinion of the Stoikes, he proveth all 
faultes to bee equall.  
 
The fourth Paradoxe, wherein is proved that all fooles and brainsickes persons be 
distraught and alienated from their right mindes: covertly meaning Clodius, and by 
him all others of like maners and conditions.  
  
The fift Paradoxe, wherein he invaigheth against the insolencye and voluptuous 
lyving of Marcus Antonius, and proveth all wise men to be free, and all fooles to be 
Slaves and bondemen.  
 
The syxt and laste paradoxe, wherein he proveth that noone are ryche, but onelye 
wyse and virtuous men, privaylye nippynge Crassus whoe sayde that none was to be 
named rich, unlesse wiyth his revenues he were able to furnishe and mayntaine an 
armye.77  
 
Although it is true that in the Latin text the term paradox was often translated from the Greek 
paradoxon as admirabilia or opinionatum, of the six paradoxes, the third is the only one in 
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which Newton explicitly—and I would argue purposefully—introduces the term “opinion.”78  
It is only in this subtitle that Newton states, as if for emphasis—or justification—that Cicero 
proves this text “according to the opinion of the Stoikes.”79 Newton seems eager to reassure 
the reader that what Cicero, and he, are translating in this paradox is not their own 
conclusion. Newton repeats this distinction in the second edition, adding a marginal comment 
at the beginning of the text: “The Stoickes doe not consider and respecte what is done, but 
with what minde and entent it is done.”80 Aside from the fact that this marginal comment 
seems superfluous since it repeats the subtitle, it is the only marginal comment which 
particularly mentions and attributes an idea to the Stoics themselves, rather than to Cicero.  
From the oddities surrounding the first English translations of this text, it seems likely that 
Renaissance thinkers were troubled by this paradox and its problematic implications for 
moral authority. 
In addition to the awkwardness with which early modern commentators and 
translators handled this paradox, we can add Cicero’s own ambiguous treatment of the 
paradox to its interpretive difficulties.  While Cicero’s stance on the paradox is less than 
clear, what is apparent is that he makes important modifications in his discussion of the 
paradox that seem to bring into play both Greek and Roman versions of equity. The basic 
argument of the third stoic paradox as it is found in Cicero’s text is that vice should be 
measured by the intent of the perpetrator and not by a crime itself or by the consequences of 
a crime. Cicero’s argument for the third paradox presents three primary cases in which vices 
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are leveled.  In the first case he argues that a sailor is equally unskilled if he sinks a ship full 
of wheat or one full of gold.  He then proceeds to argue that there is no difference between a 
man’s act of adultery with a poor young woman or a well respected woman.  In the final case 
he argues that killing a slave is the same as killing one’s father.  Comparing these categories 
of vice—imprudence, lust, and murder—these examples get increasingly complex and 
problematic because Cicero adds on what would seem to be significant qualifications. 
Clearly, the moral obligation due to gold is different from that owed to one’s father. 
Although Cicero levels degrees of vice, whether or not he means to level categories of vice is 
unclear.  Cicero himself challenges the equality of virtues and vices on exactly this point in 
De finibus bonorum et malorum where he notes the faulty analogy between the unskillfulness 
of a sailor with a crime as severe as murder. While the nature of the object that is offended is 
unimportant in navigation, it is of the utmost importance in conduct.81  Though not stated 
explicitly in Cicero’s text, the Stoics did not hold that an adulterer would necessarily become 
a murderer, though it was certainly possible.82  Instead, they believed that every form of vice 
is contained within every single person—except of course for the mythical wise man—but 
some vices are more pronounced than others.  
Renaissance commentators who discuss the text argue that all sins are equal because 
all sins arise from mental perturbations, and therefore the motivating force of the sin, the 
passions, are the same for different sins. In general, writers who are not openly hostile to this 
paradox stress that the equality between sins exists within a category of sin, but not between 
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two different kinds of sins.83  The example of the parricide and the murder of a slave is 
particularly problematic because it begs the question of whether perturbations alter with 
persons.  In some circumstances, one commentator argues, it will be lawful to kill one’s 
father even though the death of a father is different from the death of a slave because there 
are more laws regulating the relationship between father and son than the relationship 
between a man and his slave.  Such a crime is permissible because in some instances, when 
one’s motive is good, “it is better to let go of custom than to live disgracefully.”84   
Given the ambiguities and anomalies in the translation history of this paradox, it is 
not surprising that the ethical challenges presented by this paradox were not lost on lawyers 
and theologians who influenced legal and religious thought in the sixteenth century. Aquinas 
considered the problem of the equality of both virtues and of vices. Perhaps one explanation 
of why the Greek and Latin heading to the paradox is abbreviated can be supplied by the 
distinction Aquinas makes between these two equalities. All virtues are connected together in 
right reason, because “to follow virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the intention 
of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in 
the right reason of things to be done.” But the same cannot be said of vices, for “the intention 
of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather it is 
directed to tend to some appetible good.”85  Interestingly, Aquinas uses Cicero’s examples to 
support his own argument against the equality of either good or evil.  When he argues that 
“Sins take their species from their objects…But some sins are graver than others in respect of 
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their species, as murder is graver than theft.  Therefore the gravity of sins varies according to 
their objects,”86 he uses Cicero’s example of the many sins embodied in killing one’s 
father.87 In other words, good participates in a unity that evil does not.   
But despite some attempts to accept the third stoic paradox into Christian moral law, 
the issue of the parity of goods and evils was usually resisted prior to the Reformation.  
Augustine vehemently refuted the third stoic paradox, while Lactantius listed the third stoic 
paradox in his category of false knowledge.88 Influential medieval lawyers, such as Gratian, 
argued that natural law is the highest law of all in terms of its “origin and dignity,” its 
“scope,” and that “it ranks more highly [than other laws] according to the force of its 
provisions.” The Glossa Ordinaria of the Decretum notes that “there is no dispensation from 
the precepts or prohibitions of natural law, except, perhaps, when two evils so press on one 
that he must choose between them.”89  But Gratian himself notes that “when inescapable 
danger compels one to perpetrate one of two evils, we must choose the one that makes us less 
guilty” by examining the two evils and deciding which is the better of the two evils “by the 
acuity of pure reason.” A lie, for example, will “offend the Creator, but we stain only 
ourselves” whereas “when we perform a crime because of a promise, we hold God’s 
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commands in contempt through pride, harm our neighbors with faithless cruelty, and cut 
ourselves down with a still crueler sword. In the former case we perish by a twofold lance of 
guilt, in the latter we are slain three ways.”90  
But despite Gratian’s stratification of evil to ameliorate guilt, the glossator indicates 
what is at stake with such a moral taxonomy. The gloss sharply qualifies Gratian’s notion of 
choosing the better of two evils, arguing that any kind of equality between evils is an 
indication of a faulty judgment. Giving the example of a choice between a mortal and venial 
sin, the glossator concludes that “no one can really be in doubt between two evils.”  God 
punishes only those who do wrong voluntarily; if necessity required man to do something 
evil, then the law would be impossible to obey.  But all laws must be possible, “therefore, the 
person’s doubt cannot really arise from the matter itself, but it must arise in the mind and 
from foolish opinion.”91  When a man misreads a moral situation and believes that he is faced 
with two evils, he “foolishly believes himself to be in doubt. Indeed, it is not really true that 
both courses of action are evil, even though the interpretation given here [by Gratian] is that 
both are evil.”92  In other words, when parity between goods or evils is supposed to exist, it 
indicates either faulty human judgment or the presence of an unreachable ideal, which in turn 
highlights the imperfection of man.93  The alternatives, then, are either to correct 
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misjudgment, which may not be possible, or, when faced with an unattainable ideal, to create 
a new, less perfect ideal with an accompanying criterion for judgment.   
It is telling that in invoking the third stoic paradox to criticize the severity and 
unreasonableness of English law, Raphael takes the most extreme view of the third stoic 
paradox—he interprets it not as an equality that levels degrees of vice within a given 
category, but as an equality that levels all vices altogether. Raphael’s interpretation of the 
paradox in its most extreme sense only confirms the degree to which the paradox could be a 
threat to the constitution of moral value.  Against this leveling equity, Raphael posits an 
equity that reinforces moral distinctions.  
The uncertainty of moral law on a systemic scale has important ramifications for 
individual moral identity.  According to Raphael, the problematic outcome of making theft 
punishable to the same degree as murder is that this leveling is internalized in man’s 
conscience and can alter man’s motives for the worse. “Since the robber sees that he is in as 
great danger if merely condemned for theft as if he were convicted of murder as well,” it is 
possible that this “single consideration will impel him” to become a murderer rather than just 
a thief.94  The severity of the punishment creates a greater motive to deceive the justice 
system by using violence to erase all traces of crime.  The problems inherent in England’s 
social system may justify theft to some degree because the crime is involuntary since it is 
necessary to survival; however, the punishment for theft makes it more likely that the crimes 
that are committed are willful and that the criminal is wholly guilty.  England’s laws not only 
make criminals: they make criminals worse.  
Much of Raphael’s critique of equity has to do with his humanist conviction that true 
law should not simply represent moral boundaries but shape individual moral identity. 
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Raphael’s expectations for the law were not exceptional. For Erasmus, law had a key place in 
educating citizens on how to be morally virtuous.  In the Education of a Christian Prince, 
Erasmus notes that “the vast majority of crimes spring, as if from a muddy fountain, from 
perverted ideas about the state of things.”95  According to Erasmus, laws should “not only 
prescribe punishment for the guilty but also dissuade men from breaking the law.  It is thus a 
mistake to think that the laws should be restricted to the shortest possible form of words, so 
that they merely give orders and not instruction; on the contrary, they should be concerned to 
deter men from law-breaking more by reasoning than by punishments.”96  Education—and 
by extension laws that should educate but do not—are even more culpable than human nature 
for criminal or immoral behavior.  This attitude towards law and the nature of evil had 
significant implications for the nature of moral reform. In a polemical work written against 
Luther, Erasmus argues that the reason men are more likely to turn to vice than virtue is not 
because of their corrupt nature, but because of their “degenerate education.”97    
In his discussion of Utopian law, Raphael makes a direct correlation between 
ignorance and the need for law. The Utopians “have very few laws because very few are 
needed for persons so educated.”98  Raphael suggests that men must be able to understand the 
law if they are to be bound by law, and he highlights the circuitous moral dilemma in which 
England finds itself.  Because the English have created a society in which few men are 
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learned, more laws are needed; but laws will be either ineffective or unjust because men are 
unlearned and therefore will not be likely to understand the law. 
The interpretation of equity is important to notions of reform, for when it levels moral 
value, it can entirely undercut the possibility of moral reform for the individual. Despite the 
fact that Raphael rejects a leveling equity in law, his idealism causes him to accept leveling 
in other instances. For Raphael, justice and counsel are intrinsically linked, and the problems 
with the English justice system are symptomatic of the problems with the system of counsel, 
for the injustice evident in the English social system and penal codes is similar to the 
injustice within the court itself.99   
In his condemnation of Raphael’s choice of traveling and self-education at the 
expense of the duties of civic humanism,100 “More” encourages him not “to force upon 
people new and strange ideas” but to use “indirect approach” and “to handle matters 
tactfully” since “what you cannot turn to good you must make as little bad as you can. For it 
is impossible that all should be well unless all men were good, a situation which I do not 
expect for a great many years to come!”101  Raphael rejects “More’s” pragmatism because he 
objects to “dissembling” and concludes that it is impossible to do “any good because you are 
brought among colleagues who would easily corrupt the best of men before being reformed 
themselves.”102  Reform cannot take place within a morally imperfect court just as justice 
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cannot take place within a system in which laws are more likely to create crimes than enable 
reform.   
Raphael also rejects the linguistic form of equity espoused by “More,” otherwise 
known as decorum. In Utopia Raphael’s solution to the problem of reform in the English 
court is simply a policy of indecorous counsel—a policy associated with an “academic 
philosophy which thinks that everything is suitable to every place.”103 But, Raphael notes, as 
men become more corrupt, they not only use equity to create exceptions for themselves from 
divine law, but they also reevaluate the jurisdiction of the decorous versus the indecorous.  
“What did my speech contain that would not be appropriate or obligatory to have propounded 
everywhere?”, Raphael asks. By contrast, “More” encourages a culture of dissembling in 
which “useful” philosophy is actively employed in counsel in order to make a world that is 
“less bad.”  According to Raphael, this strategy of reform only uses the normative boundaries 
set up by decorum to accommodate human vice: “Truly, if all the things which by the 
perverse morals of men have come to seem odd are to be dropped as unusual and absurd, we 
must dissemble almost all the doctrines of Christ.”  Although “preachers” have had to follow 
“More’s” “advice” and have “accommodated [God’s] teaching to men’s morals as if it were a 
rule of soft lead that at least in some way or other [God’s law and man’s corruption] might be 
made to correspond,” Raphael questions the ethical outcome of such a policy. In his view, 
such a “method” only ensures “that men may be bad in greater comfort.”104 While “More’s” 
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decorum would set up a provisional moral code to effect reform, Raphael’s leveling use of 
language only leads to skepticism, in particular, a skepticism associated with dogmatism.  
Raphael’s bull-in-a-china-shop approach to counsel as well as moral and religious 
reform makes the ambiguity caused by the stylistic dexterity of Utopia itself all the more 
conspicuous.  As we will see, even though Raphael’s dichotomous understanding of good 
and evil and his unconcern for decorum has some affinities with Martin Luther, More will 
also use parts of Raphael’s argument against Luther himself.  One critic has noted that 
inconsistency evident in Raphael’s character seems to be one of ends versus means—that is, 
More and Raphael agree on the former but not the latter.105  In this way Raphael is one of the 
first reformers More encountered in his career, though one of his own imagination. It could 
be said that to some degree More agreed with his opponents on the general goal of reform, 
though as the tone of much of his polemical work indicates, he staunchly disagreed in terms 
of means.  
In the second book we find that far from wanting to repudiate equity, Raphael wants 
to rehabilitate it.  Raphael does finally espouse a system of equity—an equity of 
circumstance such as that practiced by the Utopians, not the English.  He tells us that aside 
from adultery, “there is no law prescribing any fixed penalty, but the punishment is assigned 
by the senate according to the atrocity, or veniality, of the individual crime.”106  More 
importantly, as it is for the Stoics, criminal intent is as culpable as criminal action.107   
Raphael lauds the Utopians, for in preferring servitude over capital punishment, they prefer 
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moral reform to an ideal of justice.108  The difference between the two systems hinges upon 
the law’s basis in rationality over custom and the evidence of circumstance over a more 
stable but imperfect standard of justice.109  
Even though Raphael espouses the equity of the Utopians, that is, a more rational 
version of equity that is based in circumstance, for Raphael the real reason why the Utopian 
system is admirable is not because it is an equitable system but because the Utopians have 
made equity unnecessary altogether.  At the close of Utopia, before he begins his tirade 
against pride, Raphael reaffirms the importance of abolishing the notion of private property.  
He argues that all crime would simply “die out with the destruction of money” because it is 
this kind of greed that undercuts true moral value and makes law customary and arbitrary.110  
In the absence of personal wealth in all its forms, the entire social system would support 
human virtue because temptation and self-interest—those passions which fuel the 
codification of custom rather than reason—would cease to exist. 
Raphael senses a danger in the indiscriminate application of equity.  We have seen 
how within human law, equity causes considerable problems.  Equity has the potential to 
weaken both the justice system and the moral fabric of men themselves.  Within the legal 
system, the expanded jurisdiction of the court of Chancery has created the possibility of an 
inconclusive circuit of litigation; moreover, laws that should instruct criminals only 
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encourage them to perpetrate greater crimes. Within the culture of counsel at the court of 
Henry VIII, equity only encourages an atmosphere of dissembling and justifies philosophy’s 
exclusion from politics, where it is so sorely needed.  But the greatest danger of equity is that 
it is a concept that may subordinate divine law to human law and may subject God’s law to 
human judgment.  
Immediately after Raphael condemns England’s “stoical ordinances that count all 
offenses equal,” he proceeds to qualify his own argument.  As we have seen, according to 
Raphael, when incorporated into human law the equality of vices multiplies, even creates, 
rather than contains crime.  But the outcome is different when the third paradox is read in the 
context of divine, not human, law. According to Raphael, the commandment “thou shalt not 
kill” levels all killings; God does not differentiate, for example, between criminal murder and 
legal execution by the state, prompting Raphael to ask: “If the divine command against 
killing be held not to apply where human law justifies killing, what prevents men equally 
from arranging with one another how far rape, adultery, and perjury are admissible?...if this 
agreement among men [to allow capital punishment] is to have such force as to exempt their 
henchmen from the obligation of the commandment…will not the law of God then be valid 
only so far as the law of man permits?”  Even the form of equity that Raphael sanctions 
among the Utopians which differentiates permissible and impermissible actions based on 
circumstance cannot be applied to God’s law. Divine law cannot be circumvented whenever 
a consensus of men agrees that it is expedient or “right” to do so. If man were able to exempt 
himself from divine law, then “the result will be that in the same way men will determine in 
everything how far it suits them that God’s commandments should be obeyed.”111 If this 
divine law which condemns all killers equally did not exist, then nothing would prevent man 
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from creating distinctions between justified and unjustified actions in other types of crime at 
will.   
In other words, even though Raphael would sanction an equity that distinguishes 
rather than levels crimes within human law, he is quick to remind his audience that God’s 
law is not subject to these kinds of nice equitable distinctions. The danger of viewing God as 
an equitable God is that the rational and human justice of equity may be confused with divine 
mercy. Raphael warns that “the new law of mercy in which He gives commands as a father to 
his sons” should not allow us to “suppose” that God “has allowed us greater license to be 
cruel to one another.”112  Raphael would trade the equity that represents the severities of a 
dogmatic law that levels moral distinctions for an equity that is more charitable in its ability 
to make moral distinctions on the basis of circumstance.   
In the character of Raphael we see More examining equity’s potential for normative 
and non-normative moral value, for dogma and skepticism. Raphael’s critique of the English 
legal system and the Tudor court culture of counsel reveal More’s interest in striking the 
right balance between constituting normative moral and religious value, on the one hand, and 
questioning and reforming it, on the other. Raphael rejects the imperfect normative morality 
which for him typifies English law for a more circumstantial form of equity.  But ultimately, 
Raphael hopes that law abolishes the necessity for equity altogether. Despite Raphael’s 
criticism of the rigor of the Stoics, he follows a similar policy of absolutism which is 
reflected in his understanding of the language of reform.  He rejects courtly decorum, a 
linguistic normative mode of reform, and in the place of counsel would substitutes the open 
criticism of vice which More associates with Academic skepticism. In other words, it is 
possible to say that Utopia is “no place”; it is, instead, a person. Raphael’s idealism and his 
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dogmatic method of reform make him more utopian than the Utopians themselves.  It is a 
very similar reformist methodology that More will face in the 1520s. 
 
III. Equity and a Pragmatic Approach to Church Reform in the 1520s 
In some ways, the free-spirited fictional Utopia oddly prefigures More’s lifelong 
career as a polemicist.  More’s writing of Utopia provided him with a test case to try out 
ideas, responses, and modes that he would be forced to revisit in his more serious encounters 
in his polemical debates with Luther in the 1520s when the nature of the discussion had 
changed from the humanist world of ideas to the realism of politics.  In the polemical works 
of More, Luther and Erasmus in the 1520s, the concept of equity underlies the debate over 
the identity of the true church and the efficacy of grace, merit, and free will in the pursuit of 
salvation, and the interpretation of Scriptures, an idea we will examine more fully in the next 
chapter.  Both More and Erasmus take Luther to task for his impracticable idealism, for such 
idealism has no place in the trenches of reform.  At the same time, Luther sees the reforms of 
More and Erasmus as harbingers of a cavalier and willful attitude towards divine justice. 
While equity was important to all three of these reformers, the diversity of ways in which 
they understood the term defines the methods of their reforms and the nature of the true 
church.  
In Utopia the third stoic paradox acts as a stepping off point for examining a system 
of law based on a specific kind of equity.  The paradox and the concept of equity are equally 
important in the tenth chapter of More’s Responsio ad Lutherum, a text whose importance we 
will consider more fully in the next chapter.  In comparing Luther’s and More’s attitudes 
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towards the third stoic paradox we find that the acceptance or rejection of the third stoic 
paradox acts as a kind of touchstone for attitudes towards equity and its place in reform.  
Like Raphael, Luther rejects a kind of equity that allows for an imperfect virtue. In 
his response to Erasmus’s skepticism, Luther argues that Christians should be “twice as 
unyielding as the Stoics themselves.”113  However, More appropriates Raphael’s arguments 
against Luther’s leveling of virtue and vice that he sees taking place in Luther’s interpretation 
of grace and merit. Like Raphael, More believes Luther espouses the most radical kind of 
equity indicated by the third stoic paradox.  And like the equity that Raphael fears—that is, 
an equity that breaks down not just moral boundaries within categories of virtue and vice, but 
moral boundaries in all categories of virtue and vice—More fears the radically leveling form 
of equity that emerges in Luther’s discussion of grace, merit, and free will.  Just as Raphael 
views England’s economy as allowing for an uneven, flexible, and customary law, a law 
governed by will rather than reason, so too, in More’s debate with Luther, More worries 
about a religion dictated by the individual will of a rogue reformer.   
Luther’s ambivalence about the use of equity in the realm of religious reform is 
evident in his own uncertain assertion of the term. Although Luther addresses the concept of 
equity, his discussion of equity reveals the ambiguities of his position.114  In Table Talk 
Luther associates equity not with uprightness, but with tolerating crookedness.115  In 
discussing household economy, Luther notes that a husband should allow for forgiveness for 
                                                
113 Martin Luther, De Servo Arbitrio, in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, ed. and trans. Philip 
Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969) 106. 
 
114 Mark Fortier notes that there was no German word equivalent to the notion of equity and the word Luther 
most frequently employs is, interestingly enough, “recht” (31).   
 
115 Cited in Fortier 39. 
56 
his wife, but “ought not to give up the law.”116  Luther defines equity as “not a rash 
relaxation of laws and discipline” but as “an interpretation of laws which in some cases finds 
mitigating circumstances, especially in cases in which the law doesn’t decide on principle.  
According to the circumstances equity weighs for or against. But the weighing must be of 
such kind that the law isn’t undermined, for no undermining of natural law and divine law 
must be allowed.”117  In a very typical, but very problematic formulation for Luther, he draws 
an analogy between divine and natural law. Luther’s frequent qualifications show him 
gesturing towards an acceptance of a more merciful law, but ultimately unwilling to give up 
an ideal of justice and its dogmatic assertion.  
In Utopia we found that equity offered a kind of certainty at the same time that it 
threatened a kind of destabilizing flexibility. Both in its attendance to circumstance and in its 
breakdown of moral distinctions equity threatens more than it constitutes normative moral 
value. The relationship between the tendency of equity to level moral value hinged upon 
Stoic epistemology.  For Luther, truth and falsehood should map easily onto the moral 
categories of good and evil.  One scholar has argued that Luther was attracted to the third 
stoic paradox and that he pursued a policy of “selective stoicism” that allowed him to adopt 
the third paradox in order “to secure epistemologically an absolute certainty.”118  Luther 
argues that the true church must be purely good much in the same way that Raphael demands 
pure goodness in the English systems of law and counsel. According to Luther, since “Christ 
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is without sin…it is necessary that the church also be without sin,” for Christ, the foundation 
of the Church, “should have a building of the same character as [him]self.”119  Luther defines 
virtue and vice in absolute terms so that “whatever anyone belonging to the church does must 
be either a good or an evil action.”120  
In a tone reminiscent of Raphael’s condemnation of the English penal law, More 
interprets Luther’s arguments as supporting the most radical kind of equality of virtues and 
vices. Criticizing the unrealistic nature of Luther’s idyllic church, More attacks the Lutheran 
paradox that “every good work is a sin.”  “I almost divine what he means,” More writes 
sarcastically. “He means, I think, that every single good work is a sin” because sins can 
occasion pride, “and on the other hand every bad work is a virtue because it is the occasion 
of humility.” More extrapolates this even further “so that the good works of the papists”—
their vigils, alms, prayers and chastity—“are nothing else but unmixed sins because [they 
have a] weak faith [since]…they do not trust that faith alone without works suffices [to 
secure salvation].  “But the evil works of the Lutheranists”—their drunkenness, adultery, 
robbery and blasphemy—are “nothing else but unmixed virtues” “because [they have a] firm 
faith [since]… they trust firmly that faith alone suffices [for salvation].”121 Like Raphael, 
More fears the leveling tendency of the equity borne of Lutheran absolutism.  
In his own description of his invisible church, Luther, for a moment, seems to 
moderate the severity of his views on good and evil.  To the Christian all things of place and 
circumstance “are indifferent and optional” because “every place suits [him], and no place is 
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necessary for the [him].”  Though Luther claims that this indifferency is superseded by the 
“liberty of spirit” that “reigns” in the Christian, by making the physical church indifferent, 
Luther makes the church more exclusive.  The vacuum left by corporeal indifferencies is 
readily filled by the moral absolutism that defines the spiritual church in which nothing is 
ever indifferent.122  
More dismisses the Lutheran church with its radical form of equity as having all the 
reality of “Platonic Ideas”—that is, a church that is not “palpable and perceptible,”  
“but…which is both in some place and in no place, is in the flesh and is out of the flesh,…is 
wholly involved in sin and yet does not sin at all”123  At the same time, More censures 
Luther’s vitriolic rhetoric which, according to More, frequently devolves into the pointless 
abuse characteristic of the Cynics. In their rejections of normative moral values, both the 
idyllic Platonist and the raving Cynic endanger the church and the common good of society.  
Luther’s reconstitution of normative moral value as well as his method of reform are equally 
awry. Indeed, a telling marginal note in the tenth chapter of the Responsio suggests, with 
much sarcasm, that “perhaps [Luther may have] seen [his ideal church] in Utopia.”124  
While More understood Lutheran equity as the most unreal and unhelpful principles 
in the quest for reform, Luther believed that the way More and Erasmus interpreted equity 
suggested that God’s law was a willful and arbitrary one.  Luther’s own understanding of 
equity becomes clearer in his debate with Erasmus between 1524 and 1526 over free will and 
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the value of grace and merit.  According to Luther, the concept of merit undermines God’s 
equity—a mode of decision-making that seems arbitrary to man only because it is 
mysterious. Luther argues that men’s views of God’s justice are wrong because they are 
infected by self-interest, for “when God saves the unworthy without merits, or rather justifies 
the ungodly with their many demerits, it does not accuse him of injustice; it does not demand 
to know why he wills this, which in its judgment is most unjust, but because it is 
advantageous and pleasing to itself it deems it just and good.”  However, when God’s justice 
works against man, “when he damns those without merit, then since this is disadvantageous 
to itself, it is unjust, it is intolerable, and here there is protesting, murmuring, and 
blaspheming.”  Like Raphael, Luther accuses men of judging God’s equity by their own 
standards. In his view, equity should be opposed to will and self-interest, but Erasmus and 
others “do not judge according to equity, but according as their own interest is affected. For 
if [they] had regard to equity, [they] would expostulate with God just as much when he 
crowns the unworthy as when he damns the undeserving. [They] would also praise and extol 
God just as much when he damns the undeserving as when he praises the unworthy; for there 
is equal unfairness in either case, judged by our standards.”125 
Indeed, Erasmus comes to quite the opposite conclusion of Luther in Hyperaspistes 
(1526), but he can do so because he is careful to divide good and evil into graded moral 
categories.  Erasmus differentiates between good intention and a goodness specific to 
salvation: “Good intentions are not automatically said to be good in the sense that they confer 
beatitude, for whoever has truly good intentions has been justified by grace but here we use 
‘good’ in the sense of something that approaches some resemblance to goodness and 
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withdraws from evil to some extent, unless, perhaps, we like that opinion of the Stoics, who 
make all sins equal, teaching that a person is suddenly either completely good or completely 
evil.”  Erasmus ultimately rejects the idea of the parity of evil because it is a paradoxical 
“discourse [that] is abhorrent to common sense and foreign to the usual way of thinking in 
Scripture.”126   
To explain why Luther’s equity must be rejected to allow for reform, Erasmus uses 
two similes that posit two opposed views of reform.  The first example is a “stoic similie” 
frequently used as evidence for the third stoic paradox.  The simile describes “a man who has 
fallen into water,” for whom, according to the stoics “it makes no difference whether he is 
many feet from the surface or two inches away from it if in any case he dies by drowning.”  
For Erasmus this paradox evidences the wrong-headedness of the third stoic paradox 
particularly when it is applied to the quest for reform, for such an example suggests that 
progress towards salvation, while it may be possible, will always be pointless because it will 
never affect salvation.  But Erasmus offers an alternative simile that gives weight to his 
program for reform.  He prefers the example of a great reformer, Augustine.  Transforming 
the stoic simile, Augustine’s example, which is “a comparison drawn from light and 
darkness,” not only admits degrees, but admits degrees that are effective, for a man moving 
towards light is less in the dark and hence is perceptibly closer to salvation in a way that 
matters.127  
Luther’s attitudes towards reform—his belief in instantaneous transformation, and his 
demand for epistemological certainty—are embodied in his polemical style. Indeed, the 
concepts of religious decorum, accommodation, and rhetoric are all refracted through the 
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concept of equity.  Luther’s all-or-nothing versions of good and evil left very little room for 
humanist enterprises such as the acceptance of classical literature. He had argued that even 
“the loftiest virtues of the heathen, the best things in the philosophers, the most excellent 
things in men, which in the eyes of the worlds certainly appear to be, as they are said to be, 
honourable and good, are nonetheless in the sight of God truly flesh and subservient to the 
kingdom of Satan; that is to say, they are impious and sacrilegious and on all counts bad.”128  
Erasmus uses pagan philosophy as evidence against Luther’s “Stoic notions” that argued 
“that whatever is done apart from grace is equally damnable, so that the tolerance of Socrates 
is not less grievous an offense in the sight of God than the cruelty of Nero.”  Erasmus 
admitted “that whatever is done without the gift of faith and charity and is not referred to 
God is not truly good,” but he felt that regardless of the power of grace, “whatever does not 
conflict with faith and charity and makes an approach to them, as it were, can be called good 
in some sense.”  Unlike Raphael, who despairs that reform cannot take place in an imperfect 
environment, such reform is exactly what Erasmus envisioned in the ancient pagan world. He 
exhorts Luther to “imagine, if you will, gradations of faith and of charity which have not yet 
attained effective faith, which is only given by God.” Such gradations are the very heart of 
humanist conceptions of reform: 
Imagine, if you will, a pagan philosopher who knows that there is one mind that 
created and governs all things, than which nothing better or greater can exist and from 
which all good flows forth, that rewards good deeds, that he acknowledges should be 
worshipped with purity of heart; but he tolerates accepted ceremonies, partly because 
he despairs of being able to bring the uncultivated crowd to believe anything else, 
partly because he believes it is to the advantage of the people to be restrained by such 
a religion until something better emerges, and in the meantime he admonishes those 
whom he thinks can be taught; he exerts himself to fulfill as well as he can his duties 
to his country, his parents, his wife, and children, ignoring the ill will stirred up by 
virtue and hoping to be rewarded by that mind for his good deeds. That some of the 
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pagans had such an attitude is testified by their own books. What then? Shall we say 
that such a person, when he is conducting himself extremely well, sins quite as much 
as if he got rid of his wife with poison and prostituted his children? At all events I 
think that such a person does not lack faith entirely and that his works do not stir up 
God’s wrath but rather that he renders himself capable or receiving God’s goodness 
and makes himself suited to it.129 
 
Erasmus moves on from this pagan example to Augustine’s methods of conversion. Such 
gradations of faith may not allow for the revolution that Lutheran reform requires, but they 
do allow for reform based on the theory of accommodation.130 Hence the admission of man’s 
epistemological limitations, and the ethical uncertainties that accompany them, are central to 
reformers like Erasmus and More, and will become the cornerstone of Protestant reform 
throughout the sixteenth century. 
Like Raphael, Luther’s view of equity and his attitudes towards reform are evident in 
the stylistic habits of his polemical writing.  Both More and Erasmus were critical of Luther’s 
tendency to pare down language to simple meanings. In the tenth chapter of the Responsio 
More attacks Luther’s denial of the multiple meanings of scripture.  In something of a faulty 
syllogism according to More, Luther makes the certainty of the church depend upon the 
certainty of scripture and vice versa. Such a “method of demonstration” effectively walls off 
anyone but Luther because inferences, “like the mazes of a labyrinth,” preclude a wider 
understanding. With such “Platonic ideas” that can be traced to Luther’s own mind and to 
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nowhere else, men seeking to understand the reforms of Luther are “fenced in continually by 
these barricades.”131   
Erasmus’s critique of Luther ultimately comes to the question of language. He attacks 
not Lutheran syllogism, but instead Luther’s use of paradox and hyperbole as the hallmark of 
his absolutism; at the same time, Erasmus uses his criticism of Luther’s paradoxical method 
to define his own form of skepticism.  Clearly Luther’s acceptance of the third paradox not 
only endangers the church as it stands, but also jeopardizes the possibility of a religious 
reformation altogether.  Consequently, far from participating in healthy religious debate, 
Luther’s style also jeopardizes religious reform.  Erasmus, who at times seems 
constitutionally unable to mention the name of Luther without immediately condemning his 
paradoxes, concludes his Hyperaspistes by drawing out the implications of Luther’s 
adherence to this paradox. Erasmus posits a more practical and hopeful, albeit humble, form 
of idealism that counters Luther’s exclusionism.  Contrary to Luther’s view that human 
action and will are worthless, Erasmus argues that “a person who understands much through 
human reason and believes certain truths about God, who has drunk in a habit of virtue 
according to his own small measure, is somewhat more capable than a crude soldier who has 
lived in a profound state of ignorance and the grossest vice.”132  The very epistemological 
uncertainty that Luther so despises is necessary to Erasmus’s process of reform.  Luther and 
Erasmus famously debated the role of skepticism and its implications for faith in their 
conflict over free will. In his discussion of free will, Erasmus identifies himself with the 
“ignorance” of Nichodemus and with Gamaliel and praises the latter for “suspend[ing] his 
                                                
131 More, CW 5.1.179-181. 
 
132 Erasmus, Hyperaspistes 2.742. 
 
64 
judgment.”  It is one’s very ignorance and one’s choice to suspend judgment and to open 
oneself to education in the face of that ignorance that make one acceptable to God.133  
Far from skepticism justifying unnecessary debate, Erasmus uses skepticism to set 
limits to religious controversy.  Like More, Erasmus tries to make scripture and church 
authority immune to skepticism: “I want nothing to do with Scepticism, no more than I do 
concerning the decrees of the Catholic church. But on other points, about which asserters 
struggle and fight to the death, I readily take refuge in the opinion of the Sceptics, that is, I 
will consider them at length and refrain from rash judgment. For a Sceptic is not someone 
who doesn’t care to know what is true or false—the name itself is derived from 
considering—but rather someone who does not reach a final decision easily or fight to the 
death for his own opinion, but rather accepts as probable what someone else accepts as 
certain.”134  Erasmus would confine debate only to “controverted teachings, about which the 
church itself was once skeptical and reflected for a long time before defining them, such as 
the procession of the Holy Spirit from both the other persons.”135   
Though Luther uses hyperbole and paradox to assert dogma rather than open up 
questions, Erasmus suggests that the effect may be the opposite because Luther appropriates 
these modes to make assertions about issues that should not even be open to debate. These 
modes represent, then, a kind of vain curiosity.  It is important, according to Erasmus, to pick 
one’s battles carefully, that is, to identify which “errors it would be less harmful to overlook 
than to uproot. Paul knew the distinction between what is lawful and what is expedient: it is 
lawful to speak the truth; but it is not expedient to do so in front of anyone, at any time, in 
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any way.”136  So even if the necessity that Luther argues for is correct, “what could be more 
useless than to spread this paradox abroad?”137  Erasmus associates paradox with stoic hard-
headedness and he ends his diatribe on free will with the assertion that “when propounding 
principles in an inquiry into truth, I do not think that paradoxical formulas like these, not far 
removed from riddles, should be used: here I favor restraint,”138 for paradoxes that are used 
to assert dogma can only cause the disruption of social, religious and epistemological order 
in Christendom.139  Erasmus believes that the rhetorical tropes that Luther uses to express his 
message on the bondage of the will go part and parcel with his message.  Luther is dangerous 
because he “prefer[s] above all to seem uniquely learned by means of paradoxes and 
hyperboles, although no technique tends more to sedition than they do.”140   
Luther uses rhetoric in order to exclude men from rationally understanding the 
principles of his religious dissent.  This exclusionary tactic betokens for Erasmus a kind of 
pride.  Luther’s sophistry moves their debate towards a kind of closer scholasticism that 
Erasmus would clearly prefer to avoid.  But perhaps even worse, Luther’s rhetoric sequesters 
the individual believer (Luther) from the community of believers and the church: “Which is 
more wicked, not to dispute about Christian dogmas beyond what is sufficient or to 
undermine them, throw them out, trample upon them, and decorate them with your kind of 
verbal decorations? …What remains except for you to claim for yourself the spirit of 
prophecy, or even a certain divinity, so as to pronounce what everyone is hiding in his 
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heart?”141 Fearful of the uncertainty that accompanies education in any form, Luther is, in the 
words of Raphael Hythloday, a “school teacher who would prefer to beat rather than to teach 
his students.”142 
 
IV. Text, the Value of Uncertainty, and Reform 
Though clearly making advances as a term involved in legal reform in the 1520s, 
equity was arguably a much more vexing concept when it appeared in religious debate and 
reform.  In both realms, equity offered the possibility of greater certainty by trying to 
reconcile the vagaries of human experience with a normative code of law.  But as More, 
Erasmus, and Luther were well aware, depending on how it was employed, equity could 
either serve as an answer to the problem of human limitation or it could allow that limitation 
to run amok. 
What More, Luther, and Erasmus’s interest in the moral ambiguity of equity and the 
third stoic paradox show us is that in this period uncertain moral value is central to 
discussions of the constitution of orthodoxy. As Richard Popkin has noted in his study of the 
arguments of Sextus Empiricus, as long as certainty is maintained, questions can always be 
brought against it. Conversely, I would point out that uncertainty is not as easily undermined 
by epistemic critique because its power comes not from its truth claims but from its appeal to 
the common good. In other words, it makes no truth claims on the basis of epistemology, but 
on the basis of pragmatism. Though More fears arbitrary moral value, after the spread of 
Lutheran heresy that value ironically is defined by its flexibility, not its absolutism.  
Imperfect good, over and above absolute good, is the mainstay of orthodoxy for defenders of 
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the English Church. Hence, it is not altogether unwise to align uncertainty with both the 
reform and the reconstitution of normative moral value and religious knowledge. The 
flexibility inherent in uncertainty gave the English Church a considerable amount of 
maneuverability.  
Though he is filled with criticisms for England, and though he proffers a utopia as a 
corrective to England, according to More, Raphael’s unwillingness to engage society makes 
him a malcontent more interested in complaining among a small group of friends rather than 
doing anything about the problems he observes.  But in the end, we must consider that 
Raphael Hythloday is, after all, a fictional character; so too, we must consider what greater 
purpose this debate between equity of an imperfect good and the that of stoic rigor and the 
respective strategies of reform that they proffer might serve. It is an irony characteristic of 
the wit of Thomas More, that Raphael Hythloday himself, even as he rejects equity and 
decorum as imperfect means to justice, is in fact himself an agent working within a larger 
linguistic method—namely, the Utopia itself and the tradition of Renaissance dialogue and 
paradox. As Damian Grace has argued in his discussion of Utopia and Academic skepticism, 
More uses probability in Utopia on both sides of the argument, forcing the reader to judge 
which is the better side.143  But in some ways the dichotomy is a set up, for in Utopia the 
truth is found “in utramque partem,”144 not in one place but on both sides of the argument, 
making Utopia a work that uses skepticism as a method of reform.145 Contrary to how Luther 
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uses the paradoxical mode, that is, to limit intellectual engagement and questioning, More 
uses it to open up questioning.  
Moreover, Raphael is a problematic example as a counselor, because the knowledge 
he brings from travel is a knowledge that introduces custom and relativity into a discussion 
of equity.  Utopia is organized as a diptych, book I being an exposition of the moral and 
social ills of England while book II ostensibly holds up the virtuous customs of the island of 
Utopia. It invites a comparison between two cultures much like the comparison we observed 
earlier in skeptic doctrine in which justice is defined relatively, according to one’s culture.  If 
we take Raphael at his word, then book II is a travel narrative. The knowledge Raphael 
brings from travel marks him as a purveyor of custom and relativity—in many ways not 
unlike the humanists were. And like humanists, Raphael’s appropriation of a distant culture 
as a moral model levels cultural distinctions in ways that may or may not be valid.  On the 
other hand, there really is no evidence that Utopia exists, and it may in fact be a figment of 
Raphael’s imagination. Even more largely, Utopia is, of course, a figment of More’s 
imagination. The text is the place and Raphael’s experience of Utopia, real or imagined, has a 
natural analogy in the reader’s experience with Utopia. In either case, the emphasis on 
experience would seem to highlight More’s own sense of the possibilities and uncertainties 
surrounding the resources of reform, in particular the role of the humanist appropriation of 
pagan culture, the role of the imagination, and the role of fiction.   
If viewed in the context of More’s pre-Reformation writings of the 1520s, the form 
and style of Utopia take on a new significance.  Scholars have argued over whether Utopia 
should be read more as a skeptical dialogue or a dogmatic monologue, since so much of the 
first book and nearly the entire second book are taken up with Raphael’s monologue.  Indeed, 
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the entire book could be read as a very complex dialectic of dogmatism and skepticism. 
Moreover, what is true regardless of whether the text is read as a dialogue or a monologue is 
that the text is a paradox.146  Although More largely dropped the paradoxical mode after the 
Utopia, there the mode works, as so many have argued, as a method of opening up inquiry. 
On some level it can be said that the paradox is an equitable mode, and this is true in a 
number of ways.  On the one hand, it levels ideas, in that it brings together in “a central pivot 
of equivocation upon which two arguments (logically unconnected) meet and turn.”147 On the 
other hand, in the sixteenth century it is a genre that is often “associated with the literature of 
skepticism” which uses as a “basic weapon” a “historical survey of knowledge” that forces 
dogmatists to confront the unmistakable diversity of opinion. Crucially, the method of the 
paradox, like the dialogue, is “dramatic,” making the reader “conclud[e] that knowledge is 
dramatic, i.e., that it is proportional to each historical scene,”148 or to put it another way and 
relate the mode back to equity, to make the reader conclude that knowledge is circumstantial. 
In my reading the Utopia is a fundamentally skeptical text. It evidences not the dogmatic and 
indecorous skepticism of Raphael, but rather embodies a more subtle kind of reform 
message: it is an equitable text that accommodates More’s very real criticisms of England to 
his audience through the indecorous voice of Raphael.  But at the same time, it would be 
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wrong to read Raphael as the mouthpiece of Thomas More, for Raphael’s character, and the 
knowledge he has, are problematic in important ways—indeed, in similar ways as equity is.  
Despite his problematic idealism and methodology of reform, Raphael functions as a 
fictional character used by Thomas More to open up a dialogue about the methods of reform.  
Raphael is, then, the imperfect, decorous agent of counsel that he so disdains; he is, whether 
he would want to be or not, a decorous purveyor of normative moral value.  Though More 
frequently turns to elements of fiction throughout his polemical career, Utopia stands as 
More’s final fictional work. And though it is fiction, it inaugurates More’s incisive 
examination of the importance of two equitable—that is, imperfect and provisional—
resources of reform, fiction and the imagination specifically, and more largely humanism 
itself. But More never entirely leaves behind the fictional mode even in his polemical works, 
and his concern over the influence of fiction and the imagination as agents of reform that we 
see dawning in Utopia will stay with him as he addresses the “real” reformers of the 1520s. It 
is to More’s use of normative fictions within the polemical mode and the influence of that 
mode on belief in the 1520s that we will now turn.  
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE EVIDENCE OF FAITH: TEXTUALITY, PROBABILITY, AND THE DILEMMA OF 
TUDOR POLEMICS 
 
 
  I. Spreading Heresy: The Dilemma of Tudor Polemics 
 The period beginning with the publication of Luther’s Babylonian Captivity in 1521 
and ending with Thomas More’s last polemical work the Confutation of Tyndale’s Answer in 
1533 is arguably one of the most important periods in the history of the English reformation. 
During this period it became clear that the church in England would have to begin to define 
itself not only in response to the interiorization of belief encouraged by Lutheran heresy, but 
also in response to the texualization of belief brought about by the reformers’ use of the 
printing press.  The proliferation of printed books and pamphlets and the mounting visibility 
of heresy caused important changes in the laws governing treason and evidence in heresy 
trials.  English heretics exiled to the Continent wrote and exported their vernacular works 
back into England to an audience impatient for their arrival. The importation of heretical 
works elicited a dramatic and distinctly public response from the Tudor government, namely 
book burnings and the development of a new representative of religious knowledge: printed 
religious polemic.  At the same time, the rise in heretics and the resulting heresy trials—one 
outcome of this uncontrollable importation—occasioned discussions over the nature of the 
evidence for religious belief.  Colliding with the dangerous consequences of reformed 
religion—the interiorization of religious belief free from external markers—the upsurge of 
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heresy led to a reevaluation of what constituted an individual’s credibility and how such 
credibility could be identified. In other words, Lutheran heresy made religious belief both 
invisible in its interiorization of belief and yet strangely more visible in its use of the printing 
press.  Both of these impulses threatened the stable standards of religious belief. 
More’s polemical works of the 1520s, the Responsio ad Lutherum (1523) and the 
Dialogue Concerning Heresies (1528/9) weigh the value of polemical writing and fiction to 
the preservation of an authoritative church. As the printing trade began to change the shape 
of communication, knowledge, and religious experience, polemical literature emerged as a 
mode by which to bridge oral and textual as well as private and public expressions of 
conviction.  More’s polemical works explore the epistemological uncertainties being 
unearthed in a world in which the intellect was becoming an increasingly textual 
phenomenon.  As they have emphasized the differences and continuities between oral and 
textual as well as print and manuscript cultures, scholars have debated whether the influence 
of publishing should be read as a gradual phenomenon or as an intellectual revolution.  What 
is certain is that as heretical and polemical literature was produced, imported, and exported to 
and from the Continent and England on an unprecedented and an unknowable scale in the 
1520s. Maintaining the moral and religious consensus upon which a stable society depended 
became increasingly difficult for state and religious authorities.149 More’s Responsio ad 
Lutherum initiated the public discourse in England that sought to answer Luther’s heresies as 
well as his personal attack on Henry VIII. The Dialogue Concerning Heresies, on the other 
hand, is a very different kind of polemic designed to counter the Lutheran heresy that had 
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infiltrated London and England’s universities. However, in both these works, fiction plays a 
key role in More’s evaluation of the standards of religious belief in the 1520s.   
During the decade of the 1520s, the English church redefined itself in its movement 
towards autonomy and its demonstrative reform measures against a backdrop of approaching 
enemies—both actual and feared. At the beginning of the 1520s, Lutheran ideas threatened 
from abroad, while the low whispers of heretics became undeniably audible at home.150 
When the first book burning took place in England under the order of Cuthbert Tunstal in 
May of 1521, John Fisher, bishop of Rochester, preached a sermon pointed directly at 
censuring the Lutheran quest to find an internal ground of religious conviction. Such 
conviction was sponsored by the Holy Spirit in conjunction with the reading of scripture.  
Providing an unfulfilling, if not unconvincing, answer to Luther’s objections to the 
sacraments, Fisher reinforced the moral authority of the church by flatly informing his 
audience that “[i]n the observancyes of the chyrche” many things are necessary, but despite 
their necessesity “the reason why that we so do [these necessary things] is not open to al 
men.” “Who can expresse the reason of al those wordes, gestures, orders, quesyons, answers 
that there be accustomed,” asked Fisher, when “Tradycyons were left unto the chrysten 
people by chryst & his apostles” which must be followed “notwithstandynge they be not 
wryten in scrypture.”151 In a decade in which heresy and religious belief were becoming 
textual, the Church defended itself based on its atextuality.  
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Neither the reassurance of church authority by Fisher nor the government force of 
Tunstal was successful in narrowing the widening avenues of exposure to Lutheran ideas. 
Pope Leo X had condemned all of Luther’s writings in June of 1520, and the Edict of 
Worms, written and signed in May of 1521, allowed the use of force to secure conformity to 
the pope’s decree. But despite these efforts at containment, it seems clear that the book 
burning demonstrations in London in the 1520s were more a sign of the English 
government’s failure to control the importation and printing of heretical books and the 
church’s equally significant failure to prevent the books from being bought and read than 
they were an effective show of force.152  By 1525, heretics publicly declared their doctrines 
at the universities of England; towards the end of that same year the first copies of William 
Tyndale’s vernacular translation of the New Testament were published.153 With the advent of 
Tyndale’s Bible in 1526 and the increasing number of English exiles influenced by 
Lutheranism while seeking refuge on the Continent, the shape and the language of the 
opposition to the Church of England were in the process of an important transformation. A 
crucial aspect of that transformation was the increased influence of printed materials 
imported into and printed in England. The preponderance of works printed up to 1535 were 
religious texts—practical, devotional, liturgical, and polemical, making not just the Bible, but 
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print itself the means to demonstrate an authority that could either support or rival all sources 
of orthodoxy.154 
D. M. Loades has argued that prior to the advent of religious polemics that infiltrated 
the religious culture of the 1520s, “there is no sign that the authorities in England were aware 
of the potential dangers of the press.”155  Before 1520, the printing press was virtually 
unregulated in England. The laws that did exist were remnants of responses to the Lollard 
heresies a century earlier.  Arundel’s Oxford Constitutions had been “designed to halt the 
copying, distributing, and reading of manuscript Lollard tracts,” but these manuscripts were 
“a menace more easily regulated than the flow of books from Europe’s many printing 
presses.”156  But towards the end of the decade a series of acts by the government suggests 
that Henry VIII was becoming aware not only of the press’s dangers, but of its potential to 
uphold political power. Between 1528 and 1534 Henry revised the previously open-ended 
policies that allowed foreign printers unrestricted access to the printing trade in England, 
created his own list of prohibited books, established a licensing system that allowed printing 
monopolies, and, finally, restricted all importations of foreign books into England.157  
The substantial rise in the printing and unlicensed importation of books from the 
Continent, the prominence of the dialogue form in public religious discourse,158 and the 
movement towards the use of the vernacular over Latin as the language of controversy made 
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the published word an influential component of religious identity and required the 
development of a decorum for controversial writing about religion. Beyond the physical 
markers of worship—sacraments, priests, and church structures—printed polemic was 
invested with a new force as a visible public expression of piety. As reformers actively 
sought out this means to self-definition, many began to fear the decline of the unity and 
absolutism of Roman Catholic authority; however, Henry VIII and other leaders of the 
church in England began to recognize that the established religion would have to use 
published texts to redefine itself in the face of the diversity that was cementing irremediable 
divisions in religious culture.   
At the center of this revision of spiritual identity and expression we find Thomas 
More.  Throughout his career, More evidences a deep-seated anxiety over how to judge 
men’s profession of belief when it is so difficult to know the secrets of the human heart and 
conscience. This judgment was complicated even further for More by the uncertainties that 
print culture introduced into religious truth. Though doubtful about using text to convey any 
truth, let alone religious truth, the optimistic but practical More sought to use fiction and 
dialogue as a way of gaining access to personal conviction.  
For More, fiction and the suspension of disbelief it could support had an important 
role to play in social welfare.  Once a work was published or even became a candidate for 
publication, it readily eluded an author’s control.  Publication, then, could break down the 
boundaries between the intended fictions of the author, the idiosyncrasies of a publisher or 
copyist, and the misinterpretations of even the sharpest of readers. Facing the uncertain 
power that publication offered to religious discourse, More appealed to normative fictions—
that is, beliefs that cannot be demonstrated by reason but that nonetheless may foster social 
77 
harmony—in their various guises of faith, probability, conviction, and the law that defined 
the political and religious solidarity of England.  In doing so he hoped to contain Lutheran 
doubts that threatened to dismantle the singular truth of religion by leading to an infinite 
regress of independent questioning.   
The conflict with Luther began with the publication of his Babylonian Captivity in 
1520, continued with Henry VIII’s defense of the seven sacraments in 1521, Luther’s attack 
on Henry in 1522, and culminated in More’s Responsio ad Lutherum in 1523.  Its excessive 
invectives written at the request of Henry VIII, it is the only major polemical work More 
would ever write in Latin.159  As the decade neared its end, More began composing his first 
major English work, the Dialogue Concerning Heresies, which, like the Responsio, was 
undertaken at an indeclinable request, this time that of Cuthbert Tunstal.160  By this time, the 
situation in England was more desperate, for the futility of the King’s proclamations banning 
heretical books and instituting book burnings was becoming painfully obvious to Henry and 
Tunstal.161  Far from undermining the importation of the Lutheran books being produced on 
the continent by exiled Englishmen, the bonfires of books only funded the exiles since the 
Church, in buying up the prohibited books in order to burn them, was fast becoming the 
greatest patron of heretics in addition to fueling public interest in books deemed so worthy of 
persecution. More’s Dialogue Concerning Heresies, printed in 1529, represented a delayed 
reaction to the influence of Tyndale’s translation of the New Testament, which, according to 
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the estimates of many scholars, was imported into England by the thousands, and the 
publication of Tyndale’s Parable of the Wicked Mammon, The Obedience of a Christian 
Man, and a list of other works bearing what the church believed to be an unmistakable and 
diabolical Lutheran influence.  In both 1523 and 1529 Thomas More was placed in the 
uncomfortable position of dismantling a threat to the church that had already had time to 
establish itself.   
Thomas More’s Responsio ad Lutherum was published in the same year as Fisher’s 
Asssertionis Lutheranae confutatio, prompting one scholar to give these important polemical 
works the distinction of “establish[ing] the grounds and the form of Catholic polemics in 
England throughout the first era of the Reformation.” “The endeavor” of More and Fisher’s 
work “was to expose and publicize the doctrines and doings of Luther” with the intent that 
the public—or at least the Latin-reading public—needed the texts themselves so that “all 
might conclude [Luther’s] self-evident error and damnation.”  But because such a polemical 
methodology only made heresy even more available to the reading public, More sometimes 
questioned whether this cure was any worse than the disease.162  In the Responsio, More 
committed himself to representing the words of Henry and Luther as they were written, side 
by side, doubting that the average reader would be so industrious as to compare the two 
sources on his own.  By the time More was a seasoned veteran of polemic, he noted the 
polemicist’s dilemma: “[T]hey most folyshe heretyke in a town, may write mo fals heresyes 
in one lefe, than the wisest man in the hole world can well and conveniently by reason and 
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authoryte soyle & confute in fourtye.”163  While the mind was almost habitually or 
instinctively willing to accommodate negative doubt, that is, doubt raised without evidence, 
it was less ready to produce or accept an answer to doubt.  
Far from just defining the grounds of religious polemic in the decades to come, More 
used the Responsio to interrogate whether religious polemic could be an effective mode, and 
if so, what purpose it could and should reasonably expect to fulfill, especially when the 
church’s identity was becoming as unsteady as that of its enemies. While the Responsio calls 
into question the very enterprise of polemic using its fictive frame, the Dialogue turns wholly 
to fiction in order to call into question reformist modes of belief. The exact convictions of 
More during this period are far from clear. Scholars have debated whether his defense is of 
the Roman Catholic Church, the English Catholic Church, England and Henry VIII, or even 
whether at heart he thought of himself as defending anything at all. Despite More’s dislike of 
heresy, especially “seditious heresy,”164 we find him not heedlessly immersing himself in the 
public discourse of religious controversy, but rather cautiously examining how print 
transmits and translates religious debate and what affect a published text has on religious 
controversy and consciousness. In his use of fiction in his polemical works throughout the 
1520s, More tests the changing role of language in the formation of religious belief. While 
his early use of fiction reveals his skepticism about the new media of printed polemic, by the 
end of the decade More deploys fiction skillfully to affirm the value of uncertainty and 
skepticism rather than dogmatic polemic to religious orthodoxy and the reform of heresy.  
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II. Fiction and the Normative Value of Religious Polemic  
In its methodology More’s Responsio ad Lutherum is a highly conventional religious 
polemic. But the text becomes much less conventional when we consider its publication 
history combined with More’s important revisions in the fictional epistles accompanying its 
two editions. The fictional epistolary narratives that frame the two versions of the Responsio 
ad Lutherum call our attention to More’s uneasiness about printed religious polemic 
specifically, and the influence of text on religious belief more generally.  Beyond using his 
fictions for entertainment and emotional detachment, the frames evidence More’s skepticism 
and are the product of his escalating uncertainty about the most effective way to curb heresy. 
As “printed polemic [began] to displace oral disputation,” More found himself in the midst of 
an epistemological shift that required a reexamination of the boundaries between oral and 
visual cultures.165   
If we compare More’s Letter to Maartin van Dorp (1515) with his Responsio ad 
Lutherum, we see an early manifestation of his vacillating attitude towards the question of 
whether or not printed polemic was useful for religious reform or orthodoxy. In this letter, 
More considers how a letter to Erasmus that was published before the intended recipient was 
able to read it compromises the text’s original meaning.  In 1514, Maartin van Dorp 
composed a letter attacking Erasmus for his Greek New Testament and his Moriae 
encomium. Dorp’s letter elicited a hasty reply from Erasmus, which was in turn answered by 
Dorp with a second letter. Significantly, Erasmus never received either letter from Dorp; the 
first he found in the hands of a friend in Antwerp, and a copy of the second was given to him 
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by More himself.  By the end of 1515, Dorp supervised the publication of his letter and 
Erasmus’s reply.166   
In his letter to Dorp, More stresses the importance of personal conference in religious 
and intellectual debate. He expresses his displeasure that he had been unable to speak to Dorp 
in person because he had been detained by the obligations of his political career. Similarly, 
he censures Dorp for addressing Erasmus by letter rather than meeting with him after he had 
been “recently…summoned for a private visit.”  “Why not give his instructions in person,” 
More asks, “instead of waiting to step out the door and then shouting them up from the street, 
when Erasmus was so far away that, though he should have been either the first or even the 
only person to hear the advice, he was not only the last to find out about it but he learned of it 
only through others?”167  Because the letter was published before it was read by its intended 
recipient, any purpose it had as a corrective or instructive piece of advice had been 
compromised by its publication, for what was constructive advice in private conversation or 
epistolary exchange became offensive polemic when committed to the printed page.  In other 
words, not only is textual communication not as useful in More’s mind as oral 
communication, but once a manuscript text is published, its fundamental meaning may 
change or become obsolete.168   
More chastises Dorp for his second letter to Erasmus “which is being read 
everywhere” and facetiously claims that he is certain that Dorp would never have let the 
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letter out to the public intentionally. “The main reason that drives me to think so,” More 
writes with irony, is that some passages are written “so acerbically” and “so shoddily” that 
Dorp “would have written more mercifully…and more carefully” if he had known that the 
document would become public knowledge.  However, More’s claim must be set against his 
censure of Dorp a few lines later, in which he states that Dorp wrote “as if [he is] deliberately 
twisting the meaning of [Erasmus’s] words to get all the theologians and even all the 
universities, as they are called, up in arms against him.”169  He warns Dorp that although he 
may not have meant any “ill will” towards Erasmus, readers “who fail to appreciate fully the 
modesty and the veritably swanlike candor of [his] nature” may misinterpret his meaning and 
intentions.170  In sum, in the letter to Dorp, More suggests that a public, printed text is 
vulnerable to misinterpretation, that at best it renders ambiguous and at worst it misrepresents 
the intention of the author, and that it encourages satire and polemics rather than learning or 
reasoned debate.  
This small scale polemical incident is writ large in the early 1520s in the exchange 
between Henry, Luther, and More, for by then the nature of the debate had changed, and the 
stakes were even higher.  No longer was the debate between two individual humanists, but 
between large scale representatives of orthodoxy and heresy. In his response to Luther, More 
made some concessions to the polemical mode—perhaps necessarily so—though his mistrust 
of the mode itself had only intensified.  More reaffirmed his dislike of polemic as a form of 
public discourse, for it indicated nearly the desperate state of a church or a nation that was 
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faced with a significantly high level of danger. Because a polemical work—or any other kind 
of writing for that matter—was unlikely to have any effect on a tried and true heretic, it 
would do more to spread heretical ideas than to correct them.  What had begun in 1520 as an 
offensive gesture, Luther’s Babylonian Captivity, had readily evolved into a contest between 
a radical reformer and the King of England, who composed his response in order to secure 
himself the title of Defender of the Faith.171 With the help of his advisors, probably More, 
Henry responded with a defense of the seven sacraments; from those two statements of 
position came a series of increasingly irrational and self-sustaining exchanges between 
Luther and the King.  
The message of his lengthy answer to Luther in defense of Henry VIII is that 
polemical writings are the product of a fallen, sinful world.  More begins the Responsio with 
an affirmation of the advantages of print to religious debate and with a justification of his 
conventional polemical style. Though challenged by Luther to a personal confrontation, 
More thinks the printed medium is the safest position from which to attack his adversary: “I 
think no one is so senseless as to enter the place to which his enemy summons him for a 
fight, since there cannot be a more level plain for the struggle, or one less exposed to 
ambush, than a controversy carried on by means of published books, in which neither side 
can pretend, either that any point was falsely kept from the record by the secretaries, or later 
corrupted by forgers, or that anything had escaped him unforeseen in the heat of a hurried 
disputation.”172  Human error—both honest and dishonest—endangers a dispute when it is 
transcribed from an oral to a textual, in this case manuscript, medium.  The erroneous copy, it 
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would seem, is then what would be either copied or published and placed on permanent 
public record.  Indeed, the Responsio takes the form it takes—that of a point-by-point 
refutation with immense quotations from Luther’s and Henry’s texts with More’s comments 
mediating between the two—precisely because More does not want to be accused of 
misquoting his opponent.       
But despite this affirmation, More’s uncertainty about the value of oral, manuscript, 
and published mediums to orthodoxy and reform is apparent in the intricate and ambiguous 
epistolary narratives with which he frames and complicates the Responsio. Like his other 
rhetorical flourishes—his “merry tales,” penetrating humor, and incisive irony that appear 
earlier in his fiction and later in his Dialogue Concerning Heresies—More’s fictional frames 
have been celebrated chiefly for their stylistic rather than their substantive value.  In his 
analysis of More’s polemical works, Rainer Pineas assigns the epistolary exchange between 
William Ross and John Carcellius prefaced to the second edition of the Responsio the 
“polemical function…of acting as praemunitio or prejudicial introduction to the book that 
More is about to attack.”173  Commenting on More’s use of the epistle to envision this frame 
narrative, John Headley argues that “the exercise of good letters and polemic” went hand in 
hand.174  But if the fictional frames are rhetorically powerful, they also focus the reader’s 
attention on the uncertainty of language and of the printed text.  The fictions embedded in his 
nonfiction works not only are didactic and diversionary, but they also dichotomize 
appearance and reality in a way that exposes the artificiality of the written word.   
When scholars question why More chose to create these fictional frame narratives, 
they often remark that such a cunning device should be seen as characteristic of the author of 
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the interpretive labyrinths of Utopia.  Headley, for example, suggests that More adopted a 
persona suitable to his temperament and goes so far as to suggest that the only reason More 
did not continue the fiction throughout the work was that the increasing demands of his 
political career prevented him from doing so at the time. The epistolary personas allow More 
to “keep his distance” from the necessary vehemence of his quid pro quo attack on Luther.  
They represent a “strand of festivitas” which interacts with and counterbalances his 
“Christian gravitas,” in order to prevent his “earnest piety” from becoming “insupportable to 
himself, and also to his readers.”175  
The publication history of the Responsio is complicated, but untangling it reveals the 
purposefulness of these frame letters and the depths of More’s anxieties about publication. 
More produced two versions, now known as the Baravellus and the Rosseus editions. The 
Baravellus was printed between February and June of 1523, while the Rosseus was printed in 
December of that same year.  With a few presentation copies made, More suppressed the 
work, made significant additions to the tenth chapter of the first book and rewrote the 
frame.176  More wrote the manuscripts and the errata sheets himself, not trusting the work to 
anyone else.177  
The Baravellus edition begins with two prefatory letters, John Carcellius’s letter to 
the reader followed by Baravellus’s letter to Lucullus. Of these three, only Carcellius will 
reappear in the frame of the Rosseus edition, while Baravellus and Lucullus, the latter of 
which we never actually hear from, never appear again. Indeed, as John Headley notes, the 
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only reason we know of their existence at all is because a single copy of the Baravellus 
edition has been preserved.  
In the first edition, the letter of Carcellius to the reader indicates that he comes into 
contact with the text when he casually visits a printer’s shop. The unnamed printer shows 
Carcellius his latest endeavor—a “little book brought to him from Spain, written by 
Ferdinand Baravellus, a man very outstanding in theology.”  Baravellus writes the book, 
Carcellius says, because Luther’s slanders undermine religious unity and social hierarchy.  
The printer’s motives for reprinting the work is profit; the printer is confident that this 
text “is the kind of work…everyone would be eager to buy.” Carcellius asks to borrow the 
book and vows to help the printer in his project if he is able to “add to the value of the work 
in any way…so that the book might be more favorably received when it was published.”178  
He approves of the work and decides to give the book some order, adding chapters with titles 
and “an index so that single items might be found more readily by the reader.” He also hopes 
that these editorial measures will make the text more competitive with imported texts, which 
Carcellius anticipates since the work “seemed to be just what all the people were looking 
for.”179  Carcellius admits the invasiveness of his editorial practice by warning the reader that 
he has had to make changes and add comments of his own and by asking the reader’s 
forgiveness for “boldly [laying] hands on the writing of another person.”180  From the outset, 
Carcellius is associated with and takes an active role in the printing trade even as he also 
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serves as a reader and editor for the text, advising future readers of its shortcomings, but 
ultimately of its desirability.  
In the second prefatory letter in the Baravellus edition, significantly also a record of a 
conversation, we can discern the character of the author of the Responsio from his own 
words.  By his own account, Baravellus is “tricked” into writing this text by the uncle of 
Lucullus.181 He identifies himself as a part of the “university” and his conversation with 
Lucullus’s uncle begins with the uncle questioning him on the temper of the university 
towards the works of Luther.  Baravellus attests to the generally lukewarm attitude of 
Luther’s readers at first, which turned fiery only after the publication of Luther’s Babylonian 
Captivity. Though he seems only incidentally concerned about the spread of  Lutheranism, 
Baravellus feels obligated to answer Luther because he does not merely defend himself, but 
attacks the King and in doing so “twist[s]” the words of Henry “in the telling, so that through 
fraud he could appear to the reader as witty.”  Despite these political motivations for writing 
the book, Baravellus is certainly the weaker side in his debate with Lucullus’s uncle. He 
reluctantly writes this text, offering repeated excuses to Lucullus’s uncle as to why 
responding to the ravings of a lunatic—even if they are ravings against Henry VIII—is 
pointless.  But finally, Baravellus is persuaded, that is, nearly commanded, “to answer at 
length” and juxtapose the King’s and Luther’s texts, adding to them his own commentary.  
The uncle advises that the project will require him to “do violence to [his] excessively 
modest nature” in order to match wits with the “frenzied friarlet.”182  
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What emerges from these two letters are two distinct views of Baravellus, two ways 
of approaching a text, and a number of ways in which texts are being altered for better and 
for worse.  If we compare the printer’s version of the author with the author’s own account of 
the genesis of the work, we see both Baravellus’s and Carcellius’s shortcomings. Carcellius 
articulates a social, political, and theological agenda for the work that seems inconsistent 
with Baravellus’s pathetic rendition of why he wrote the work. At most, Baravellus has a 
political agenda remote from religious controversy per se.  Carcellius also makes claims 
about the audience of this work that Baravellus seems never to have considered. As a 
polemical writer, Baravellus lacks intention and will, although it is unclear whether this 
absence of moral intent detracts from the efficacy of the polemic.  What is clear is that his 
very nature must be adapted to fit the tone of religious controversy.  Baravellus indicates the 
trepidation with which More viewed the potential affects of polemicism on the writer 
himself. 
Then there is Caracellius.  Carcellius is suspiciously eager to make the text’s 
publication as financially successful as possible.  While he is zealous for controversy, the 
idea of curbing heresy could not be further from his mind.  He wishes to seek revenge against 
Luther for insulting Henry VIII and England more generally, but there is little thought to 
what this text can actually do against the spread or prevention of heresy. Carcellius also 
claims to amend the text in order to make it more reader-friendly, but in fact, his emendations 
do not support that claim. One look at the so-called index will reveal a long list without any 
readily recognizable organization—chronological, topical, alphabetical—whatsoever.  
 In other words, in determining the “value” of a text, Carcellius considers the book’s 
newsworthiness and profitability over its moral intent or value. Carcellius’s focus on the 
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economic success of the press is particularly instructive in light of David Loades’s argument 
that printing and popular literacy were mutually encouraging. “Before 1520,” Loades 
explains, “there was a thin trickle of ballads and romances” which Loades contrasts with the 
“vast flood” of a broader range of printed materials “by the end of the century.”  He attributes 
this flood both to the “influence of printing” and “vernacular bibles,” which occasioned this 
“change…by creating a fresh demand in the minds of those already literate.”  Loades places a 
special emphasis on the role of religious controversial writing of the 1520s, “especially from 
1529 onward when they became a source of news and argument on the current issues of 
domestic politics.”183   
In a later letter to Erasmus dated June 1532, More’s anxiety about the motives of the 
reading public can be seen in full relief. Complaining about the “open-door policy towards 
these newfangled erroneous sects,” More worries that the “steady stream of books written in 
our vernacular and containing mistranslations, and worse, misinterpretations of Scripture, 
have been sending into our land every brand of heresy from Belgium.”  He had responded to 
many of these works—just as he had reluctantly written the Responsio—not for the men who 
will examine all texts carefully, “but because some people would like to give an approving 
eye to novel ideas, out of superficial curiosity, and to dangerous ideas, out of devilry; and in 
so doing they assent to what they read, not because they believe it to be true, but because 
they want it to be true.”184 Print, it would seem, only corroborated intellectual freedom and 
indulged human error.   
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In the prefatory letters to the first edition of the Responsio, More anticipates the 
ethical dilemma that printed religious polemic brings about by the 1530s. More would seem 
to be calling into question the motives of polemic—probably in part because in defending 
Henry’s Assertio from Luther’s attack on it, More is defending a text that was less a product 
of Henry’s “intellectual curiosity or holy zeal” and more of his desire for a “resounding 
title.”185 The entire exchange points to More’s uneasiness about print as an agent of reform. 
In the two letters prefaced to the Baravellus edition, there is little correspondence between 
the intentions of the publisher/reader and the writer. Indeed, the publisher/reader Carcellius 
and the writer Baravellus work at cross-purposes.186 Carcellius thinks only of the reader and 
little of the author, while Baravellus, at least in the prefatory epistle, has little concern for his 
audience. As the editor, Carcellius addresses the reader; Baravellus addresses Lucullus; and 
never shall the editor, reader, and writer meet. Never, that is, until the Rosseus edition.  
John Headley notes that in dropping Baravellus from the second, this time published 
and circulated, edition, More “explains the premature appearance of the first issue and 
satisfactorily accounts for all the activities, doubts, and confusion of the loyal Carcellius.”187 
The second edition ends with the printer explaining the need for the emendations that the 
author required and made, which provides a rationale for the second edition.  In the Rosseus 
edition, More rewrote the prefatory letters, this time dropping the Spanish persona of 
Baravellus and taking on the persona of an Englishman. Headley has argued that this change 
occurred because “the Baravellus had been somewhat overly fanciful and remote in its 
                                                
185 Headley, Introduction, CW 5.2.721. 
 
186 On humanist anxieties about the corruptibility of the printed text, see Martin Davies, “Humanism in Script 
and Print in the Fifteenth Century,” Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, ed. Jill Kraye 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) esp. 57.   
 
187 Headley, Introduction, CW 5.2.797. 
91 
Spanish setting, [while] the revised version is emphatically English,” and it was appropriate 
that an Englishman should defend the English king.  Quite true, but this does not explain why 
More did not just change the settings and the names, but rewrites the letters altogether.   
Though still very early in his public career, by 1523 More’s hesitations about 
publication had many precedents in his own as yet brief printing history.  In 1518 in response 
to the 1513 attack of Germain de Brie, or Brixius, on England, More published a collection 
of epigrams. He was encouraged, he tells Erasmus in May 1520, to print his own and 
Brixius’s writings together in order to open the entire contents of the controversy to the 
reader and to allow the reader to judge with all the information in hand.  In the end, Erasmus 
persuaded More to suppress his writings against Brixius, including a letter that had already 
been published. More immediately bought up all the copies not yet sold by the printer to 
prevent his letter against Brixius from becoming available to the public.188  This episode in 
More’s publication history will become one of a pattern—both in fact and fiction. The 
publication history of the Utopia is yet another example as is his letter to Bugenhagen in 
1526.189   
In the first letter of the second edition of the text, Carcellius suggests to us just how 
desirable polemical texts are to the reading public. Staying with a host outside of Rome, Ross 
is given Luther’s response to Henry’s Assertio. Ross immediately takes the book, saying, 
“Indeed, there is nothing I would rather read.”190  It would seem fairly safe to say that Ross is 
no heretic, not even the incipient heretic whom More introduces us to in a Dialogue 
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Concerning Heresies. Ross claims that after reading the King’s book—which, though 
polemical, would seem to be justified reading for even the most pious Englishman—he must 
read Luther’s because the King’s arguments were so solid that he cannot imagine what 
Luther would say that would be a “credible” argument.  Moreover, Ross not only reads the 
book, he reads it aloud to the host.  Ross is unbothered by the fact that this book has been put 
on the papal Index because it is so entirely heretical that it could never be mistaken for 
anything other than what it is—“scurrilous railing and heresies abhorrent to the ears of all 
good men.”191  In many ways Ross represents the rarest of creatures—the ideal reader—
whose existence, as More’s 1532 letter to Erasmus indicates, he increasing doubts.   
The ways in which the host convinces Ross resemble the ways in which the uncle 
convinces Baravellus to respond to Luther.  Ross refuses to allow the book to be rushed into 
print and wants time to do more research on some of his points, but he does allow his learned 
host to borrow it and show it to friends. The host then disseminates the text in manuscript 
among “several of his learned friends.” “My host,” Ross writes, that is, the very man who 
convinces Ross for the necessity of this text, “assured me that the work would remain in my 
control.”  When the host returns the manuscript to Ross, he encourages him to publish the 
book immediately, noting that the learned men to whom he had showed the book had wanted 
to publish the book without Ross’s consent, but the host kept his word and did not allow such 
publication to take place. However, the way in which Ross repeatedly stresses the host’s 
insistence that he print the text immediately serves to raise the reader’s suspicion of the 
host’s character. It seems likely, given the discovery that Ross is about to make, that the host 
knew that one of his friends had copied the book and very possibly was planning to publish 
it.  
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Ross finally agrees to publish, but still doubtful, he sends the book to Carcellius—the 
very man who in the letter in the first edition was so eager to harness the selling power of 
polemic. It would seem that the eagerness for polemical writing is an index of its moral 
unreliability.  Making an additional manuscript of the book, Ross gives the book to a young 
man he identifies only as Herman of Prague, a one-time student of Carcellius in England.  
Never hearing from Carcellius, Ross assumes that the book is lost, for he has “no doubt” of 
Herman’s “trustworthiness…even yet.” For a man who feels strongly the need to control 
polemical works, Ross puts his text in a good deal of jeopardy in various ways.  While 
preparing yet a third manuscript to send to Carcellius again, Ross finds that the book has 
already been published and that another man has claimed it as his own. Ross notes that since 
he was sending the manuscript only to a friend, he neglected to put his name on the text, so 
he assumes that “some compassionate man received it as a child cast off by an unknown 
father and brought it out as his own.”192 
In short, far from being a rhetorical device, the letters that frame the Responsio can be 
read more substantively, as taking part in and addressing the very problematic relationship 
between print culture, religious polemics, and religious belief.  None of Ross’s decisions, 
with the exception of his initial desire to read the text, are his own. After Ross reads Luther’s 
text, he is morally compelled towards an indeclinable, inertial path. Publication makes new 
demands on the orthodox Christian whose responsibility it is, whether he likes it or not, to 
respond to such an attack. It becomes apparent in the 1520s that the cost of ignoring such 
texts is futile book bannings and burnings.  Six years following the publication of the 
Responsio ad Lutherum, More will articulate the problematic nature of the polemical mode 
when he begins his Dialogue Concerning Heresies with “an olde sayd saw”: “One busyness 
                                                
192 More, CW 5.1.23-25. 
94 
begettyth and bryngeth forth a nother.”193 These prefatory fictional epistles foreshadow the 
flurry of polemical debate in which More will find himself entangled between 1529 and 
1533.  With their mixed motives, questionable agendas, and careless misinterpretations, 
Carcellius, Baravellius, and Ross are every bit as ambiguous and illegible as the more overtly 
fictional character Raphael Hythlodaye.  If the epistles are meant to prejudice the reader, they 
prejudice him against the printed text as a source of religious knowledge altogether.   
More’s suspicions about the limited moral value of a printed text becomes even 
clearer if we turn to the content of the Responsio.  In addition to the fictitious narrative that 
frames the Responsio and calls into question the effects of a polemical, print culture on 
religious belief, More also takes on the question of the problem of Lutheran biblical 
hermeneutics in his lengthy tenth chapter. The emerging print-dominated, vernacular 
polemical culture of the 1520s that forced More to reassess the value and means of printed 
religious debate went hand in hand with a similar reevaluation occasioned by the Lutheran 
heresy of sola scriptura. More’s hermeneutics evidences his distrust of the printed text.  If 
printed texts are unwieldy containers of meaning, the scriptures do not escape More’s 
scrutiny either.  For More, the written word has no special value; many things necessary to 
salvation have not been recorded in the scriptures, but the unwritten word may be seen as a 
stronger source of certainty.   
As we saw in the first chapter, in the important tenth chapter of his Responsio ad 
Lutherum, More attacked the dogmatism of Luther’s ecclesiology as an impediment to 
reform; here too, More also attacked the epistemological certainty that was the basis of 
Lutheran hermeneutics.  According to More, epistemological certainty was a luxury that a 
reformer often did not have and did not need.  In contrast to Luther, More deemphasizes the 
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power of the written word, arguing that many things necessary to salvation have not been 
recorded in the scriptures.  Instead, More looks to what he called the unwritten word of God 
as a source of certainty.  More concedes that Luther’s strictly literal reading of the written 
scripture allows him the security of a single meaning, but this meaning which Luther 
“present[s] as the indubitably true meaning” is frequently one that is the “least probable of 
many.” In other words, the literal sense of scripture grants certainty, but not a perfect truth.  
More accepts the ambiguity of the scriptures (an ambiguity which Luther patently denies): 
“The literal sense, if it should ever be evident, is almost always the only one effective for 
proving anything; still, since it often happens that a matter is expressed too obscurely for that 
single meaning to flash out from the ambiguous words, all the most learned men and the 
holiest of ancient theologians have usually ascertained various meanings, leaving the matter 
open for careful consideration.”194  But this instantaneous transformation from ignorance to 
knowledge mirrors Luther’s model for the ideal reader: that is, like the spontaneous 
emergence of a Stoic sage out of an ordinary man, the perfect reader will move 
instantaneously from ignorance to knowledge, from damnation to salvation.195   Moreover, 
the greater problem is that the false sense of certainty gained by a literal interpretation creates 
all the more reason for doubt in matters that require faith.  In the Apology, More will 
complain that for heretics “there is nothynge that ought to be taken for a sure and undowted 
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trouth of the crysten bylyefe, but yf it maye be proved by playne and evident scripture,” 
though even the written scripture cannot be identified “but by the chyrch.”196 More argues 
that the physical church and both necessary and unnecessary points of doctrine are contained 
in the unwritten word of God. On the other hand, More dismisses the Lutheran concept of the 
invisible church. In other words, More bases the church and its sacraments on the unwritten 
word of God, while Luther seeks to justify an invisible church on the concrete text of 
scripture.   
More’s attempt to acknowledge the new weight given by Lutheran reformers to 
individual religious experience is evident in his understanding of the individual’s interaction 
with the Scriptures.  More argues that the truth of scripture is transmitted orally through 
sanctioned channels, but that the act of “hearing” God was a decidedly experiential form of 
knowledge.  The holy spirit, “theos agraptos; that is, ‘the God of whom nothing is written,’” 
could be the only guarantor of scriptural truth.  Significantly, the Holy Spirit spoke not just to 
clergy, but to the common man.  Even an average uneducated man, for example, the apostle 
Peter, might receive the truths of scripture without reading or hearing the scriptures read.  
Peter learned by experience, “not from a word written exteriorly but from the Spirit of the 
Father pouring Himself out interiorly”; nevertheless, he should be no less certain about the 
word of God just because “he felt it, did not read it,” or just “because he heard it interiorly, 
not exteriorly.”197  But according to More, this individual religious experience only 
strengthened the power of the Church because it immunized the laity against heresy.  
Stronger than tablets of stone, wood, or any printed text, the “new law [is written] inwardly 
by the finger of God on the book of the heart…[and] what he has written on the heart will 
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last…so indelibly that no deceptions of the heretics can erase it, no matter how many 
scriptural texts they produce from the books of the gospel that are apparently contrary to the 
true faith.”198  
What we see in the Responsio is More questioning how print culture affects textual 
meaning as well as how the new culture of polemical literature that print culture gives rise to 
in the 1520s affects religious belief. For More, Luther’s hermeneutics which would seem to 
undercut true religious meaning only further indicate the uncertainties of the relationship 
between the printed text and religious belief.  
In the peroration of the Responsio, reflects on the ethical costs of polemic for its 
writer. He notes that polemic loses its efficacy when the writer “recount[s] decently what has 
been written indecently.”199  More fears that in answering polemic in the only way polemic 
can be answered—that is, with equally abrasive if not more abusive polemic—the publishing 
of controversies will only perpetuate religious divisions and make more members of society 
aware of them.200  The peroration ends with a confession that utterly deflates the religious 
value of the text when More notes that his “book [is] not to be the kind that demands 
publication as something that must be read, so I trust it is not the kind which a person ought 
rightly to condemn who deigns to read Luther’s trifles.”201  If a man already rejects Lutheran 
doctrine, then he has no need to read this book, the author claims; moreover, these books, the 
author realizes, are the products and perpetuation of heresy.  The author, far from wanting his 
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work to be a best seller as Carcellius does, would rather all polemical works be burned than 
that they be necessary.202 The mode of religious polemic, then, by its very nature, has no 
absolute moral or religious value; it is entirely dependent upon its very problematic context 
for its ethical value.  More’s doubt about the polemical mode as an effective purveyor of 
moral value is underscored by the fact that this kind of text is highly circumstantial and 
unstable, and that any good it can create exists only in response to human error.     
 
III. Normative Fiction and the Criterion 
More’s discussions of scripture and Lutheran hermeneutics in the tenth chapter of the 
Responsio are instructive because they show him defining his commitment to a church that 
promotes orthodoxy and social harmony at the cost of certainty.  Though he censures the 
utopian nature of the Lutheran church, More himself sought to reinforce the fictions 
necessary to hold society together with as little damage as possible to the ideal of religious 
truth.  For this reason, it is important that although More begins the decade of the 1520s by 
using fiction in a limited capacity to examine the moral stakes of the polemical mode in print, 
by the end of the decade he will forgo traditional polemic for the more skeptical form of the 
fictional dialogue. But it is precisely within this less dogmatic form that More searches for 
certainty. In the Dialogue Concerning Heresies, More uses fiction to justify the 
indemonstrable but necessary assumptions that religious and political unities rest upon.  
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Central to the stabilizing power of these fictions is something More terms “credence.” 
Though it is difficult to separate truth from falsehood, credence emerges as a criterion to help 
a man determine what to believe. Credence is a negotiation between the individual 
conscience and all external sources of knowledge—political and religious institutions, history 
and tradition, texts, and heretics—but social and religious harmony, not truth, is its final 
aim.203 It can be defined quantitatively or qualitatively, that is, it can be manifested either as 
a faith in consensus or as a faith in an individual based on the evidence of his virtuous 
character. Either way, for More the essential characteristic of credence is that it follows a 
logic of probability. Moreover, More contrasts credence and the probability it is based upon 
with a similar but destabilizing rationale for religious reform: possibility. Unlike possibility, 
which recommends a stay in judgment and which will not resolve doubt, probability can be a 
benchmark for a legitimate or normative value judgment. 
Many scholars have argued that probabilism arrived in human consciousness only 
after the work of Pascal. Ian Hacking in particular has argued that societies that lack 
sophisticated mathematics and that value piety are not environments in which probabilism 
can exist.204  But if we look at the two forms of probability Hacking describes, we can see 
that something that at the very least approaches probability is central in the discussions of 
law, justice, faith, and ethics in the early sixteenth century.  Hacking distinguishes between a 
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probability that is based on degrees of belief in the integrity of a given piece of evidence and 
a probability that is defined by the production of stable relative frequencies.205  Though 
More’s ideas about consensus are not aleatory in the least, clearly there are hints of both of 
these definitions in his understanding of quantitative and qualitative consensus.206  In the 
Dialogue there are two important test cases that More uses in developing his sense of the 
evidence necessary to establish credence: the belief in miracles, or more to the point, a faith 
in those who claim to have seen miracles, and witness testimony in heresy trials.  Both of 
these cases reveal More’s attempts to answer the problem of the uncontrollable uncertainty 
that occurs when men use subjective experience as a criterion for faith.    
The nature of probability and credence are investigated in the fictional exchange 
between two oppositional characters, a narrator who represents orthodoxy and a messenger 
who represents an “incipient heretic.” Through the characters of his Dialogue—actual and 
implied—More dramatizes the strain that print culture and Lutheran heresy placed upon 
social relationships.  The increasing subjectivity and interiority of religious identity made 
credence difficult to determine with any precision. The subject of credence opens the 
Dialogue, and we soon discover that it is the very cause of the Dialogue—both in the sense 
that it is the impetus for the conversation that takes place as well as the record of that 
conversation.  The narrator suspects that the messenger has Lutheran sympathies from the 
very beginning; however, in an attempt to put the narrator at ease regarding his religious 
leanings, the messenger arrives with a “letter of credence” written by a third party we never 
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see that is meant to validate his religious character. But not so easily put off from his 
suspicions, the narrator begins the dialogic process of locating and exposing the threat of 
heresy that he suspects. The dialogue, then, illustrates the degree to which the increasing 
interiority of religion and faith combined with a new readership of an English scripture 
placed a significant strain on social bonds, making the maintenance of religious authority 
particularly important. Once again, More’s fictional frame calls our attention to the complex 
and dynamic relationship between oral, manuscript, and print culture.  
However, the stability of religious authority is especially problematic for the narrator 
because unlike Luther, who defined the true church as an entity purified of all evil, the 
narrator contends that the church is a mixture of good and evil. Because of this mixture, the 
church must be held together by a normative religious authority that will negotiate and 
control these differences.  According to the narrator, truth and falsity often reside closely 
together, making it difficult for the individual to separate them and encouraging the 
splintering of religious belief.  “Never was there a heretic / that said all false,” affirms the 
narrator, who reads the subtle changes that Tyndale makes in his translation of the Bible as 
an example of the ease with which heresy can be spread without the reader’s knowledge.207   
This problematic mixture makes finding standards for credence all the more difficult—and 
all the more important. 
While the narrator insists that religious truth must be determined on the basis of 
consensus, the messenger is a great believer in the value of the senses. The first of the four 
books of the Dialogue is devoted to a debate between the messenger and the narrator over the 
veracity of miracles.  The discussion centers on the question of qualitative probability—
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whether or not men who are known to be honest should be believed when what they report 
seems entirely against reason and nature. According to the narrator, far from being contrary 
to reason, a “styffe” stance against miracles is likely to occasion “unreasonableness.”208  If an 
individual is credible, so the argument of the narrator goes, then he should be believed even 
if what he says seems impossible because it is probable that a person who is an honest and 
virtuous man will not lie about what he claims to have seen or what he claims to know. 
Probability is a more reliable criterion when it is grounded in the evidence of virtue rather 
than the senses.  
According to the narrator, reason and judgment based on experience and the senses 
are often deceptive and lead to error. To illustrate this point, the narrator gives the example of 
the “man of Inde” who, never having left his own country and so never having seen any skin 
color other than black, assumes that white skin is contrary to the nature of man. In a case 
such as this, logical conclusions based on sense experience do not lead to an approximation 
of truth.209  The messenger agrees with the narrator’s conclusion, but argues that the missing 
ingredient is the education that would inform the man of Inde that skin color is determined by 
climate.  The narrator unfavorably compares the man of Inde to the messenger, who assumes 
by a kind of formal syllogism that all men are fools and so only knowledge confirmed by 
one’s own senses is trustworthy. Signficantly, the “man of Inde” is likely a reference to St. 
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probability is a late seventeenth-century phenomenon seldom know how to explain—wrote that if “barbarians” 
were introduced to both Christians and Saracens, “they would not be able or obliged to guess which of these 
two was the truer religion without some more visible proof of probability on one side or the other.” See De indis 
in Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writings, ed. and trans. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991) 271.  
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Thomas, the doubting apostle.210 Moreover, the narrator compares the messenger to the 
doubting Thomas who wants “goddess blessynge to byleue that I se not.”211    
The narrator then attempts to define faith skeptically in response to the messenger’s 
empiricism, and he notes that many kinds of knowledge—not just spiritual knowledge—
require the assistance of faith.  Many social bonds depend upon a faith in indemonstrable 
premises.212  For example, no firsthand experiential knowledge exists that identifies beyond 
doubt one’s relatives. Following the messenger’s standards for confirming truth, no man can 
ever truly know who his parents are, since he was not cognitively present at his conception or 
delivery, nor can a man ever really know who his son is since only his wife (presumably) 
knows for certain the father of the child.  So too, certain everyday phenomena like weather 
would “semeth…impossible” without an affirmed belief in the science of astronomy.213  But 
the messenger privileges the truths of his own experience over the word of a thousand or 
more men. The narrator warns him that it is just as dangerous “in beynge over harde of 
byleve / of thyngys that by reason and nature seme and apere impossible / where thye be 
                                                
210 Germain Marc’hadour notes that More always referred to doubting Thomas as ‘Saint Thomas of Inde’ 
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212 In his discussion of More and Euclidean geometry, Ralph Keen has noted the Platonic element of Euclid’s 
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154).  
 
213 More, CW 6.1.66. It should be noted, however, that this is a problematic argument for the messenger to 
make, given his earlier tirade against learning.   
 
104 
reportyd by credible wytnes / havynge no cause to lye” as to be “to light of credence.”214  In 
other words, the senses cannot be trusted as a source of doubt or belief.  
So too, the senses are not an adequate measure of miracles. According to the narrator, 
an event or phenomenon is often termed miraculous not because it is truly something against 
nature, or as the narrator defines it, those things which God does that “doth nothing against 
nature / but some specyall benefyte above nature,” but because, like the man of Inde, the 
limitations of man’s senses in conjunction with the imagination invent miracles out of the 
unfamiliar.215  “They acquayntaunce and dayly beholdynge takyth away the wondering” as, 
for example, a man born blind that regains his sight might consider the sun, moon, and stars 
to be miraculous, when a sighted man takes for granted that they are natural phenomena.216  
There is very little reason “why we sholde of reason more mervayle of the revyvynge of a 
dede man / than of the bredynge / bryngynge forth and growynge of a chylde into the state of 
man.”217  Even the latest inventions and discoveries—the world as a sphere, the melding of 
iron, the separating of silver, for example—represent a kind of knowledge for which the 
cause remains unknown. The narrator’s argument is not meant to undercut faith in true 
miracles or to suggest that miracles do not exist, but rather to show that the senses are not an 
adequate guide to religious knowledge.  Since categories like the miraculous become 
subjective and arbitrary when measured by sensory experience, they cease to become a 
                                                
214 More, CW 6.1.70. 
 
215 More, CW 6.1.75. 
 
216 This argument would seem to be a paraphrase of the ninth mode of skepticism as listed in Sextus 
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source of true religious knowledge.  In order to remain a valid form of religious knowledge, 
the truly miraculous must be based on a more certain form of evidence.  
The crucial point of the narrator’s questioning of the messenger’s unwavering 
reliance on the senses is that probability must be separated from—and trusted above—
possibility. Faith may use probability to lead to certainty, but reasoning based on sensory 
evidence produces only a number of equal possibilities that leads to the irresolvable doubt 
that jeopardizes stable religious knowledge and normative moral value.  The messenger will 
be convinced by neither qualitative nor quantitative probability, that is, by neither the virtue 
of an authority nor by consensus.  Even “if they were… .x thousande / they were worn out of 
credence with me,” says the messenger, “whan they sholde tell me that they sawe the thynge 
that my selfe knoweth by nature and reason vnpossible.”218  Because the messenger makes 
judgments about truth and falsehood based on reason and possibility, all men are equally 
believable or unbelievable.  The messenger lacks a standard of judgment unless he is judging 
by ocular proof.  “Thus moche haue I proued,” claims the narrator at the end of the chapter, 
“that yf ye byleue no man in suche thyngys as maye not be / than must it follow that ye ought 
to byleue no man in many thyngys that may be / for all is one to you…And of trouth ye can 
not tell whyther they may be or may not be / excepte they be two suche thyngys as imply 
contradiccion / as one selfe thynge in one selfe parte to be both white and blacke at ones.”219 
According to More’s critics, this non-experiential view of faith jeopardized its 
sincerity and led to skepticism. In his response to More’s Dialogue, William Tyndale 
vehemently contests the value that the narrator—and by extension, More—placed in 
probability based on individual virtue or consensus.  In his Answer to Sir Thomas More’s 
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Dialogue Concerning Heresies (1531), Tyndale attacks More for his belief in either a 
quantitative or a qualitative probability. According to him, More’s faith is an inferior faith he 
terms “historical faith,” which depends upon “the truth and honesty of the teller, or of the 
common fame and consent of many.”  In Tyndale’s view, this kind of faith may only lead to 
doubt precisely because it is difficult to maintain non-experiential belief in the midst of 
conflicting opinions. “If one told me that the Turk had won a city, and I believed it, moved 
with the honesty of the man,” a man’s faith would be jeopardized “if there come another 
[man] that seemeth more honest, or that hath better persuasions that it is not so, I think 
immediately that [the first man] lied, and lose my faith again.” This kind of secondhand faith 
is always open to the possibility of correction, which prevents constant belief.  “A feeling 
faith,” on the other hand, “is as if a man were there present when [the city] was won, and 
there were wounded, and there lost all that he had, and were taken prisoner there also: that 
man should so believe, that all the world could not turn him from his faith.”  Only 
experiential faith—a faith which, Tyndale suggests, entails suffering—will keep a man 
constant.  The first kind of faith is “but an opinion” which is easily disproved “if a more 
glorious reason be made.”220  
The practical stakes of the narrator’s discussion of miracles culminates in book three 
of the Dialogue, where his attention turns to an examination of the evidence for faith in 
heresy trials.  The dynamics of heresy trials made painfully obvious the problems of the 
Lutheran interiorization of belief.  John Bellamy has argued that the “proliferation of Tudor 
treason laws” was the “by-product” of the challenge of Rome to the king’s supremacy.221  By 
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1534, heresy officially became a crime of treason.  In addition to giving jurisdiction to lay 
authorities and bishops in enquiries into heresy, the Henrican government “introduce[d] 
provision for witnesses into legislation promoting religious obedience,” and the testimony of 
prosecution witnesses “dominated the Tudor treason trials and secured so many of the 
convictions.”222  Though the outcome of a trial depended upon local self-informing jurors, by 
the Middle Ages the standards for jurors and evidence had changed and power had shifted 
from the jury to the judge.223 Up until the fifteenth century, a witness’s testimony was not 
tested in front of the jurors.224 By the Tudor period “trial juries were thought to be fact 
finders and assessors of the credibility of those who testified.”225  By 1532, two to three 
witnesses were required in heresy trials, and the defendant was permitted to use his own 
witnesses as long as they were “of as good honestie and credence” as those of the 
prosecution.226   
But the standards for accusation were not as reliable as those of evidence. Many trials 
were based on nothing but “seditious words uttered and overheard in public places” or 
“information” that allowed the accuser to make a charge and then “withdraw into obscurity 
without any legal responsibilities”227  Many accusations of treason between 1532-1540 were 
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“without proper foundation often being prompted by malice.”228  In other words, by the early 
sixteenth century, in order to make a correct conviction, the jury had to assess the credibility 
of the witnesses, the accusation, and even the confession or abjuration of the defendant.229   
Indeed, the very basis of positive law was probability. In his popular Dialogue 
between a Doctor and a Student, Christopher St. Germain defined the many intellectual 
faculties that contribute to common law; crucially, St. Germain expressed concern about the 
effects of heresy on these natural faculties. In particular, he cites “sinderesis,” the “natural 
power of the soul” which is the “law of reason,” that allows man to judge good and evil 
without error. Despite its infallibility as a faculty, it has been perverted in heretics “by the 
darkness of ignorance” which makes them believe that “when they die for the wickedness of 
their error, [they] believe they die for the very truth of their faith.”230  The corrective to 
heresy is found in positive law.  However, the “law of man” or positive law is “a thing which 
is necessary, and probably follow[s]…the law of reason and…the law of God.” St. Germain 
notes that positive law “is called probable, in that it appeareth to many, and especially to wise 
men to be true” since the law of reason and the law of God is “very hard” to determine.231  
                                                
228 Bellamy, Tudor Law 84. 
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The Dialogue was published in 1529, in the midst of a significant increase in heresy 
trials as well as shifting standards for evidence.232  A large part of these changes has to do 
with legislation about treason that addressed slander and libel.233 The possession of banned 
books—not one’s beliefs per se—became a pivotal piece of evidence in the heresy trials. Of 
five Henrican heresy statutes, only the “act concerning those who printed or sold prohibited  
books…relied on accusation by private persons, and trial by ‘sufficient’ witness”; all other 
acts simply used witnesses for accusation.234 
In book three, More considers the credibility of witnesses, oaths, and abjurations in 
heresy trials as concrete justifications for the moral value of probability. The majority of 
book three is devoted to discussing heresy trials—in particular, the famous trial of Thomas 
Bilney and Richard Hunne. The use of credence in determining the integrity of witnesses was 
crucial in Thomas Bilney’s trial, which ended, to the narrator’s palpable disgust, in Bilney 
abjuring heresy to save his life.235  The most vexing part of Bilney’s abjuration was its 
exclusion of any admission of guilt—Bilney never had to confess that he ever held heretical 
views himself. The messenger absurdly suggests that perhaps Bilney forgot that he ever held 
these views, but the narrator notes that many credible men had come forward who claimed to 
have heard some of Bilney’s heretical sermons. The messenger attempts to call their 
testimony in doubt “for lacke of [their] indyfferency peradventure as they stode 
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unsworne.”236  Indeed, the messenger is not persuaded of Bilney’s guilt by the number of 
heretics that have adopted his beliefs, nor of over twenty men who have materialized to 
testify to Bilney’s heresies. As St. Germain suggests, it would seem that the messenger’s 
“sinderesis” has been warped by heresy. The narrator says that the messenger’s doubts are “a 
thynge straunge,” to which the messenger only reaffirms his irresolvable doubts: 
“Why…sholde this be straunge to you? Me thynketh it sholde be straunge to no man but very 
playne to euery man / that it myght be so.  For I praye you, myght it not so be? Were it not 
possible that they myght all lye and though they were as many mo?”237  In the messenger’s 
case, the kind of literalism and doubt sanctioned by Lutheran heresy gives free reign to the 
imagination to ignore the logic of probability that rests on faith in consensus or virtue. 
More uses this conversation between the narrator and the messenger, this dialectic of 
probability and possibility, to insist upon a standard of belief in men.  The narrator admits the 
possibility, but as he frequently reminds us of the scholasticism of the messenger’s 
methodology, so too here he notes that the narrator’s argument “were rather to be graunted at 
a scole in argument / than at a courte in judgement.”238  It is at this point, being at his “wyttes 
ende,” that the narrator seeks to answer the messenger’s possibilities using a “merry tale” of 
the fictional court case of Wylken and Symken.  The fiction is a kind of parable meant to 
underline the dangers of experience to the normative moral value that upholds social 
harmony.  
The story begins with a strange wager in which Wylken bets Symken that he can 
prove that a horse has recently traveled a certain road. The two agree to the wager, and they 
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take four judges with them to determine the winner.  In Symken, More gives us not just the 
image of a mere doubter, but the very picture of a skeptic who revels in man’s uncertainty. 
Because he looks for certainty in the truths of experience, Symken’s disbelief is confirmed 
by his imagination. Both Symken and Wylken note that horse shoes appear on the road until 
they reach a body of water at which point the horse evidently was taken on a ship and is no 
longer traceable.  Though Wylken believes that this visible evidence is enough to earn him 
his wager, Symken objects, for the “so-called” horse may be a gelding or a mare, and hence, 
no horse at all. This first objection, the narrator tells us, is a legal matter because both parties 
agree that some creature resembling a horse walked the road, though the exact categorization 
of the animal—whether geldings and mares should be classified as horses or not seems to be 
open for debate—must be determined by the “checker chamber case” or even, by 
praemunire, the papal court in Rome.  
But Symken’s second challenge to Wylken’s evidence is not a matter that the courts 
are able to address.  Symken begins a new line of argument that calls into doubt knowledge 
that is deducted from sensory experience. Though a rational man like Wylken would seem to 
be perfectly within the bounds of reason in forming the conclusion that a horse has walked on 
the road based on the fact that he has witnessed the hoof prints with his own eyes, Symken 
objects to this assumption.  “Lo here ye se,” says Symken, “men have gone this way / and 
how can ye than be sure that any horse wente here? For I put case sayth he that these men 
whiche wente here had horse shone in theyr handes made fast upon longe steles / and always 
as they wente pricked them downe harde in the grounde.”  As arbitrary as this “wyse 
invencyion” sounds, it is possible because it levels reason and the imagination, probability 
and possibility.  Both are interpreting the same sign, though in different ways, but neither 
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interpretation can be proven. Therefore, argues Symken, one argument cannot be held to be 
truer than another.   
Even more problematic is the fact that—like the heretical pamphlets plaguing 
England—all Symken has needed to do to win the wager is to introduce uncertainty; the 
outcome of the wager favors Symken not because he has proven or disproven anything, but 
only because he has assigned possibility the same epistemic value as probability.  Both the 
narrator and the messenger scoff at Symken’s wit in the end, but the importance of this story 
is not forgotten, for with Symken, More shows the degree to which the imagination and 
individual experience and all the possibilities they can conjure, must be kept in check by law 
based on reason grounded in a probability based on virtue or consensus. He also further 
illustrates the problem that subjective experience produces for judgment, in this case for the 
judgment of law. At the same time, More implicitly acquiesces that the laws upon which 
society is based are in large part probable, not demonstrable. If doubt—that is, the nature of 
man, is not controlled by law, social harmony is unlikely to survive.  
The unwieldy human imagination of a citizen like Symken—or like the messenger, or 
Luther, for that matter—wreaks havoc on the assumptions upon which custom and law are 
based. This kind of inventiveness lacks any criterion for judgment. For though it may be the 
case that all the witnesses against Bilney have lied and that the church cannot tell whether 
Bilney’s abjuration is true or false, giving free reign to these kinds of possibilities to the 
extent that they prevent legal action and endanger orthodoxy is too high a cost, for “it may 
be,” retorts the narrator, “yf we go this way to worke / that all the men lyed that ever have 
sayd they came from Rome / and that all the briefs and bulles were fayned that ever were 
supposed to be brought from thens / for ought that he can tell that never came there hym 
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selfe.”  Indeed, the narrator mockingly argues that since the messenger has never been to 
Rome himself he might “as well doubte whyther there were any Rome or no.”239  Symken’s 
belief in possibility rather than probability creates the infinite regress of questioning that was 
typical of skepticism and that is symptomatic of what Popkin has labeled the “crise 
pyrrhonienne.”  
But if Symken represents the unlicensed questioning of Luther or the messenger, he 
also represents Bilney, who makes oaths which he knows not to be true. But More uses a bit 
of intellectual slight of hand to convince the messenger here too. The messenger fears that 
the supposed witnesses against Bilney are lying themselves because they lack “indifferency.”  
In the end what the narrator argues is not that the witnesses are indifferent and therefore 
truthful; instead his argument is contingent upon the faith that if two indifferent men come to 
a judgment based on the testimony of these witnesses (note that More does nothing to restore 
any credibility to these witnesses themselves) then probability tells the judges (who are able 
to make judgments irrespective of witness testimony anyway) that Bilney must be guilty. 
More overlooks validating the witnesses because their sheer number lends them legitimacy, 
but again, also because there is no evidence to be found for credence in Tudor heresy trials.  
More’s answer to the “crise pyrrhonienne,” then, is not a legal system based on truth, but an 
admittedly flawed system that judges and regulates religious belief; it is not a system that 
prizes truth, but rather one that prizes normativity. More engages in skepticism about the 
senses not to promote it, but to limit a more dangerous kind of skepticism—the kind that 
leads to irremediable uncertainty and doubt. In doing so, he relies neither solely on faith nor 
reason, but upon some third thing that rests uneasily between the two: fiction.  
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IV. Print Culture and the Dangers of “Consensus” 
Despite More’s adherence to the authority of consensus and the virtue of the church, 
to some degree he defies Tyndale’s neat dichotomy between a “historical” and a “feeling” 
faith. More did, in fact, put a premium on a “feeling faith”—that is, a faith based on personal 
experience of the unwritten word of God rather than the wrote affirmation of the written 
word or the seeming certainty of a literal hermeneutics.  More’s early polemical work shows 
a reform-minded man keenly aware of the challenge that Lutheran reforms in combination 
with a new culture of printed polemic presented to his steadfast affirmation of church 
orthodoxy. Such a belief at best defied, at worst undermined, the consensus that More’s 
church so depended upon.  In the face of such a category of belief whose uncertainty 
contested the codification of normative moral and religious value, More looks to probability 
as the basis of moral value and religious knowledge. The Responsio shows More seeking to 
come to terms with the challenges print culture presented to the use of language as an agent 
of normative moral value and religious knowledge.  The Dialogue continues and develops 
More’s uncertainty about the basis of moral value and religious knowledge as he criticizes 
reformed religious identity based on individual experience by calling into question the value 
of the senses for religious belief.  
More’s early polemical works reveal how the importation of heretical texts into 
England in the 1520s, Lutheran hermeneutics, print culture, and the more general 
interiorization of religious identity challenged him to reexamine the evidence for faith. 
Throughout the Dialogue, determining when credence makes one faithful and when it makes 
one a fool is at issue in both secular and sacred realms.  Part of the problem stemmed from 
the necessarily indeterminate state of heresy.  When the messenger questions the court’s 
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standards for witnesses, the narrator explains the essential dilemma of heresy.  “The chyef 
cause why that in heyghnouse crimynall causes / as thefte / murder / treason / & heresye” that 
the law accepts witnesses that it would not normally accept in trials of lesser offenses is that 
if the court did not do so “all such crymes shold passe forth vnpunished / and therby shold ye 
world swarm full of such myscheueous peple for lacke of profe and tryall in the mater.” For 
heretics do not usually bring with than “a notary / & honest wytnesse…but vse to do yt by 
stelth as couertly as they can.”240  Indeed, one of the most convincing pieces of evidence was 
“written evidence of traitorous intent,”241 and often it was books, rather than beliefs, that 
were the most damning pieces of evidence in trials.242   
In the Dialogue, More reassesses the nature of belief in light of the rise of heresy in 
England.  He argues that belief rests on probability based on consensus, and consensus, in 
turn, rests—at least to some degree—upon fiction. Yet clearly, More is also working against 
the fictions of the printed page—and losing the battle.  It should be noted, too, that More’s 
polemical works of the 1520s represent something of an anomaly in his polemical career. 
After his Dialogue Concerning Heresies, More largely retreats from fiction and returns to 
vehement polemic.  This period, then, represents an important testing ground as the 
relationship between language and belief are recalibrated to accommodate an era of new 
epistemological challenges for moral authority and ethics. 
In one of these later texts, the Apology, that More wrote to criticize St. Germain’s 
denial of the Church’s authority in the law, the issue of credence and of the Tudor 
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polemicist’s dilemma come to the fore.  Citing some of his later polemical works, many of 
More’s opponents have criticized him for being too one-sided. His “wurkes were worthy 
myche more credence,” his critics tell him, if he “had wryten more indyfferentely.” He finds 
himself in a losing comparison with St. Germain who has written in a “charytable mylde 
maner.”243  But Germain’s charity, according to More, is a dangerous rhetoric that seems to 
express the values of a consensus rather than the opinion of a single man.  In sharp contrast 
to his own characteristic “quod he” and “quod I,” a device he employs in the Dialogue, St. 
Germain’s rhetorical handle is “some say.” More argues that this rhetorical shift is of the 
utmost importance, for “Under hys fayre figure of some say / he maye ye wote well, & some 
saye that he so doth, devyse to brynge in all the myschyefe that any man can saye. And yet 
over thys without hys masker of Some say / he saith open faced some of the wurste hym 
selfe, and that in some thynges that are as some trewe men saye not trewe.”244  In other 
words, print makes it possible to fabricate consensus when no consensus exists, and it 
threatens to invalidate More’s much-valued criterion of judgment, probability.  It is this 
ability to fabricate authority, enabled by print culture, and not simply the questioning of the 
Renaissance mind, that facilitates the intellectual crisis—the “crise pyrrhonienne”—of the 
Reformation in England.  And it is this crisis of the textualization of belief that will be a great 
source of stability and instability for the Church of England as it sought to mediate between 
its orthodox and reformed identities for many years to come. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DENYING THE CONTRARY: CUSTOM AND CONFORMITY IN THE 1590s 
 
I. Hooker and Elizabethan Religious Polemic 
 As we have seen in the work of Thomas More, from its inception, the Church of  
England was riddled with problems of uncertainty surrounding notions of reform that had as 
much to do with doctrine and discipline as they did to do with discourse. Central to the 
establishment of the Elizabethan church was the multivalent question of edification, that is, a 
notion of reform related both to church polity and individual moral progress.245 On the 
macroscopic level, edification refers to the overall movement towards reform, which began 
in earnest under Edward VI and, in the view of many, came to a grinding halt with the 
Elizabethan Settlement. Once propelled with momentum towards reform, as the Church of 
England came closer to defining itself, the effort to reform shifted into the work to maintain 
and enforce its increasingly nationalist, religious identity.  But the question of edification 
also occurred on a microscopic level as the value of moral philosophy and the possibility of 
individual reform was called into question by influential Calvinist notions of grace and 
predestination.   
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 Paul Cefalu has studied the “divergent ways that Conformists and Puritans attempt to 
construct a moral theology that remains consistent with this widespread position against 
moral perfectionism” in the early modern period, as reformed Protestant ideas concerning 
sanctification vastly complicated—indeeed, made nearly impossible—the idea that a 
“compensatory moral system should be incorporated into the order of salvation” at all.246  In 
England, the question of edification was rendered even more complicated by differences in 
reformed and orthodox interpretations of the Church’s role in individual edification.  The 
uncertainties about edification on both the institutional and individual level are mirrored in 
the more general confusion in England over notions of orthodoxy and conformity, on the one 
hand, and dissent and contrariety, on the other. Modern scholarship has shown that notions of 
orthodoxy were not well defined in England by the end of the sixteenth century. In particular, 
Debora Shuger has criticized early modern scholars’ nearly habitual “division of beliefs into 
the orthodox and subversive,” a dichotomy rendered false in her view by the way that “the 
so-called subversive ideas keep resurfacing, however contained, within the confines of 
orthodoxy” in early modern literature.247  Reading the scholarship on both sides of this 
dichotomy—we will call the sides orthodox or conformist and puritan or reformer, 
acknowledging that these are all contentious terms without treading into the debate over 
terminology ourselves—one cannot help but be impressed by how complex and how 
symbiotic these two sides really are. Patrick Collinson and Peter Lake have famously feuded 
over the extent to which Puritanism “had [any] substantial existence beyond what was 
attributed to it by those enemies who first invented it as an abusive term,” Collinson insisting 
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that the “character of a puritan, both in the literary-generic sense and more generally, 
originated as an attributed character, charged with intensely polemical resonances,” while 
Lake has criticized scholars for inventing the myth of a codified Anglicanism well before its 
time.”248 Collinson himself has argued that conformist writers like Bancroft and Hooker tell a 
story of “progressive radicalization” and to him it seems likely that religion was not as 
“polarized [as they] represented it.”249  
Susan Brigden is illuminating on the way in which these two sides used defensive 
strategies that at times inadvertently worked to define each other. For example, Archbishop 
Whitgift seemingly solidified the Puritan or reformist objection to the church with his 
insistence on subscription of the clergy to an article to which “no puritan, no ‘precisian’ 
could, in conscience, consent” in 1583; at the same time the reformist offensive launched via 
polemical attacks only served to create a highly paradoxical defensive strategy on the part of 
some of the most prominent members of the church.250  At least for a brief moment before 
the rise of a more definitive sectarianism in the seventeenth century, at the end of the 
sixteenth century the reformist puritan cause enjoyed a perhaps blissful—if politically 
ineffective—moment of relative solidarity while the Church of England largely suffered from 
an adolescent identity crisis.  
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The question of edification is particularly relevant to an understanding of the culture 
of polemical discourse that flourished in the 1580s and 1590s. One of the central questions 
faced by writers of this discourse was whether it was meant to invite reform or to reinforce a 
status quo, and whether or not the latter could be accomplished without the former. In other 
words, late sixteenth-century polemical literature is frequently a mode of discourse caught 
between the impulse to edify and to codify. In his recent bid to “rehabilitate the category of 
polemic,” Jesse Lander has argued that we should recognize the “productivity, if not the 
prettiness, of polemic,” for in his view “polemic produces arguments and identities: early 
modern polemic is not only polarizing but also pluralizing.”251 Lander encourages us to view 
polemical literature not just as an argumentative, emotionally-charged genre, but as a genre 
endowed with a kind of rationalism.  The long-standing “negative assessment of polemic” 
which sees the genre as “the opposite of dialogue and negotiation” is deceptively one-sided 
and can only lead to the conclusion that polemic is concerned solely with “retrenchment, the 
hardening of partisan identities and ideas, [and] a sort of discursive calcification.” Lander’s 
argument depends upon his sense that that the “bipolar model of addresser and addressee” 
creates a false sense of dichotomy, and we should “recognize[e] instead that the audience for 
polemic is variegated and split”; hence, “the polemicist’s aim is not to convert the object of 
attack but to convince a wider audience that the case is so.”252  
Whether or not Lander’s claim can be made always and everywhere is debatable, but 
what is so important about Lander’s rationalist view of polemic is that it brings into sharper 
focus a very real thread of confusion in the discursive wars of religion at the end of 
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Elizabeth’s reign caused in part by the variety of ethical discourses available to the public. It 
is a difficulty occasioned as well by the problematic rhetorical position of the Church of 
England, poised as it was—or as it claimed it was—as a Church in the famous “middle way.” 
Scholars have tended to stress this as an irenic or faux irenic stance, but it is also a position 
riddled with theological, ethical, and philosophical problems, not the least of which is 
making an argument for changes in theological and moral value in the face of the increasing 
sense of the relativity of custom.   
Lander’s two models of polemic imply one model whose end is the zealous 
enforcement of dogma and another whose end is rational and didactic. I would argue that in 
the late sixteenth century generally, and in the work of Richard Hooker specifically, both of 
these models are being used and even tested against each other.   The uncertain relationship 
between dogma and didacticism is evident in the reception of Hooker’s work, both by his 
contemporaries and by modern scholars. It is perhaps telling that the man who has been 
considered by many to be the founder and poster child for a well-defined “Anglicanism” died 
in 1600 while composing an answer to the writer of A Christian Letter of certaine English 
Protestants, unfayned favourers of the present state of religion, authorized and professed in 
England (1599), who had condemned the “Speculative Doctrine” contained in the Lawes of 
Ecclesiasticall Politie as well as what he perceived to be Hooker’s implicit critique of the 
policies of Elizabeth towards the Church of Rome.253  In short, even the most conformist of 
conformists could be read as a nonconformist while clearly the opposite cannot be said of the 
nonconformists who, though not exactly organized—certainly not as organized as they would 
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become by 1640—did have a certain kind of solidarity that the Church of England was 
struggling to find.254  
The evolution of scholarly literature on Hooker has moved him away from his 
unquestioned reputation as an orthodox defender of the Elizabethan Church and as a codifier 
of the via media to consider the often complex synthesis of orthodox and reformed theology 
found in his work. Some scholars have analyzed this hybridity in terms of a particular 
theological idea, for example justification, while others have pointed out the inconsistencies 
that can be found in Hooker’s views when the entire body of his work is read against itself.255 
What I find more compelling than the debate among modern scholarship about Hooker’s 
religious leanings is the way in which his contemporary opponents like the writer of A 
Christian Letter often read his doctrine as dangerous to both the peace of England and the 
unity of the English Church.256   
For Hooker, the question of edification is imbedded in his understanding of reform. 
One of the primary ways that Hooker assesses the validity of reform is to consider its original 
inception, how and why it was passed on to its followers, and the changes accrued along the 
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way. In the Lawes, Hooker seems less concerned with the codification of the via media than 
with the refutation of the via extrema represented for him particularly by the reform 
strategies of Thomas Cartwright. In response to the Church of England’s policy of 
conformity, Cartwright proposed a reform strategy based on contrariety.  Contrariety was so 
problematic for Hooker precisely because it dismissed the importance of edification both to 
the stability of the English Church and the moral strength of the individual believer.   
In the work of Hooker, conformity emerges as a strategy of reform that calls into 
account not just the Church of England, but also the Church’s proximity to the dual 
influences of Rome and Geneva. For Hooker conformity is not consonant with the stasis 
represented by the Elizabethan Settlement, but is rather a dynamic process of reform that 
relies upon the role of doubt in the development of a rational religion. In this chapter I will 
examine moral value in the work of Hooker, his tendency to deny contrariety as a valid 
strategy for reform, and the centrality of that denial to his understanding of the relationship 
between certainty and moral law.  In positing conformity as a more rational alternative to 
contrariety, Hooker investigates the usefulness of doubt, and a concept in his view closely 
related to it, adiaphora. To many of his opponents, Hooker’s approach to doctrine and 
conformity actually led to the breakdown of religious unity in England. I will argue that some 
of these objections are based on destabilizing aspects of Hooker’s method to determine moral 
value, namely the reliance of reason on the senses, the observation of custom, and the 
taxonomy of certainty. While these elements avert contrariety, they substitute human notions 
of relative certainty and imperfect knowledge for a divinely appointed church. At the same 
time, they act as a Calvinist critique and affirm the value of edification. 
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II. “False Prophets” and the Skepticism of the Elizabethan Church 
It is fair to say that a concern about the dangers of false knowledge permeates and in 
some cases dominates much of the literature of the 1580s and 1590s. In many ways, all 
avenues of belief were blocked by doubt, or at least the anticipation of doubt.257  As 
conformist ministers struggled to defend the church against the entertaining pamphlets 
written by Martin Marprelate, they sought to give their congregation the means by which to 
distinguish between religious truth and the “vain babblings” of “false prophets.” Martin 
Marprelate may have been the mascot for false prophecy, but he was just the starkest 
manifestation of a much more subtle and pervasive anxiety about the nature of reform. Even 
a decade prior to the Church’s conflict with Marprelate, Whitgift and the much less 
rhetorically savvy Thomas Cartwright debated reforms in the Admonition Controversy. As 
Whitgift recited the oft-quoted mantra of the conformists, “Errare possum, haereticus esse 
nolo,” he cautioned his audience against failing to distinguish between the church and the 
reformer, between true theology and morality.  While the church may err, error should not be 
identified with heresy, and while reformers may offer sound moral advice, such advice 
should not be mistaken for church doctrine. Whitgift defended his distinctions, arguing that 
“I do [criticize]” the reformers “[not] because I would have men abstain from reproving vice, 
and exhorting to godliness, but to let it be understood that these be no certain proofs of the 
verity of the doctrine, being commonly used in most vehement sort of the heretics and 
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sectaries, to allure the people unto them, and to win credit unto their opinions.”258 If allowed 
to heretics, moral authority could act as a lure to tempt unsuspecting reform-minded 
members of the laity into the snares of false doctrine.  
From one perspective, the position of Whitgift and the Elizabethan church regarding 
reform was hardly clear cut.  In their defense of the Church against the purveyors of false 
knowledge, conformist-minded ministers like Whitgift took a dual tactic. In addition to 
legislating measures to ensure conformity, essentially attempting to make their constituents 
hard-line dogmatists, the church also employed a defensive rhetoric that was largely a 
rhetoric of skepticism in the sense that it encouraged people to be skeptical about what they 
heard. Whitgift admitted the need to “grow in faith and knowledge, and always be growing 
and going forward,” yet for him, this kind of reform did not make it necessary “that we must 
daily invent new opinions, or broach new doctrines, and alter in judgement.” On the contrary, 
Whitgift argued that “we must grow in strength of faith, we must increase in practice and 
love of virtue, we must study to increase our knowledge, that we may be the more confirmed 
in the truth that we have learned out of the word of God. This is an evil collection: we must 
grow in the knowledge of the truth; therefore must always be altering and changing our 
religion.”259  Whitgift’s rhetoric of reform which encourages the idea of the development of 
knowledge only led back to an affirmation of the church as it was.  
However, Whitgift begins his Defense of his Answer to the Admonition to the 
Parliament with a skeptical epigraph that undercuts such certainty: “If any man thinke that he 
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knoweth any thing, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to knowe.”260  In the epistle to the 
reader he recommends a certain kind of trial to protect oneself against false prophets, 
presumably men such as Cartwright.  “Try before thou trust: believe not lightly every report,” 
he urges, “as thou hast two ears, so use them both: condemn no man before he be heard: 
abstain from speaking evil of any when he is not present to make thee answer (for that is a 
great injury): respect not the person, but the cause, and let not every pretensed zeal carry thee 
headlong thou knowest not whither.” Crucially, Whitgift encourages the same kind of trial 
for his own polemical work defending the Church of England as he urges the reader to use 
for “false prophets” and admonishes his reader to “suspend thy judgment of this book, until 
thou hast advisedly and indifferently read the same.”261 
Many scholars have noted the degree to which the Marprelate controversy put 
Whitgift in a nearly impossible position because the tracts were designed to win the opinions 
of the masses by their sheer entertainment value alone. Moreover, Whitgift was mindful that 
Marprelate was more interested in reaching the masses than the Parliament.262  Trading “the 
prolix and chaotically systematic canons of contemporary disputation or polemical 
exchange” for “the demotic mode of the gutter press,”263 Whitgift knowingly sanctioned the 
breakdown of religious decorum on the conformist side when he hired Thomas Nashe and 
other “low brow” writers to combat Marprelate on his own terms.264    
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The incident of Martin Marprelate is important not only in the history of the early 
modern English church but also in early modern literature because it marks a breakdown in 
the theory of decorum.265 Given that both reformers and the Church of England alike rejected 
Marprelate’s style (even if the former did not always object to his matter), it seems fairly 
certain that Whitgift must have anticipated a very real threat in Marprelate’s bid for a popular 
audience.266  The fact that such indecorous writing was, on some level, so effective in a 
matter so important must have made conformist and non-conformist writers alike wonder 
what the value of decorum was, since it was certainly not its cogency.267 Moreover, the 
mixed message of Whitgift shows that this crisis of decorum with regard to style is only 
symptomatic of a larger crisis over the question of epistemological decorum surrounding 
religious reform. Perhaps because the Church of England had been accused by its reformist 
antagonists of adhering too much to the Church of Rome, its defenders did not simply 
highlight the value of consensus; instead, they changed tactics to encourage a skeptical 
outlook.  It is not a skeptical outlook without boundaries, but it is a push towards putting 
control in the mind of the individual believer—perhaps because this was the church’s only 
hope to control the effects of polemical literature on a large scale.   
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This uneasy strategy of conformity that would harness the trial of individual reason 
for its own ends is readily apparent in one of Richard Bancroft’s sermons of the late 1580s. 
Bancroft cautions his audience against the threat of “false prophets,” which would seem to 
indicate the seriousness with which these men considered their opponent. In a sermon 
preached at Paul’s Cross in 1588, Bancroft warns, “‘Stay prophane and vaine babblings, for 
they will increase unto more ungodliness’” because schism opens the door to its dreaded 
cousin heresy.268 Bancroft as well as the anti-Martinist author of Mirror for Martinists (1590) 
uses a reference to Melanchthon succinctly to define the problem: “We understand whom to 
avoid (meaning the Papists) but as yet whom to follow we know not.”269 Perhaps because 
they needed to validate their own disruption of their conformity with the Church of Rome, 
the conformists of the English Church tend to justify their newfound orthodoxy in light of 
historical change. Bancroft compares false prophets, in this case specifically Martinists, to 
“Helena, of Greece, for that they move as great contention in the church as she did troubles 
betwixt Grecians and Trojans.”270 Rhetoric aside, the suggestion seems to be that in fighting 
the Martinists the English Church finds itself in the midst of an epic and historic battle.  
Just as Whitgift had used trial as a means to defend the Church against Cartwright in 
the 1570s, Bancroft similarly encouraged his audience to “Trie the spirits whether they be of 
God.” But Bancroft is quick to follow up his exhortation to trial with a caveat about its limits: 
“Some forbid the children of GOD to proove any thing. Others command them to be ever 
seeking and proving of all things. But neither of them both in a right good sense, do deale 
therein as they ought to do. A meane course betwixt these two is to be allowed of and 
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followed: which is, that we proove some things, and that we receive without curiositie some 
other things being already examined, proved and tried to our hands.”271 In defining a mean 
between the complete condemnation and complete licensing of individual trial, Bancroft 
effectively announces the epistemological repercussions of the via media.  The ideal layman, 
it would seem, should value his own reason up to a point. Indeed, though it is not exactly 
clear how Bancroft envisions proof, what is perhaps most striking about this passage is that 
doctrine is not proved to the mind, but is “proved and tried to our hands.”  
For Bancroft, the greatest danger of reform is its potential to encourage variability 
and relativity within the church. Finding no proof for their ideas in “the words of scripture, 
fathers or counsels,” the reformers’ methods seem to be dictated by current necessity rather 
than universal or divine law. The Scriptures, which become variable and customary in the 
hands of reformers, “are appointed to serve the time, and have divers understandings: so that 
at one time they may be expounded after the universall, common, and ordinarie custome: & 
that the same custome being changed, the meaning of the Scriptures may likewise be 
changed…for the understanding of the scriptures runneth with the practice of the church.” 
Such an understanding of church practice suggests that “obedience [is] most full & perfect 
which is without reason.”272 Despite his own exhortation that individuals should be skeptical 
of false prophets and scrutinize their doctrines, he criticizes the kind of “prophet” that would 
have the “people to be alwaies seeking and searching (as well themselves as their followers) 
[and] can never finde whereupon to rest. Now they are carried hither, not thither. They are 
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alwaies learning…but do never attaine to the truth.”273 Uncertainty is the weapon of heretics 
and schismatics, who bring their potential followers into a state of uncertainty by 
encouraging them to “search, examine, trie and seeke” so that they become more susceptible 
to reformist doctrine.274 But Bancroft differentiates the trial he charges his reader with from 
the trial of doctrine, which is only to be undertaken by “those who have skill to so trie it” lest 
“all religion will wholie become doubtfull.”275 
Given his fear of willfully determined doctrine and a church destabilized by too much 
reform, it is perhaps not surprising that Bancroft indicts what he sees as the inevitable 
outcome of such questioning—that is, an unfettered desire for liberty. Discussing the 
subscription of ministers required for them to obtain their degrees, he warns men against the 
skepticism exemplified by the reformer Osiander, who viewed subscription as a 
“wickedness” and “cruelty” whereby “Christian liberty is…restrained” and a “yoke and 
bondage laid upon mens consciences.” “These out cries” Bancroft affirms by citing 
Melanchthon’s commentary, “in so great licentiousness and confusion of this time are 
plausible with many, who take to themselves an infinite libertie of coyning newe opinions, 
and in a Pirronious sort of the overthrowing of all things which have been rightly 
determined.”276 According to Bancroft, the unshakeable dogma of reformers can only have 
one result: unlicensed skepticism and the forfeiture of any systematic religion altogether.  
Bancroft’s fear of skepticism is surprising if we consider the degree to which the 
opponents of the church were dogmatists.  More important than the rhetorical chaos 
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occasioned by the Marprelate tracts is how the willful dogmatism of the tracts influenced the 
Church’s conception of its audience.  In large part Bancroft had very little desire to change or 
refute the hard-nosed stance of the Martinists. Instead, it was those skeptics in the middle, 
those indifferent members of the laity who were caught in between a church struggling for 
definition and its reform-minded dissenters, who were the true subjects of Bancroft’s 
rhetoric.   
Bancroft begins his large catalogue of reformist doctrine, A Survay of the Pretended 
Holy Discipline (1593), by noting that he can do nothing for those men “addicted unto their 
own opinions, as concerning the pretended holy Discipline” but pray that their “prejudiciall 
and obstinate mindes” may be “mollify[ed]” by God. He addresses his text instead to those 
“both of the clergy and laitye, who notwithstanding they favour the pretended discipline, 
euen with singleness of heart” yet they realize “that men may be often times deceiued with 
shewes and probabilities, as allwayes heretofore many haue beene.” In order to combat the 
weakness of the human mind, Bancroft envisions a system of checks and balances wherein 
the “spirites of any prophets in our dayes” are “subiect to the spirites of other prophets” and 
he hopes that those who are not dogmatists “will be pleased, I trust, to yeald themselves vnto 
the Apostolicall rules of trying of all thinges, and not be carried away, either with rashnesse 
or preiudice, to belieue any spirit, vntil they haue tried it thoroughly whether it be of god.”277  
Trial, then, is an exercise in reason and a way to control human error.  
Though some have categorized Bancroft as one of the greatest polemicists of the 
1590s and the Survay as one of the greatest polemical works of the late sixteenth century, it 
still bears noting that he begins his text if not with irenicism, then at least with hope that the 
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dominant religious landscape is not polemical but pluralist. It is “on behalfe” of the reform-
minded men “and for their sakes especially” that he has “presumed to offer vnto their wise 
and indifferent consideration, such simple notes and observations …whereby if either they or 
any other shall reape anye profit, to the establishing of their mindes in this giddy age, from 
running vppe and downe after euery young start-vp, hether and thether, to seeke new 
platforms of Church-gouernement in this place or that: when as we haue one of our owne, 
which is in my conscience truly Apostolicall.”278 Read in this light, Bancroft’s intent is not 
that far afield from that of Francis Bacon in the first edition of his essay “Of Studies”: “Read 
not to contradict, nor to believe, but to weigh and consider.”279 Bancroft both encourages the 
skeptics, and writes for them specifically, as though the dogmatists were beyond the hope of 
the most compelling evidence and the most persuasive rhetoric—or perhaps at least beyond 
the rhetoric Bancroft wishes to use.  It is against this background of uncertainty—the anxiety 
about false prophets and the Church’s problematic rhetorical position—that Hooker’s 
understanding of the moral value of doubt and custom should be read.  
 
III. Fashioning the Skeptical Reader  
In their defense of the Elizabethan Church and their articulations of conformity, 
Bancroft and Whitgift show us the complex interplay between dogma and skepticism as a 
rhetorical strategy. This tendency has much to do with the breakdown of religious decorum 
and the disjunction between style and subject matter.  Though stylistically reformist writings 
such as the Marprelate tracts can be said to be skeptical in the way that their rhetorical 
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shiftiness showcases the deceptiveness of persona and rhetoric in a way that underscores the 
subjectivity of truth, they are ultimately dogmatic.280 So too, perhaps the opposite can be 
argued of Richard Hooker’s Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie which, for all its philosophical 
and theological weightiness, can be quite skeptical.281 Indeed, the mix of dogmatism and 
skepticism so apparent in the works of Whitgift and Bancroft finds perhaps its greatest 
expression in Richard Hooker’s Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie, in which doubt and custom 
prove to be leading principles of reform. In Hooker, as Debora Shuger has so eloquently 
written, “one discerns a groping to hold together the disparate elements of a changing culture, 
seemingly archaic mystical representations, a problematic historicism, [and] epistemic 
contradictions.”282 
But if doubt was an important ingredient in late sixteenth-century orthodoxy and the 
“dominant culture was not an obscurantist monolith of ideological…commonplaces nor were 
questioning and doubt invariable subversive attacks on a monological orthodoxy,”283 not all 
of Hooker’s contemporaries agreed or made allowances for this expansion of orthodoxy to 
include doubt as a strategy for conformity. Hooker’s own critics were keenly aware of the 
unorthodox tendencies of his supposed defense of the English Church. Far from being 
concerned only about the ways in which the Lawes deviated from the Thirty-Nine Articles, 
the anonymous writer of A Christian Letter (1599) questioned the very incorporation and use 
of philosophy in the Lawes. In his view, Hooker’s Lawes leveled Scripture “to bee at the least 
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of no greater moment then Aristotle and the Schoolmen.”284 In addition, the writer was 
suspicious of Hooker’s overall agenda in writing the Lawes, which he considered to be too 
tolerant at best, skeptical and atheistic at worst: “Doe you meane to bring in a confusion of 
all thinges, to reconcile heaven and earth, and to make all religions equall? Will you bring us 
to Atheisme, or to Poperie? Or to prepare a plot for an Interim, that our streetes may runne 
with blood, when all religions shal bee tolerated, and one shall bearde and provoke another? 
Are there not examples sufficient of unspeakeable massacres abroade?”285  Though the writer 
of A Christian Letter is unknown, some have suggested Andrew Willet as a likely candidate. 
Willet has been described as an orthodox clergymen with a moderate impulse for reform, but 
this quotation makes his religious affiliation entirely unimportant, for the writer would seem 
to fear schism, the Catholic Church, and Continental reformers equally. The writer of A 
Christian Letter feared what he viewed as both the theoretical and practical ramifications of 
the Lawes: that it supported a relativistic view of religion and that it encouraged the 
importation of the civic chaos caused by Continental reformers into England.  
Though very few scholars have taken the time to consider the weight and validity of 
this accusation against Hooker, it is a worthwhile endeavor to consider the degree to which 
Hooker’s Lawes can be read as “bring[ing] in a confusion of all things” and what that might 
mean, since Hooker clearly is not a radical reformer.286 One reason why this writer might 
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have made such a claim is because of the precarious position of the English Church: a church 
of reform at once not broken from Rome, at once instituting reforms not always unlike those 
of the Continent, and in both respects opening itself up to the charge of innovation and the 
borrowings of custom.287 In some of his most recent scholarship, Patrick Collinson has 
invited us to consider the awkward relationship between England and the reforms taking 
place on the Continent. Collinson has argued that the Elizabethan Settlement “rested 
primarily on the principles of autonomy from Rome and royal supremacy, not on the 
reception of true doctrine and conformity with the community of Reformed churches. 
Consequently, relations between England and the centres of Continental reform were never 
secure and always subject to political arbitrariness.”288 However, despite this more passive 
relationship to Continental reformed churches, Collinson simultaneously detects within 
Puritan communities in London a “sense of solidarity with the international Protestant 
community…in their active involvement in the affairs of the stranger churches, which they 
continued to regard as models of the ‘church rightly reformed’ such as they hoped to see 
established in England.”289 Despite political gestures in support of a distinctly English 
orthodoxy, it would seem that England was subject to the influence of the Continent as many 
reform-minded individuals actively promoted cross-cultural exchange as they participated in 
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both English and Continental churches. In conjunction with Collinson’s view, it is interesting 
to note that although the author of A Christian Letter was anonymous, its printer was 
associated with the French church and was known for producing Puritan tracts.290 
The question of reform was bound up for many in the question of national identity. 
The writer of a Myld and Just Defence of Certeyne Arguments (1606) justifies the reformers’ 
interest in the changes in church doctrine on the Continent by downplaying the boundaries of 
nationality. Against the zealous anti-papist clergyman Gabriel Powell’s argument that 
reformers “emulat[e]…forreyne novelty,” the writer argues that their reforms are “neither 
noveltie, nor forreyne.”291 While the rejection of the charge of novelty is not particularly 
novel itself, as most reformers found precedent for their ideas in the example of the apostolic 
Church, the writer redefines the notion of “foreign” so as to minimize its importance 
altogether:  
Touching the word forreyne, though indeed the thinges desired by us are in all 
Churches of other Countryes fully reformed in doctrine with ours, yet those Churches 
being all the same houshould of faith that we are, they are not aptly called forreyne.   
As Englishmen traveling in other Countryes and living after English fashion, are not 
therefore Forreyners in respect of England whiles they so travel; but still to be 
accounted of the same country, so all Churches and all members of the Church, in 
what Country so ever they be, are not to be accounted Forreyners one to another, 
because they are all Citizens of heaven, and we make all one family or body.292   
 
The writer of a Myld and Just Defense suggests both that the unity of faith was fast 
superseding nationalism as an indicator of religious identity and that the Continental church 
exerted a powerful force on the English Church; in other words, the idea of reform was 
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changing conceptions of English identity and nationalism.  Read against the Myld and Just 
Defense, the writer of A Christian Letter’s criticism about the potential of the Lawes to 
promote the breakdown of an English reformed religion seems all the more incisive. Though 
the intent of the Lawes has been debated,293 part of Hooker’s purpose would seem to involve 
not simply defining the English Church, but taking stock of the complicated relationship 
between the English Church and the models of reform proffered by Continental reformers.  
The Preface to the Lawes illustrates the uncertainty with which Hooker viewed 
reform—uncertainty both about how to undertake it and how to combat it. Like Bancroft and 
Whitgift, Hooker welcomes his readers to try notions of reform, as when he asks that “men 
doe but holde themselves in suspense” while they read his Lawes, subjecting it to the 
“generall triall and judgement of the whole world.”294 He begins his Preface by taking a 
seemingly irenic stance as he attempts to diffuse any polemical charge in the text by virtue of 
his very identity as an orthodox clergyman responding to the writings of polemical reformers 
like Thomas Cartwright and Martin Marprelate. He challenges his readers to divorce his text 
from its author and to “regard not who it is which speaketh, but [to] waigh only what is 
spoken.” As Hooker denies an adversarial persona, he invites reformers to a joint rational 
examination of the truth, describing himself as “one, who desireth even to embrace together 
with you the selfe same truth, if it be the truth…for plainer accesse whereunto, let it be 
lawfull for me to rip up to the verie bottome, how and by whome your Discipline was 
planted, at such time as this age we live in began to make first trial thereof.”295 Because 
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Calvin and his followers are convinced that they are correct, and Hooker and others are “fully 
perswaded otherwise,” he proposes that “some kinde of triall be used to finde out which part 
is in error.”296 The Lawes, then, is set up at the very beginning of the text as a kind of 
comparative analysis of the process of reform. Hooker imagines not just a text of polemic, 
but a text of trial. 
In particular, Hooker examines recent Protestant history for clues to the nature of 
reform. Beginning with the Preface to the Lawes, Hooker reveals his preoccupation not with 
the failure of Continental reformers, but with their success. At the same time that he invites 
reformers to attend his magisterial symposium on reform, Hooker acts as a quasi-objective 
historiographer of the Protestant church as he catalogues the mistakes of Luther and Calvin. 
For Hooker the root of the problem of reform is that reformers of the past have not accurately 
demarcated the moral value of their reforms because they have not differentiated between 
things necessary and things indifferent to salvation. Indeed, he argues that the current state of 
the Church of England—that is, the discursive reformist siege it is undergoing—is derived 
from two critical problems, one a moral miscalculation, or “misdistinction” as he terms it, 
made by Calvin and one a flaw inherent in human nature. What Hooker finds is that both the 
Calvinist reformers’ failures and their followers’ ignorance of these short-comings are caused 
by the susceptibility of the mind to prejudice.  
Calvin’s mistake, quite simply, was that the multiple churches that developed when 
he undertook a reformation in Geneva led to “marvelous great dissimilitudes” the more that 
people separated themselves from Rome. In turn this newfound religious pluralism caused 
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“jealousies, hartburnings, jarres and discords amongst them” that “might have easily bene 
prevented, if the orders which each Church did thinke fit and convenient for it selfe, had not 
so preremptorily bene established under that high commaunding forme, which tendered them 
unto the people, as things everlastinglie required” for salvation.297 Once these dissimilarities 
had been given the force of doctrine rather than acknowledged as things indifferent, the 
reformers were loath to undermine their own credibility by retracting their stance. 
Exacerbating the evil of the Calvinist reformer’s miscalculation in polity, human nature’s 
tendency to “worketh in us all a love to our owne counsels” makes the possibility of true 
reform even less likely.298 The consequences of that self-love combined with the 
“contradiction of others” would seem to be both polemical discourse and the perversion of 
reason. Once committed to an opinion, man fights to maintain it by “sharp[ening] the wit to 
dispute, to argue, and by all meanes to reason for it.” Hence, a “wise man” like Calvin is able 
to find “at the least a probable opinion of likelihood” in the Scriptures in support of his own 
views of doctrine and polity. Juxtaposed as it is against the example of Calvin, Hooker’s 
claim that “the first meane whereby nature teacheth men to judge good from evill as well in 
lawes as in other things, is the force of their owne discretion,” would seem to be a very 
problematic assertion that highlights the great influence of human error on reform.299  
Both the success and failure of Continental reformers indicate for Hooker the 
preeminent importance of making moral distinctions when undertaking reform. The ability to 
discern good from evil is easy in things necessary to salvation.  In “more obscure, more 
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intricate and hard to be judged” cases which are “a lower degree of importance,” God has 
appointed particular individuals—presumably men like Hooker—to the study of divinity.  To 
illuminate and justify this claim, Hooker uses a metaphor from Galen to articulate his 
understanding of the role of reason in reform: “If the understanding power or facultie of the 
soule be (sayeth the grand Phisition) like unto bodily sight not of equall sharpnes in all, what 
can be more convenient that, even as the darke-sighted man is directed by the cleare about 
things visible, so likewise in matters of deeper discourse the wise in heart do shewe the 
simple where his way lyeth.”300 Supported by this and other metaphors arguing for an 
ecclesiastical hierarchy that adequately addresses the intellectual shortcomings of man, 
Hooker then shifts away from his earlier objective and even irenic tones to commanding his 
audience to “Presume not yee that are sheepe to make your selves guides of them that should 
guide you, neither seeke ye to overskip the folde which they about you have pitched. It 
suficeth for your part, if ye can well frame your selves to be ordered. Take not upon you to 
judge your judges, nor to make them subject to your lawes who should be a law to you. For 
God is not a god of sedition and confusion but of order and peace.”301 How very far we have 
come in the short distance of a preface from Hooker’s invitation to “regard not who it is that 
speaketh.”   
In short, the shiftiness of Hooker’s rhetorical registers throughout the Preface—from 
the irenic, nearly conversational dialogue with reformers, to the objective analysis of 
Protestant history, to the polemical mouthpiece of the English Church—would seem to 
indicate his awareness of the precarious rhetorical situation of the English Church. For all of 
his rhetorical wanderings—call it instability or call it craftiness—Hooker does seem invested 
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in interrogating the value of various forms of human knowledge in order to understand their 
place in legislating reform. Quoting Galen again, whose blend of rationalism and empiricism 
reappears in crucial points in the Lawes when Hooker addresses the method of reform, he 
considers the dangers of mental presuppositions, that is, the dogmatic mind, to reform. 
Hooker notes that “many times …that which a credible person telleth is easily thought 
probable by such as are well perswaded of him. But if two, or three, or foure, agree all in the 
same tale, they judge it then to be out of controversy, and so are many times overtaken, for 
want of due consideration; eyther some common cause leading them all into error, or one 
mans oversight deceiving manie through their too much credulitie and easiness of beliefe.” 
Error can spread from person to person like a disease, tainting the mind with prejudice as it 
does so. It is this tendency of the mind to be prejudiced—this tendency that has made Luther 
and Calvin so successful—that Hooker returns to again and again as both a means and an 
impediment to reform.302  
Despite the admitted uncertainty of reformers in England who profess not to know 
“with whom the truth is,” they have been remarkably successful in convincing a large 
number of people of their ideas.303 According to Hooker, their success has been due in large 
part to their zealous dogma that so influences the mind of their followers that it makes men 
unable to gain access to the truth of the Scriptures. This approach is typified for Hooker by 
their reliance on a nearly mystical kind of deduction.  Just as the followers of Pythagoras 
became obsessed with the “speculate knowledge of numbers” by which they vainly 
interpreted the world around them, so too reformers have been able to “fashio[n] the very 
                                                
302 FLE I, Preface 4.8. 
 
303 FLE I, Preface 3.4. 
 
142 
notions and conceipts of mens minds in such sort, that when they read the Scripture, they 
may thinke that every thing soundeth towards the advancement of that discipline, and to the 
utter disgrace of the contrary.”304 Though reformers’ claim to sola scriptura would seem to 
be a claim to evidence, Hooker suggests instead that they use a more deductive kind of logic, 
planting notions without proof in the mind of men which then allows them to find 
appropriate “evidence” for their preformed ideas. The trope so commonly used by almost all 
writers of this period in the prefatory matter requesting an “indifferent reader,” far from 
being simply rhetoric, has a particularly pointed meaning in the context of Hooker’s 
Lawes.305 
Unlike Bancroft, who effectively gives up on dogmatic reformers and turns his 
attention to the readers who had not yet made up their minds, Hooker is interested in turning 
dogmatists into skeptics. In matters of reform, Hooker avers, doubt should be the guiding 
principle. Though men should not “observe those lawes which in their hearts they are 
steadfastly perswaded to be against the law of God,” Hooker realizes that it is not likely that 
these men will change their belief.  The only reasonable recourse left for these men caught in 
the bind of conscience that does not involve the very undesirable outcome of political 
resistance is that they “for the time…suspend” their “perswasion” lest they “offend against 
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God by troubling his Church without any just or necessary cause.”306 In other words, Hooker 
would move reformers away from their deductive, dogmatic impulses, impulses which are 
likely to lead to political instability, to a skepticism that may not rid the mind of prejudice, 
but will keep it from doing further harm.  
 
IV. Certainty and Moral Value 
Long before A Christian Letter was published in 1599, Hooker had established 
himself as someone dangerous to the unity of the Church; indeed, the claim that his ideas 
were subversive to peace bookends Hooker’s career. In 1586, Walter Travers, Hooker’s 
noted Calvinist adversary at the Temple Church in London, was prohibited from preaching 
because of his public criticisms of Hooker’s exposition of doctrine, in particular his views on 
predestination and justification. In the exchange between Hooker and Travers in that same 
year over this dismissal, Hooker notes that Travers criticized him for his “inconformity” and 
his “surlie and unpeaceable disposition.”307 Travers worries that Hooker’s preaching will 
break the church asunder because he knows of very few men “who make any conscience of 
their ministry” who will be able to prevent themselves from speaking out against Hooker’s 
doctrines.308 In his counter to Travers, Hooker claims that Travers is blinded by his own 
reason. He questions the prejudiced mind of Travers, who “judgeth my wordes, as they do 
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colours which looke upon them with greene spectacles and thinke that which they see is 
greene. When indeed that is greene whereby they see.”309  
In his early surviving sermons of the 1580s, Hooker exhibits a profound concern for 
the role of the mind in belief-formation and for the certainty of moral value.  And, in fact, it 
is precisely these concerns that Travers’s criticizes. Travers primary criticisms of Hooker 
have to do with Hooker’s assertions that “his best author was his own reason” and that “the 
assurance of that we believe by the word, is not so certeyne as of that we perceive by 
sense.”310 Hooker’s defense of both these views in his Answer to Travers are the foundations 
for his justification for the necessary presence of doubt in religious experience.  
 In his Sermon of the Certainty and Perpetuity of Faith in the Elect (1585-1586), 
Hooker addresses the question of the moral value of doubt—that is, of whether or not the 
admission of doubt into one’s mind makes one an unbeliever.  Crucially, Hooker limits doubt 
by differentiating between the doubt of the “unbeliever” and the “weak believer,” noting that, 
in the latter, doubt is an affirmation of piety and humility, that is, an appropriate 
understanding of man’s position in relation to his salvation and to God.311 Hooker separates 
the truth of experience and the truth of faith in order to explain doubt. He begins by 
distinguishing between the Certainty of Evidence, “that which we know by sense, or by 
infallible demonstration” when the truth is “cleere…[and] manifest” to the mind, and the 
Certainty of Adherence, which is based on affection and intuition and is characteristic of “the 
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principles, articles, and conclusions of the Christian faith.”312 While the Certainty of 
Evidence stresses the certainty of information coming from the senses and the fact that proof 
must always be more certain than the “thinge proved,” the Certainty of Adherence stresses 
the more uncertain apprehension of goodness. Faith allows that the “promises of God” are 
recognized “not only as true, but also as good.”  And even when the evidence of truth “is so 
small that it grieveth him to feel his weakness in assenting thereunto,” the Certainty of 
Adherence so fixes belief that  “all the world is not able quite and clean to remove him from 
it; but he striveth with himself to hope against all reason of believing.”313  
The indemonstrable truths of religion which are in part the source of doubt as they are 
the basis of faith, give doubt a necessary theological purpose: it is evidence that man does not 
possess inherent righteousness and that he requires divine intervention for justification.314 
Doubt and the variability it allows within goodness provide an explanation for the varieties of 
religious experience without necessitating that one experience entirely preclude another. If 
the certainty of faith was categorized in the same way as the certainty of sensible experience, 
then there would be no levels of faith: “The trueth of somethinges is so evident, that no man 
which heareth them can doubt of them: As when wee heare, that a part of anything is less 
then the whole, the mind is constrained to say this is true. If it were so in matters of faith then 
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as all men have equall certaintie of this, so no believer should be more scripulous and 
doubtfull then another.”315 
In his Answer to Travers’s Supplication to the Privy Counsel, Hooker elaborates on 
the distinction he makes between the Certainty of Adherence and the Certainty of Evidence 
in his Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect, when he distinguishes 
the kind of knowledge gained from senses and that gained from faith:  
I have taughte [Travers] saith That the assurance of thinges which we believe by the 
word is not so certeyne as of that we perceive by sense. And is it as certayne? Yea I 
taughte as he hym self I truste woulde not denye that the thinges which God doeth 
promys in his worde are surer unto us then any thinge we touche handle or see, but 
are we so sure and certeyne of them? if we be, why doth God so often prove his 
promises unto us as he doth by arguments taken from our sensible experiences? We 
must be surer of the profe then of the thinge proved, otherwise it is no profe. Howe is 
it that if tenne men do all looke upon the moone, every one of them knoweth it as 
certenly to be the moone as another: But many beleevinge one and the same promis 
all have not one and the same fulnesse of perswasion? Howe falleth it out that men 
beinge assured of any thinge by sense can be no surer of it then they are, whereas the 
strongest in faith that lyveth upon the earth hath alwaies neede to labor and stryve, 
and praie that his assurance concerning heavenly and spirituall thinges maie growe 
increasse and be augmented?316 
 
Even as Hooker differentiates the certainty of the senses from the uncertainty of faith, he 
links faith with the senses when he argues that God “prove[s] his promises…by arguments 
taken from our sensible experience.”  Despite this linking of the certainty of the senses to 
faith, clearly faith requires labor to grow and develop that knowledge from the senses does 
not. If faith were as certain as the senses, or if goodness were as certain as truth, then it 
would entirely undercut the necessity of moral growth.  
Despite this discussion of the senses and their relation to faith, Hooker does defend 
himself from Travers’s accusation of a more subjective, idiosyncratic reason by identifying a 
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reason that is highly theological and deductive.317 He denies that he relies upon “myne owne 
reason as nowe it is reported” by Travers, and claims instead that he looks to that  
true sound divine reason, reson whereby those conclusions mighte be out of Ste  
Paule demonstrated and not probably discoursed of onely, reson proper to that  
science whereby the thinges of god are knowne, theologicall reason which out of 
principles in scripture that are playne soundly deduceth more doubtful inferences, in 
suche sorte that being herd they neither can be denied nor any thing repugnaunte unto 
them received, but whatsoever was before otherwise by miscollecting gathered out of 
darker places is therby forced to yeld it self and the true consonaunte meaning of 
sentences not understood is broughte to lighte.318 
 
This deductive reason is clearly, for Hooker, applicable to the knowledge of God, but it 
competes with his notion of the imperfect knowledge of man that is based on faith and is 
applicable to the study of virtue and reform.  
In his early work, Hooker attempts to uphold a neat dichotomy between faith and the 
senses, between goodness and truth. But this neat dichotomy between the sensory knowledge 
and faith gives way in the Lawes to a more expansive religious epistemology that does 
include a role for the senses, or at the very least for a reason that is not always deductive but 
is quite often mired in circumstance and custom and which operates actively and 
disputatively. It is this latter reason, not the more deductive, certain theological reason, that 
provides the basis for Hooker’s articulation of conformity as a dynamic strategy for reform 
that actively evaluates the role of the variability of custom to a stable English Church. In 
contrast to the reformer’s deductive and speculative approach to influencing the minds of 
their followers, Hooker characterizes the mind early in the first book of the Lawes in a way 
that emphasizes the role of the senses and an inductive reason.  
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Hooker’s comparison of angelic and human knowledge underscores the central role 
of the senses to human knowledge. While “Angels alreadie have full and complete 
knowledge in the highest degree that can be imparted unto them,” men begin from an “utter 
vacuity” and must instead “growe by degrees, till they come at length to be even as the 
Angels themselves are.” Invoking a description of the mind of man from Aristotle’s De 
anima that is repeated by Thomas Aquinas, Hooker characterizes the mind as “a booke, 
wherein nothing is, and yet all things may be imprinted.”319 It is up to man to “search by 
what steppes and degrees” the mind may ascend “unto perfection of knowledge.” At the very 
point at which he underscores the mind’s potential, Hooker describes the importance of the 
senses to the development of man’s moral knowledge. Until men “grow to some ripenes of 
yeares, the soule of man doth only store it selfe with conceipts of things of inferiour and 
more open qualitie.” But rather than holding man back, as they might in Platonic 
epistemology, Hooker insists that the senses “doe serve as instruments unto that which is 
greater,” namely reason. Reason, in turn, may be aided by “the helps of true art and 
learning,” which Hooker says are neglected in “this age of the world.”  Though Hooker 
emphasizes the role of “education and instruction” in making it possible for man “to judge 
rightly between truth and error, good and evill,”320 he does not dismiss the senses for 
education. The senses retain an important role in discerning law, for it “is a great deale more 
easie for common sense to discerne, then for any man by skill and learning to determine” 
when a man’s reason is “capable of those lawes, whereby he is then bound to guide his 
action.”  Hooker contrasts the value of abstraction and practice to illustrate his claim: “Even 
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as it is not in Philosophers, who best knowe the nature both of fire and of golde, to teach 
what degree of the one will serve to purifie the other, so well as the artisan, who doth this by 
fire, discerneth by sense when the fire that that degree of heat which sufficeth for his 
purpose.”321 Observation and the information it lends man through the common sense is a 
greater indicator of reason and law than reason is alone.  
In addition to this fuller articulation of the role of the senses in recognizing law and 
becoming a moral agent, the dichotomous certainty that Hooker offered in the Sermon of the 
Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect is replaced by a taxonomy of certainty that 
allows greater room for doubt, things indifferent, and custom.  Hooker’s understanding of 
this taxonomy relies upon his notion of the epistemological decorousness of the mind. In his 
discussion in the Lawes of evidence for faith that can be found outside of the Scriptures, 
Hooker notes that the mind of man has a kind of decorum inherent to it: it quite rightly 
proportions certainty of belief in relation to evidence. Although the mind naturally “desireth 
evermore to know the truth according to the most infallible certainety which the nature of 
thinges can yield,” the fallible nature of the mind does not allow that all things are known 
with equal certainty. Hooker creates a spectrum of assurance that ranges from “plaine aspect 
and intuitive beholding,” to “strong and invincible demonstration” and finally to 
“probability.”322 Though reformers would know all things with complete certainty, Hooker 
cautions that “it is not required or can be exacted at our hands, that we should yield unto any 
thing other assent, then such as doth answere the evidence which is to be had of that we 
assent unto.” Hooker’s taxonomy of assurance creates an epistemological decorum that 
allows for doubt. Because of this decorum, “even in matters divine, concerning some things 
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we may lawfully doubt and suspend our judgment, inclining neyther to one side nor other.” 
The reformers’ untenable desire for certainty—the desire that earned the puritans the name of 
“precisians”—causes people unnecessarily to doubt themselves and to “fall into anguish and 
perplexitie” over what they imagine to be a “lacke of faith.”  “The hearts assent” to truth is 
proportionate to the evidence “which the truth hath eyther in itselfe or through proofe” and 
“neither can it be stronger, being grounded [upon evidence] as it should be.”323 Despite its 
deficits, the mind naturally preserves truth through its discretionary powers “because [it] doth 
rather follow probable perswasions, then approve the thinges that have in them no likelihood 
of truth at all.”324 For Hooker, doubt is not only natural, but also reasonable; more 
importantly, incorporated into moral reform, it has the potential to bring the good of reform 
closer to truth.  
 
V. Contrariety, Custom, and the Elizabethan Church 
Hooker’s understanding of conformity as a strategy for reformation depends upon his 
sense that human goodness must always be understood in terms of levels of certainty. Hooker 
tends to stress levels of certainty because they help him articulate conformity as a kind of 
reform distinct from the simple opposition advocated by Thomas Cartwright and other 
Puritan reformers. Even before Hooker, Francis Bacon expressed the problematic nature of 
the Martinist reform agenda in his Advertisement Touching the Controversies of the Church 
of England. According to Bacon, the Martinists’ method of reforming by opposition is an 
inherently flawed practice:  
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Most of the heresies and schisms of the church have sprung up of this root; while men 
have made it as it were their scale, by which to measure the bounds of the most 
perfect religion; taking it by the furthest distance from the error last 
condemned…they think it the true touchstone to try what is good and holy, by 
measuring what is more or less opposite to the institutions of the Church of Rome; be 
it ceremony, be it policy or government, yea be it other institution of greater weight, 
that is ever most perfect which is removed most degrees from that church; and that is 
ever polluted and blemished which participateth in any appearance with it.325 
 
The central notion here is measure, that is, the idea that reform is a nearly quantitative 
process that can be empirically measured, as if with a scale. Bacon introduces what, for 
Hooker, will be two competing notions of the reformed church. On the one hand, reformation 
and the church can be thought of in degrees, indicating that reform must be measured in 
increments. On the other hand, the reformers measure not by increment and degree, but by 
opposition.  For Hooker, reformation by degree engages reason in the process of reform, 
while reformation by opposition is a nearly knee-jerk reaction to a (mis)perception of 
absolute evil. This reaction is problematic both because it undermines the role of reason and 
because it assumes a too simplistic understanding of good and evil.  
Cartwright openly avowed the effectiveness of reforming by contraries.326 Basing his 
principles of moral and religious reform on the commonly accepted dictum of Hippocratic 
medicine, Cartwright argued that “contraries are cured by their contraries.” Since 
“Christianitie and Antichristianitie, the Gospell and Poperie be contraries,” it seemed logical 
to Cartwright that “Antichristianity must be cured not by it self, but by that which is (as much 
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as may be) contrary unto it.”327 Cartwright easily translates the medical notion of polarity to 
morality: “If a man would bring a drunken man to sobrietie, the best and nearest way is to 
carry him as farre from his excesse in drinke as may be: and if a man could not keepe a 
meane, it were better to fault in prescribing lesse then he should drinke, then to fault in 
giving him more then he ought.” In Cartwright’s view, moving as far from one excess as 
possible does not to lead one to another, opposite excess; rather, such opposition is necessary 
to reach the good, as he illustrates in the metaphor of the crooked stick. In order to make a 
crooked stick straight, “we do not only bow it so farre until it come to be straight, but we 
bend it so farre until we make it so crooked of the other side, as it was before of the first side, 
to this end that at the last it may stand straight, and as it were in the midway between both the 
crookes.” Hence, Cartwright concludes, the “best and surest policy” for reform is “utter 
inconformity” to the Church of Rome.328  Reform depends upon defining the contrary to a 
given evil with the idea that direct opposition to that evil will produce good. 
In contrast to Cartwright, Hooker understood the problem of determining the nature 
of the true reformed church as one of decorous proportion. Offering an alternative model of 
reform, Hooker rejects Cartwright’s idea that a stick can only be brought to its median point 
by bending it in the opposite direction; he argues instead that “he which will perfectly 
recover a sick and restore a diseased body unto health, must not endeavor so much to bring it 
to a state of simple contrariety, as of fit proportion in contrariety unto those evils which are to 
be cured.” Using a medical metaphor, Hooker illustrates his view that Cartwright’s polarizing 
mode of reformation produces only new and even more destructive forms of evil, as “he that 
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will take away extreme heat by setting the body in extremity of cold, shall undoubtedly 
remove the disease, but together with it the diseased too.” A more careful anatomy of the 
problem is required. A “skilful cure” requires first “the knowledge of the part affected,” then 
the identification “of the evil which doth effect it.” Only after evil and its effects have been 
isolated can the reformer proceed with making conclusions “not only of the kind but also of 
the measure of contrary things whereby to remove it.”329 An accurate determination of 
contraries involves analysis and scrutiny. 
It is quite appropriate that Hooker’s notion of a measured reform in the Lawes 
corresponds to conceptions of diagnosis and cure in Galenic thought.330 In ancient medicine, 
Hippocrates represented a movement towards finding cures based on the observation of 
nature. Nature, in turn, was understood as a unified living organism composed of diverse 
parts which could only be understood relative to the whole organism.331 Galen, who studied 
Hippocrates and was influenced heavily by his reliance on observation, connected logic to 
observation and experimentation.332 Galen’s writings, some of which were first translated 
and published in England by Thomas Linacre and were published in full in Italy in 1525, 
represented a prisca medicina, a return to purer sources of Greek medicine.333   
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While Galen’s predecessors had adequately developed theories of the elements and 
their oppositional relationships, he criticizes them for neglecting to address the all important 
concept of the “well-balanced mixture.” In Galen’s view, excess could only be understood in 
relation to this ideal balance. The “aim” of a “healthy regime” is “to cool any body which is 
hotter than it should be, to heat any which is colder…in each case the attempt is to remedy an 
excess by the introduction of what is missing, in order to bring about a state which may be 
described as well-balanced or median.”334 Galen envisioned mixtures not in absolute terms, 
but in degrees. A preponderance of any one element could be described as an imbalance, a 
disease, or in the worst cases, death.335 What this meant, then, is that cures could only be 
obtained through an analysis of proportion: “To all these objects, that is animals and plants, 
we attribute the best, median type of mixture within their own genus, not in the absolute 
terms which involve an equality of opposites, but when they are possessed of that type of 
good proportion relevant to their faculties.” Galen saw an easy transition between medical 
and ethical theory using this idea of proportion. “Justice,” for example, “is thought of in this 
way, as a technique of finding equality not by any fixed measure, but by use of the criteria 
appropriate to the case. Thus in the case of all well-balanced animals and plants, their 
equality of mixture consists not in the amounts of each element in the mixture, but in the 
appropriateness of these amounts to the nature of the animal or plant in question.”336  
Almost as Galen revised Hippocratic theories of medicine by incorporating 
experimentation and anatomization, so too does Hooker seem to posit a measure of reform 
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that revises Cartwright’s more simplistic view of the moral values at stake. Like Galen, who 
rejects a too simplistic notion of diagnosis and cure, Hooker rejects a too simplistic method 
of reform and values the idea of mixture. For Hooker and his defenders, the most accurate 
method of reform required a more incisive form of reason than the strategy for reform 
offered by Cartwright and his followers. In his Just and Temperate Defense of the Five Books 
of Ecclesiastical Polity (1603), William Covel succinctly encapsulates Hooker’s attitude 
towards Cartwright’s assumption of the absolute opposition of good and evil.  Though the 
Papists clearly must be reformed, “we are loath to grow to an error on the contrary hand, and 
to derogate too much from the Church of God: by which removal of one extremity with 
another, the world, seeking to procure a remedy, hath purchased a mere exchange of the evil, 
which before was felt.”337 But Covel also elaborated to explain why such a strategy was 
logically unsound and an incompetent measure of reform: “The nearness, oftentimes to evil, 
is warrant enough for suspicion, to accuse of evil; and because all errors are not equally 
distant from the truth, some men, in their true assertions, are supposed, by weak judgments, 
not to differ at all from error.”338 In other words, like Calvin’s “misdistinctions” which 
transformed things indifferent into things fundamental for salvation, English reformers like 
Travers are not discriminating enough to differentiate between absolute evil and an 
imperfect, but useful, good.  
In addition to being entrenched in the medical terminology and debates of the late 
sixteenth century, Hooker’s rejection of Cartwright’s neat dichotomy also is indebted to his 
dismissal of the more simplistic Ramist logic to which men like Travers and Cartwright 
                                                
337 Covel 20; see also Hooker FLE II.5.8.4. 
 
338 Covel 51.  
156 
gravitated.339 Hooker’s movement from the more one-dimensional notion of certainty in his 
Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect to his exploration of different 
levels of certainty and religious experience in the Lawes is indicative of his adherence to 
more complex, Aristotelian structures which, for him, were more rational and more 
representative of the nature not of truth, but of the nature of goodness. In his early work, 
Hooker is committed to the idea of separating truth from goodness. In his Learned Treatise 
on Justification, Hooker differentiates between the knowledge of truth and the knowledge of 
good: “Devills know the same thinges which we believe, and the mindes of the most ungodly 
maie be fully perswaded of the truth, which knowledge in the one and perswasion in the 
other is sometimes termed faith but equivocally, being indede no suche faith as that whereby 
a christian man is justified. It is the spirite of adoption which worketh faith in us, in them not: 
the thinges which we believe are by us apprehended not only as true but also as good and that 
to us: as good they are not by them apprehended, as true they are.”340 While truth can be 
apprehended by anyone, even devils, goodness can only be apprehended by those with faith.  
We can see, then, why it is so important for Hooker to open up forms of certainty and 
to allow for what he calls a “latitude or extent” within notions of good.341 For Hooker, the 
problem with Cartwright’s theory is that good and evil—at least human good and evil, as 
opposed to the philosophical notion of absolute good and evil—do not neatly fit into a model 
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of equal opposition.342 Hooker’s objection to the notion of reforming by contrariety has much 
to do with his argument that reason has a basis in the senses, his defense of custom as 
something that must be constantly evaluated to determine its moral worth, and his sense that 
adiaphora and levels of certainty allow the church license to prescribe a rational form of 
orthodoxy.343 The primary way in which Hooker defends the Church’s customs is by 
invoking the morally neutral category of adiaphora, or things indifferent to salvation, as a 
neutral moral category that allows the church to use customs based on their expediency. 
Using the moral vacuity of indifferency, Hooker maneuvered within this moral space to 
justify the customs of the Church.  He created a framework for moral choice in things 
indifferent by making expediency the measure of judgment, a measurement similar to Stoic 
notions of “things preferred.”  In his treatment of indifferency Hooker argued that it was 
impossible to “otherwise think, than that what things God doth neither command nor forbid, 
the same he permitteth with approbation either to be done or left undone.  ‘All things are 
lawful unto me,’ saith the Apostle, speaking, as it seemeth, in the person of the Christian 
gentile for maintenance of liberty in things indifferent; whereunto his answer is, that 
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nevertheless, ‘all things are not expedient;’ in things indifferent there is a choice, they are not 
always expedient.”344  
But for Hooker, the concept of adiaphora goes hand in hand with his sense that 
reason must determine adiaphora, and that reason is not fundamentally imitative but 
disputative. It is this definition of reason as disputative that must be brought to bear on an 
analysis of custom.  Clearly, for Hooker, custom is not always positive, and it is particularly 
dangerous because it can lead to relative notions of good and evil. Hooker cites Augustine’s 
description of “certaine halfwaking men…who neither altogether asleepe in folly, nor yet 
throughly awake in the light of true understanding, have thought that there is not at all any 
thing just and righteous in it selfe: but looke wherewith nations are inured, seeing each sort 
of people hath a different kind of right from each other, and that which is right of it owne 
nature must be every where one and the same, therefore in it self there is nothing right.”345 
This threat of moral relativism is why it is so important, Hooker stresses, that the law of 
reason must be “universally agreed upon” and that “the greatest morall duties we owe 
towards God or man, may without any difficultie be concluded.”346 According to Hooker, it 
is custom that has caused the breakdown in this universality and that explains why not all 
men accept the same moral law. When “lewde and wicked custome” grows in popularity and 
garners a large following—as Hooker indicates in his Preface that it did in the case of 
Calvin—it “may of force even in plaine things…smother the light of naturall understanding, 
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because men will not bend their wits to examine, whether things wherewith they have been 
accustomed, be good or evill.”347  
Yet, such a negative view of custom is a precarious assertion for Hooker to make, for 
in comparison to the reformers who claim that their reforms take the Church of England back 
to the original apostolic church, the Church of England itself is remarkably customary. 
Moreover, as Hooker negotiates the relationship between the identity of the reformed English 
Church and its doctrinal and ecclesiological borrowings from Geneva and Rome, it becomes 
apparent that Hooker’s church is associated with custom by virtue of its extraordinary 
inclusiveness. The relationship of the English Church to the Church of Rome was absolutely 
central, in Hooker’s view, to understanding how to undertake reformation. In Hooker’s mind, 
conformity is not an impediment to reform, nor does it undercut the value of the moral 
decision making of the individual. It was an individual’s moral duty to pursue both reform 
and conformity at the same time: “The indisposition therefore of the Church of Rome to 
reforme hir selfe must be no stay unto us from performing our duetie to God, even as desire 
of retaining conformitie with them could be no excuse if we did not performe that duetie. 
Notwithstanding so far as lawefullie we may, we have held, and doe hold fellowship with 
them.” Hooker views reform in a relativist light; just as there are many who “make the 
Church of Rome utterly no Church at all, by reason of so many, so grievous errors in their 
doctrines” so too there are many who “under pretence of imagined corruptions in our 
discipline, doe give even as hard a judgment of the Church of England it selfe.” Hooker 
extends his notion of the visible Church out further, to show that “even heretickes them 
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selves” are “a part of the visible Church,” “though a maimed part.”348 To some degree this 
undercuts the certainty and the value of the visible Church while at the same time allowing 
Hooker to make a case for the necessity of a centralized ecclesiastical authority.  
A point of contention between Cartwright and Hooker over the right method of 
reform that encapsulates Hooker’s sense of the importance of a discriminating reason is their 
differing interpretations over Tertullian’s De idolatria. Cartwright argues that according to 
Tertullian, “Christians should not be like the Idolators, no not in those thinges which of them 
selves are most indifferent to be used or not used.”349 In his defense of England’s retention of 
some of the customs of the Church of Rome, Hooker argues that custom cannot be dismissed 
without a rational examination of it. Comparing the relationship between the Church of 
Rome and the Church of England to the heathen nations neighboring Israel, Hooker argues 
that “we may doubt, whether the Lord in all such indifferent ceremonies, as those whereof 
we dispute, did frame his people of set purpose unto any utter dissimilitude, either with 
Aegyptians or with any other nation els…there is no necessitie to thinke, that God for feare 
of infection by reason of neerness forbad them to be like the Cananites or the Aegyptions, in 
those things which otherwise had bene lawful enough.”350 Moral value is determined by use, 
but the moral value of use is not transferable: an indifferent practice is not made evil simply 
because it is used by the Papists. Moreover, a custom established by heretics which was once 
evil, may “being presently without harme” become indifferent.351  
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Reforming by the Cartwright’s logic of contraries not only limited reform, but also 
sanctioned innovation that ultimately discredited the moral authority of the Church. To 
utterly exclude the Roman church from reform by fighting over things indifferent made 
reform seem irrational at best. Moreover, eschewing all Roman Catholic practice is 
counterproductive, if the reformers’ goal really is to enact religious reform, for “when God 
did by his good Spirite put it into our hearts, first to reforme ourselves (whence grewe our 
separation) and then by all good means to seeke also their reformation; had we not onely cut 
off their corruptions but also estranged ourselves from them in things indifferent, who seeth 
not howe greatly prejudiciall this might have beene to so good a cause, and what occasion it 
had given them to thinke (to their greater obduration in evill) that, through a froward or 
wanton desire of innovation, we did constrainedly those things, for which conscience was 
pretended?”352 For Hooker, the method of reform went far towards validating the process of 
reform itself.  Moreover, if reform is undertaken incorrectly, it may make “prejudiciall” 
against reform those very individuals most in need of reform.   
At times Hooker does see good and evil in absolute terms. For example, he argues 
that there is an essential unity between good and evil, and that men “needeth [not] one rule to 
know the good and another the evil by.”353 Earlier in the Lawes Hooker had used the 
metaphor of the crooked stick in order to describe his notion of good and evil: “For he that 
knoweth what is straight doth even thereby discern what is crooked because the absence of 
straightness in bodies capable thereof is crookedness. Goodness in actions is like unto 
straightness; wherefore that which is done well we term right.”354 But Hooker never 
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maintains this notion of rightness for very long, and more often he turns his attention towards 
classifying moral value, arguing that reason may judge an act to be mandatory in the case of 
absolute notions of good and evil, permissive in the case of diverse and evitable evil, and 
admonitory in cases of diverse good.  Moreover, even as Hooker champions the astute 
observation of church practice above the irrationality of the reformers, observation is a 
fundamentally flawed practice, but one necessary in the current age.  The observation of 
“signes and tokens” that are indicators of goodness are ranked a far distant second place to 
the “most sure and infallible way” to understand goodness: through “the knowledge of causes 
whereby it is made such.”355 The knowledge of causes is “so hard that all shunne it, and had 
rather walke as men do in the darke by hap hazard, then tread so long and intricate mazes for 
knowledges sake.”  
Hooker, then, is a moral reformer very much attuned to the needs and deficits of his 
own age. He characterizes himself as a physician helpless against the imbecility of his own 
patient. Just as  “Physicians” often must forego the “methods of curing” that they  “know to 
be the fittest” on account of their patient’s “impatiency,” so too in “this present age full of 
tongue and weake of braine” Hooker chooses not to “make any curious or deep inquirie” into 
the “causes of goodness.” Far from using an ineffective “far removed discourse,” Hooker 
concentrates instead not on abstract theories of virtue, but discussions of goodness that 
address the very real anxieties of the period about the presence of doubt and the possibility of 
moral reform.356   
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VI. Bringing “all to a confusion” and Motivating Reform 
 In his biography of Richard Hooker published with the 1665 edition of Hooker’s 
complete works, Izaak Walton characterizes Hooker in his youth as “an early Questionist, 
quietly inquisitive Why this was, and that was not, to be remembered? Why this was granted, 
and that denied?”357 Though Walton is quick to assert that modesty keeps this penchant for 
questioning in check, it is telling that even Hooker’s sympathetic biographer cannot resist the 
idea that he is a man with a mind more prone to raising questions than answering them.  
In his denial of the reformer’s position that scripture is the only rule of moral truth, 
Hooker cites doubting Thomas as proof that all moral value need not be found exactly in the 
scriptures.358 Commenting on the Biblical episode in which doubting Thomas must see the 
wounded Christ in order to believe in the resurrection, Hooker concludes, “Can there be any 
thing more plaine, then that which by these two sentences [about Thomas’s demand for 
ocular proof] appeareth, namely, that there may be a certaine beliefe grounded upon other 
assurance then Scripture; any thing more cleare, then that we are sayd not onely to believe 
the thinges which we knowe by anothers relation, but even whatsoever we are certainly 
perswaded of, whether it be by reason or by sense?” In his argument for the validity of things 
indifferent, Hooker argues that it is necessary to doubt that the Scripture is the only source of 
knowledge about certain human action and belief. In a nearly tautological expression of the 
nature of belief, Hooker rhetorically highlights the problem of the doctrine of sola scriptura: 
“The ground of credite is the credibility of thinges credited.”359 The certainty upon which all 
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of Hooker’s uncertainties rest and perhaps the only thing that keeps Hooker from true 
skepticism is his unwavering assertion that a criterion of belief is absolutely necessary to 
moral value and that the church serves as that criterion. Even if Scripture credited all belief 
and doctrine, “yet still that Scripture which giveth credit to the rest, would require another 
Scripture to give credite unto it.”360 Indeed, in some of the most pessimistic moments of the 
Lawes, one can reasonably wonder whether Hooker does not see the sole purpose and the 
sole infallible truth of religion more generally, and the English Church more specifically, as 
protecting man from the skepticism that is so natural to human nature. Moreover, there is a 
just irony in the fact that even as he argues for the English Church as a source of assurance, 
he uses one of the greatest Biblical doubters to do so.    
Determinations of moral value, the basis for any method of reform, is, finally, the 
point over which Hooker dissents from the reformers. According to Covel, the problem with 
the writer who criticizes Hooker’s Lawes in A Christian Letter is that he does not have an 
appropriate notion of good and evil, which causes him to come to the three false conclusions 
that “all sin is but one sin…that all sins are equal...[and] that all sins are united.”361 Against 
these conclusions, Covel argues instead “that sins are of divers kinds; of divers degrees; of 
divers natures; and that all are not, where one is.”362 Here again, as we saw in the debate 
between More, Luther, and Erasmus over moral reform, the problematic third Stoic paradox 
haunts Protestant determinations of moral value. Quoting the paradox nearly verbatim and at 
length, Covel comes to the conclusion that “howsoever, in some sort, virtues are called equal; 
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yet vices are not: for all virtues, from the vanity of the world, tend but to one perfection 
(either to reason, as the Philosophers thought; or, to say better, to the revealed will of God, 
which is the rule of good and evil); but sins departing from this lead unto divers vanities, in 
divers kinds. Neither are virtues all equal simply, but by a kind of proportion; because they 
all proceed from the love of God, and all tend unto his glory.” Hence, the reformer’s impulse 
to “run so far, with a desire for safety, from those opinions that were thought dangerous” 
brings them only “at length unto those that were much more dangerous, in truth.”363   
Though the Lawes can and should be read as an extension of the Admonition 
Controversy, more largely Hooker’s interest to explain doubt and levels of certainty with 
regard to moral value is a philosophical response to many problems inherent in Calvinism for 
notions of edification and reform. Perhaps the irony of Calvinism, which started as a reform 
measure (though a measure distinct from Calvin himself), is that the well-noted “anguish and 
perplexitie” caused by its central tenets about grace and predestination undercut individual 
motivation for reform. It is precisely man’s uncertainty about moral value that in Hooker’s 
view allows for reform. According to Covel, it is “the consideration of this inequality of sin, 
as it acquainteth us with those steps that sin maketh in us; so it causeth us not to despair that 
we have committed some, but to hope and to be thankful, that we have escaped greater.”364 
As difficult to accept as levels of certainty were to some, as much as adiaphora invited 
speculation about the nature of moral value and its apparent relativity, and as much as 
Hooker’s Lawes threatened “to bring all into a confusion,” it is possible that such moral 
confusion was necessary in Hooker’s view to motivate reform. Though Hooker’s movement 
from dichotomy to taxonomy may allow a fissure in the union of truth and goodness, in 
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Hooker’s view, that fissure allowed for an alternative space where conformity could flourish 
and was preferable to what he saw as the full scale breakdown of truth and goodness that the 
strategy of opposition offered.  
CHAPTER 5 
PRETERNATURAL PHENOMENA, SKEPTICISM, AND THE BREAKDOWN OF 
ANALOGICAL THINKING AT THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 
I. Empiricism, Natural Philosophy, and Moral Value 
 At the end of the sixteenth century, preternatural phenomena were an important site 
of intersection between natural and moral knowledge. Many looked to unexplainable natural 
phenomena such as earthquakes and astrological conjunctions as messages from God about 
the moral state of England. Yet there was a great sense of uncertainty about these signs and 
whether or not they should be considered supernatural or preternatural at all. The increasing 
interest in experience, empiricism, and observation in natural philosophy shored up the 
epistemic demands on preternatural phenomena. As these standards became more pressing, 
and it seemed as though man’s understanding of preternatural phenomena could become 
more certain, many began to question whether a knowledge apprehended by the senses 
should act as a moral guide.  In other words, as preternatural phenomena became more 
certain, it provoked questions about the shape and characteristics of moral knowledge. Was it 
right for moral knowledge to be empirically certain? And if it was empirically certain, then 
was the source of moral knowledge God or man or was moral value some strange 
collaborative project between them?  
Moral and natural philosophy enjoyed an increasingly strained relationship in this 
period, and advances in natural philosophy were sometimes justified at the expense of moral 
philosophy. Twice in the Advancement of Learning, Francis Bacon argues that it was not 
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natural knowledge that caused the fall of man, but moral knowledge. In his defense of natural 
philosophy against the charge of atheism, Bacon contends that “it was not the pure 
knowledge of nature and universality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names 
unto other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him, according unto their 
proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall; but it was the proud knowledge of good and 
evil, with an intent in man to give law unto himself and to depend no more upon God’s 
commandments, which was the form of the temptation.” It was not the “natural knowledge of 
creatures, but the moral knowledge of good and evil” that caused the fall of man.365 Yet, for 
Bacon the study of nature can be profoundly moral, as when he writes famously at the 
beginning of his essay “Of Atheism,” “a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism; 
but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion.”366  This tension between 
Bacon’s differentiation and commingling of natural and moral knowledge clearly articulates 
the uneasy relationship between natural and moral law in this period. 
The problematic status of nature as a resource for moral law is nowhere more 
apparent than in the discussions of the preternatural in the 1580s and 90s. Late Elizabethan 
England was a marvelous age—that is, an age endowed with a strong sense of the ties 
between the natural, preternatural, and the supernatural. It would seem that moral guidance 
was everywhere: plagues, comets, earthquakes, astrological conjunctions and so many other 
unexplainable phenomena provided much material for the moral pamphleteering so popular 
at the end of the century. In particular, prognostication pamphlets as well as works dealing 
with the influence of the stars and planets on man—both physically as well as politically, 
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morally, and socially—proliferated. As seen in the work of Philip Stubbes and other puritan 
moralists, the sense of moral decline, particularly in London, added to the sense of doom 
accumulating at the end of Elizabeth’s reign that fuelled the production and demand for 
prognostication literature. Although the powers of preternatural phenomena captivated the 
imagination and harnessed the fears of the philosopher and layman alike for centuries leading 
up to the early modern period, in the late sixteenth century, pamphlets dealing with 
preternatural phenomena emerged as a guide to stem the tide of England’s moral collapse.  
But as Lorraine Daston has argued, trying to determine what was truly a miracle or 
sign from God was “a delicate matter of balancing theological context against admittedly 
incomplete natural knowledge.”367 The status of astrology in the period provides a 
particularly good illustration of her point. Hardly a science, arguably an art, possibly a 
miracle: astrology is a prime example of the early modern tendency to set up epistemological 
boundaries that immediately become blurry, the kind of impulse that can be indulged by a 
culture still unencumbered by strict disciplinary categories.368  Philip Melanchthon’s attitude 
fairly typifies the convoluted relationship between astrology and astronomy in the period. In 
his preface to Sacrobosco’s De sphaera, a standard university textbook on astronomy, 
Melanchthon focused his writing on the defense of astrology rather than the praise of 
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astronomy alone.369 While he differentiates between the astrologer and the astronomer, the 
two share a very close relationship. Astronomy measures and tracks the motions of the 
heavenly bodies, while astrology is classified as “a part of natural philosophy, which teaches 
what effects the light of the stars has on the elements and on mixed bodies, and which 
temperaments, alterations, or inclinations it contrives.”370 In Melanchthon’s rendering, both 
forms of knowledge were highly empirical.  
The methodologies for both astronomy and astrology were in a significant period of 
redefinition and any neat distinction between astronomy as an empirical knowledge and 
astrology as a more imaginative, analogical knowledge is bound to be problematic. For 
example, Cardano had argued for the importance of the empiricism of Hippocratic method as 
a model for the astrologer’s enterprise.371 Meanwhile, in his Scholae mathematicae (1569), 
Peter Ramus had argued for the importance of direct observation like that practiced by the 
ancient Greeks over and above the use of mathematical models. Ramus’s argument prompted 
a response from Kepler, who quoted him on the title page of his Astronomia nova (1609), but 
proceeded to use that text to defend the use of mathematical models and hypothesis in 
astronomy.372  
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But clearly astronomy was empirical in a way astrology was not, and more 
importantly, astrology was often implicitly or explicitly a moral discourse in a way that 
astronomy never could be. Pamphlet literature of the 1580s and 90s reveals the extent to 
which many writers felt the need to interpret natural and unnatural events. In general, 
prognostication literature, inasmuch as it is an indicator of anxiety over predestination and 
the doctrine of election, serves a very cogent ethical purpose.373 As such, the business of 
interpreting nature—not just physical phenomena such as the alignment of the planets, 
weather, and cataclysmic events such as earthquakes, but also other extraordinary natural 
events such as diseases, droughts, and plagues—became an important focal point for much 
pamphlet literature. Poised between sensory knowledge, demonstration, and empiricism on 
the one hand, and Platonism, magic, and analogical thinking on the other hand, at the end of 
the sixteenth century astrology found itself between two competing methodologies.  In other 
words, the debates over astrology’s relationship to moral knowledge provide a window into 
the contested value of empiricism to conceptions of moral knowledge and moral discourse.   
That preternatural phenomena could act as signifiers of God’s attitude towards man 
was largely made possible by the prevalence of analogical thinking in the period.   
Dorothy Koenigsberger has argued that early modern analogical thinking is an attempt at 
knowledge production, as when men “use the real or seeming similarities, or the identical 
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likenesses, between one thing and other…to describe what is less known from that which 
they feel they already know.”374 Brian Vickers has shown the degree to which the interest in 
the occult is entirely dependent upon analogical thinking. But he reminds us too that for the 
occult, analogy is not simply a trope, but rather “it posits a real connection, an interequation 
or identity of elements on the corresponding levels of classification.”375  What is important 
for our purposes is that as sensory knowledge and experience became more important to 
Renaissance natural philosophy, many became concerned about the uncertainty that this 
allowed into the analogy between natural and moral knowledge. The problem was not 
necessarily that the correspondence no longer existed, but rather a growing recognition that 
man simply could not understand it; and significantly, it was not that man could not 
understand it because it was knowledge shrouded in divine mystery, but because he could not 
perceive it with his senses.  
With an increasing emphasis on empiricism and induction, astrology’s reliance upon 
analogical thinking is the heart of much of the polemical literature written against it.376 But as 
astrology moved towards a more empirical framework, the basis of moral knowledge had to 
be reevaluated and changed accordingly.  Much of this is helped by advances in astronomy 
so that, as Daston notes, “In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
preternatural phenomena swung from the almost-supernatural extreme of portents to the 
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almost-natural extreme of Baconian facts.”377 But despite this movement, many still viewed 
astrology, as Melanchthon had, as occupying a middle place that allowed for a continuum 
between arts as diverse as divination and medicine.378 Moreover, even Bacon associated 
astrology along with natural magic and alchemy as “sciences…which have had better 
intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man than with his reason.”379 
One way in which this strange middle place between two opposing methodologies 
expressed itself in Renaissance texts was in the way in which astrology was often associated 
with poetry and rhetoric by both its opponents and supporters.380 In the Vanitie and 
Uncertaintie of the Artes and Sciences, Agrippa calls astrology “nothing eels but meere 
trifles, poetes fables, and monstrous sayings, with whiche they haue imagined that the 
Heauen is aboundantly replenished. And there is no sort of men, that more agree together, 
then Astrologers and Poetes.”  The only difference between them is that “Astrologers do liue, 
abuse men, and gaine by these fables, whilest the Poetes inuentours of them doo leade their 
life in greate necessitie.”381  
Perhaps both because of its association with rhetoric and its debatable relationship 
with the senses, the polemics over astrology was a key site for the importation of skepticism 
into English. In the Tetrabiblos, Ptolemy had noted the epistemic difficulties presented by 
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astrology: “Even though one approach astrology in the most inquiring and legitimate spirit 
possible, he may frequently err…because of the very nature of the thing and his own 
weakness in comparison with the magnitude of his profession.” As a form of knowledge, 
astrology was uncertain because it was “composed of so many unlike elements”; hence, it 
must always be “conjectural and [is] not to be absolutely affirmed.”382  Acceptance or 
rejection of astrology reflected one’s attitude towards the senses and had much to do with 
how one chose to accommodate their fallibility.  
Polemical literature written against astrology has a long-standing tradition dating 
back to Sextus Empiricus, whose Adversus astrologos influenced Pico della Mirandola’s 
Disputationes adversus astrolgoiam divinatricem.383  In addition, the spokesperson for the 
second book of Cicero’s oft quoted De diviniatione is the Skeptic Carneades, who concludes 
that “divination is not applicable in any case where knowledge is gained through the 
senses.”384 For the most part, those people who criticized astrology took a skeptical point of 
view, arguing that knowledge, if there were any to be had, had to come through the senses. 
But as astrology became more associated with astronomy, an area of knowledge becoming 
increasingly available to sense perception, it offered the possibility that astrology might be a 
way to methodize moral relativity. In other words, the connection between an unmethodized 
moral knowledge and an increasingly empirical branch of natural philosophy suggested that 
moral knowledge might have something to gain from natural philosophy.   
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In his Defense of Poesy, Philip Sidney illustrates the problematic figure of the 
astrologer in the late sixteenth century and his relationship to natural and moral knowledge. 
Sidney chooses to defend the knowledge of the poet by using the astrologer as a primary 
counter example. This choice is all the more revealing since Sidney tends to defend poetry 
from things it has been, in his view, unfairly and unadvisedly associated with or accused of.  
Sidney describes the ill-advised pursuit of other forms of learning that attempt to “lead and 
draw us to as high a perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clayey lodgings, 
can be capable of.” He devises a list of forms of learning that are related to astrology and the 
occult sciences: “Some that thought this felicity principally to be gotten by knowledge, and 
no knowledge to be so high or heavenly as acquaintance with the stars, gave themselves to 
astronomy; others, persuading themselves to be demigods if they knew the cause of things, 
became natural and supernatural philosophers; some an admirable delight drew to music; and 
some the certainty of demonstration to the mathematics.” Sidney then invokes the story 
repeated in nearly every polemic published against astrology: “When by the balance of 
experience it was found that the astronomer, looking to the stars, might fall in a ditch…then 
lo, did proof, the overruler of opinions, make manifest that all these are but serving sciences, 
which, as they have each a private end in themselves, so yet are they all directed to the 
highest end of the mistress-knowledge, by the Greeks called architectonike, which stands (as 
I think) in the knowledge of a man’s self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with the end 
of well-doing and not of well-knowing only.”385  At best, this unfavorable comparison 
between astrology and poetry suggests that astrology may lead to a kind of imcomplete moral 
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law; at worst, it suggests that astrology leads only to a knowledge of natural, but not moral, 
law.  
This story, which refers to the ancient astronomer Thales and is found in one of 
Plato’s primary works on epistemology, the Theaetetus, is highly instructive about the issues 
surrounding astrology in the early modern period. In the Theaetetus, Socrates expands and 
elucidates Protagoras’s idea of man as the measure of all things and argues that perception 
and experience are the primary means of knowledge. At the same time, he explores the 
uncertainty inherent in sense perception. The story of Thales arises during his critique of 
philosophers who make themselves look like fools because of their lack of experience.386 In 
using this story as a counter to the moral knowledge gained from poetry, Sidney draws our 
attention to the importance of experience for the moral cogency of Elizabethan poetics. 
Although Sidney famously uses the zodiac as the metaphor for the poetic wit, his 
ultimate critique of astrology comes in the ironic Astrophil and Stella in sonnet XXVI in 
which astrology becomes a rhetoric in the service of the courtier poet.387  Here Sidney uses 
astrology to underline the importance of method to moral knowledge. Though “dusty wits 
dare scorn astrology” and the “promising wonders” and “birthright in the sky” that any 
astrologer would recognize in Stella’s beauty (here specifically her “lamps” or eyes) 
Astrophil affirms in the sestet,  
For me, I do Nature unidle know, 
And know great causes great effects procure, 
And know those bodies reign on low. 
And if these rules did fail, proof makes me sure, 
Who oft fore-judge my after-following race 
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By only those two eyes in Stella’s face.388 
 
Setting aside questions of whether Stella’s beauty more invigorates moral virtue or moral 
depravity, the repetition of “know” in the first three lines of the sestet sets up a comparison 
between two kinds of evidence for moral knowledge, “rules” and “proof.” The courtier-poet 
finds evidence for the untenable rules of astrological influence in Stella’s face.389  Sidney 
fairly reflects competing deductive and inductive models of poetics, natural, and moral 
knowledge. He also indicates that deductive forms of knowledge—that associated with 
astrology and rules—are less valid than experience. At the very least experience offers 
certainty when deductive method falters.  
In this period of transition in moral philosophy, natural philosophy, and literary 
criticism writers pause to assess the place of sensory knowledge in dermining moral value. 
Astrology and knowledge of preternatural phenomena play a key part in discussions about 
not just appropriate, but effective, moral language.  In this chapter I will begin by considering 
the attitudes of Jean Calvin and Philip Melanchthon towards astrology. These two writers set 
up two traditions of thought about astrology and its relationship to moral knowledge, both of 
which were influential in England. In the second section I will then consider the writings of 
the Harvey brothers in the 1580s on preternatural phenomena and how they offer us a 
spectrum of ways to look at the question of the relationship between moral and natural 
knowledge. I will then consider the example of Thomas Nashe’s Christs Teares over 
Jerusalem, in which preternatural phenomena get to the heart of the limits of the human mind 
and moral discourse as he mediates his own competing interests in the value of decorum and 
skepticism for moral reform. I will conclude by way of looking at the reemergence of 
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astrological polemic at the turn of the century as it reveals the implications of sensory 
knowledge for moral value.  
 
II. Reform and the Problem of Mixed Causation 
Defenders and detractors of astrology interpreted it either in terms of signification or 
causation. In practice these two aspects led to significant methodological differences and 
religious controversies. While the moral health of a nation was signified by preternatural 
signs such as earthquakes and comets, the moral health of an individual was often framed in 
terms of causation. For Jean Calvin, astrology, which was always interpreted as a cause of 
moral value, threatened providence; astronomy, on the other hand, could be beneficial insofar 
as contemplation of the heavens affirmed divine order. For Philip Melanchthon, who 
envisioned a closer relationship between astrology and astronomy, astrology could actually 
strengthen the argument for providence, especially when granted a causative role in moral 
law. 
  The idea that astrology shaped the moral behavior of an individual made it, to some 
degree, fall victim to Calvinism.390  Calvin considered astrology not as a means to interpret 
providence, but as its competitor. However, it can also be said that Calvinism fell victim to 
astrology in that astral determinism ran the risk of looking too much like the doctrine of 
election; many believed that the moral determinism that was the logical outcome of nativities 
short-circuited moral value in the same way that Calvinism could seem to render piety and 
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ethics useless.391  In both cases, the notion of reform and grace was rendered obsolete.392 
Indeed, it is perhaps telling that Calvin begins his Admonition against Astrology Judiciall 
with a discussion of how astral determinism is not a “licence to all evill”—almost as though 
by protesting against this view he is implicitly defending his own doctrine of 
predestination.393   
In the Institutes, Calvin praises the study of nature as a source of moral knowledge. 
Man’s ability or inability to read nature was central to his knowledge of himself and of God. 
Nature was a primary source of knowledge of God, and, since knowledge of God necessitates 
a certain kind of behavior, Calvin reasoned, a guide to moral action. Moreover, this kind of 
knowledge was freely open to everyone: “There are innumerable evidences both in heaven 
and on earth that declare his wonderful wisdom; not only those more recondite matters for 
the closer observation of which astronomy, medicine, and natural science are intended, but 
also those which thrust themselves upon the sight of even the most untutored and ignorant 
persons, so that they cannot open their eyes without being compelled to witness them.” With 
more specialized knowledge of nature comes a more specialized knowledge of God; as man 
comes to understand higher levels of nature, such as the “motion of the stars,” “God’s 
providence shows itself more explicitly.”394  Astrologers looked at the heavens in order to 
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understand man, while Calvin suggested that the heavens should tell man more about God 
and moral value would be revealed through that knowledge.  
It is this correspondence between knowledge of God and knowledge of nature that 
stabilizes Calvinist ethics.395 Because man’s understanding of nature is fundamentally 
corrupt and imperfect, so too is his understanding of ethics: “Because all of us are inclined by 
nature to hypocrisy, a kind of empty image of righteousness in place of righteousness itself 
abundantly satisfies us. And because nothing appears in or around us that has not been 
contaminated by great immorality, what is a little less pleases us as a thing most pure—so 
long as we confine our minds within the limits of human corruption.” Man’s limited ability to 
apprehend moral law finds an analogy in the limitations of the senses:  
Just so, an eye to which nothing is shown but black objects judges something dirty 
white or even rather darkly mottled to be whiteness itself. Indeed, we can discern still 
more clearly from the bodily senses how much we are deluded in estimating the 
powers of the soul. For if in broad daylight we either look down upon the ground or 
survey whatever meets our view round about, we seem to ourselves endowed with the 
strongest and keenest sight; yet when we look up to the sun and gaze straight at it, 
that power of sight which was particularly strong on earth is at once blunted and 
confused by a great brilliance, and thus we are compelled to admit that our keenness 
in looking upon things earthly is sheer dullness when it comes to the sun. So it 
happens in estimating our spiritual goods. As long as we do not look beyond the 
earth, being quite content with our own righteousness, wisdom and virtue, we flatter 
ourselves most sweetly, and fancy ourselves all but demigods.396 
 
Indeed, knowledge of the heavens would seem to be absolutely necessary to calibrate man’s 
moral compass, for it is only by comparison with something greater that man understands his 
own strengths and weaknesses.  
But the idea that astrology directly influenced the physical world was problematic for 
Calvin. In his Admonition against Astrology Judiciall, Calvin praised the “true Astrologie,” 
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and even admitted that certain revered Old Testament biblical figures such as Moses looked 
to the starts for guidance in important decisions about husbandry and civil policy.  However, 
like Ficino, he was quick to note that the “naturall order and disposition that God hath set in 
the stares and planets to judge of their office and propertie and virtue and to bring all to their 
end and use” was a “Speciall knowledge” not meant for all persons to comprehend.397  
Careful to protect the role of providence in the lives of men from interference from the role 
of the stars, Calvin only allowed that at most stars may “emprinte certain qualities in the 
persones but they cannot cause that this thing or that should fall upon them.”398 Insofar as 
astrology could replace the prescriptions of God and social custom and may get in the way of 
man’s civic duty, it was a destabilizing force to the Christian commonwealth and to 
individual moral reform.399 
According to Calvin, astrologers attribute causality to celestial forces, rather than 
seeing them instead as signs from God. The latter is an observational mode in which man 
interprets the will of God, while the former instead activates the imagination and ultimately 
redirects man’s attention away from God.400 The danger of this mistake is wide-ranging in 
that it is applied not just to men, but to religion; hence, astrology leads to a sense that religion 
is customary and relative.  Astrologers  
make all Christian religion as wel subject to the stars as mens bodies. For they 
undertake to render a reason wherefore Mahomet and his Alcoran hath a greater 
dominion then Christs and his gospel: to wit because the aspect of the stares is more 
favorable to the one then to the other….these phantastical felowes say that some 
corner of some signe of the Zodiak doeth cause man to believe [the Bible]. 
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Contrariwise the sect of Mahomet as the Scripture teacheth us is a iust plague of God 
to punishe the ingratitude of the world. And yet they will make men believe that it is 
set up and advanced by the disposition of the stars. To be shorte it is evident that all 
they which mainteyne such madness know not what it is to speake of God and his 
religion, no more then brute beastes.401 
 
In its attempts to explain variety on earth, astrology suggests that religion’s raison d’etre is 
natural and material rather than spiritual.  Even more problematic, the evidence produced by 
astrology for religious difference contradicts Biblical truth. Despite the fact that Calvin views 
nature as a source of moral knowledge in the Institutes, astrology is a clear exception because 
it suggests that nature should be read in a causative rather than a signifying way.  Calvin 
feared that the book of nature might supplant the book of Scripture as a source of moral 
knowledge, and in doing so move moral knowledge away from providence and towards 
relativism.   
Many in England followed in Calvin’s polemical footsteps, including William Fulke 
and William Perkins. For both writers, astrology failed as a source of moral knowledge 
because it lacked an empirical basis.  At the same time that Calvin was published in England, 
William Fulke wrote the first English polemic against astrology entitled Antiprognosticon 
(1560), a text devoted to astrologers in general, and to Nostradamus in particular.  Fulke 
made much of both the obscurity of the art and its utter lack of method: “There is no mean 
whereby mans witte may atteyne to so greate knowledge, ther is no methode, no induction, 
that can maintayne truth of those propositions, which they take for their principles…For by 
what reason are ye able to demonstrate or shewe, that Saturne is so hertefull, malicious, and 
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pestilent? By induction?”402  For Fulke, the reliance on astrology only exhibited man’s 
irrationality and made men like “bruite beaste[s].”403  
So too in his Foure Great Lyers (1585), William Perkins polemically addressed “the 
Astrologers, the Star-gazers, and Prognosticators” who he hoped would be “as stubble [and] 
the fire will burn them [and] they shall not deliuer their own liues from the power of the 
flame.”  Perkins considered astrology a kind of “idolatry…covered with fayre and golden 
shewes,”404 and like Fulke, he questioned the soundness of its methodology.  Much less 
dismissive of the idea of astral determinism than Calvin, he compared the prognostication of 
the astrologer to the diagnosis of a physician and contended that although a physician may 
test out his diagnosis in order to more fully understand causality, an astrologer is much more 
limited in his ability to experience and observe the heavens.405 Because of the seeming 
proximity between diagnosis and prognostication, “for some, skepticism over astrology 
transferred to skepticism about medical profession,” but in the case of Perkins, medicine 
served as a counter example to a methodologically less certain astrology.406 For Perkins, the 
hallmark of “humaine learning which is profitable, and hath use in the life of man, is…often 
observations, and experience.”407 Man is impeded from understanding celestial causality by 
his “imbecilitie of wit,” as well as the infinite number of stars, their variety, and movement. 
                                                
402 William Fulke, Antiprognosticon, that is to saye, an Invective agaynst the vayne and unprofitable predictions 
of the Astrologians as Nostradamus, etc., (1560) B2-B3. 
 
403 Fulke C2.  
 
404 W[illiam]. P[erkins]., Fovre Great Lyers…A Resolution to the countri-man, proving it vtterly unlawfull to 
buye or use our yearly Prognostications (London: 1585) B1. 
 
405 This is a somewhat ironic contrast since astrology was actually used in medical training, at least in Italy, to 
aid prognosis (Broecke 13). 
 
406 Maclean 306. 
 
407 Perkins C5.  
 
184 
In addition, the study of astrology is also vexed by the “infinite varietie of inferiour things, 
which do hinder, pervert, change, receive, or not receive the virtue and predictions of the 
stars.”408 As we shall see, Perkins arguments about the inadequacy of the senses in a more 
general way, echoes the arguments that will be taken from Sextus Empiricus by polemicists 
at the turn of the century.  
While Calvin and his followers like Fulke and Perkins tended to stress the inadequacy 
of the senses in gauging astrological phenomena, Philip Melanchthon dealt with this 
inadequacy very differently. Instead of giving up on astrological knowledge, Melanchthon 
tried to validate astrology by pushing it closer to its relatively more stable cousin, astronomy. 
409 Melanchthon stressed the breadth of astrology, its key virtue being the general 
impressions that could be taken from it and interpreted. But despite the uncertainty of 
astrology, Melanchthon still considered it an art that, like medicine or politics, relied not 
upon guessing, but upon the “interpretations” of “certain observations.”410 In making 
astrology a crucial part of natural philosophy, Melanchthon moved the notion of morality 
towards natural law: “Astrology is a part of natural philosophy, which teaches what effects 
the light of the stars has on the elements and on mixed bodies, and which temperaments, 
alterations, or inclinations it contrives. And since morals, studies, decisions, and vicissitudes 
often re-echo inclinations, ‘each follows the elements of his nature’, as it is said.”411 This 
movement towards a more natural view of custom and moral law made is more stable.  
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Unlike Calvin, Melanchthon was comfortable with a more mixed and complicated 
picture of human knowledge, action, and will. In his view, human action has three sources: 
natural inclination, the category under which he put astrology; divine providence, which 
acted above nature; and demons. For Melanchthon, astrology went very far in explaining the 
moral and religious variety in the world: “If anyone contemplated the character of different 
regions and the minds of various peoples, what other cause for this difference could he show 
than the nature of the heavens?...And I do not judge that education, habit, custom, laws and 
advice contribute nothing to ruling these inclinations, but I put these, too, under that category 
of action that springs from nature.”412  Melanchthon borrows this idea of mixture from 
Hippocrates, who argued that “not only the difference between regions has its origin in 
heavenly causes, but also the differences in customs between various regions. If these things 
are certain, it is manifest that the foundation of the art is true and fixed, that is that heavenly 
light has great influence in tempering and changing the elements and the mixed bodies….and 
[the planets] in various combinations, form wonderful mixtures, just as in remedies various 
herbs are mixed, and voices in song.”413 Moreover, such a mixture was supported by 
Ptolemy, who argued that the decrees of astrologers do not have the force of command or 
certainty as though they were “praetors.”414 For Melanchthon, the study of the stars only 
corroborated a providential universe and was in some ways necessary to protect from what 
otherwise would seem to be the most likely conclusion: that such mixture was not organized, 
but clearly a product of chance.415 By finding a rational, natural basis for custom, astrology 
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made it less relative. Astrology, then, acts as a kind of coping mechanism that can protect 
providential order from what could seem to be a shapeless, various world.  
 The attitudes of Calvin and Melanchthon towards astrology show how high the 
religious and moral stakes were surrounding discussions of astrology. One’s attitude towards 
astrology said much about one’s understanding of the will, providence, the possibilities of 
human knowledge, and the relationship of that knowledge to moral value.   
They also foreground two very different views of the relationship between moral law and 
nature and two very different ways of dealing with uncertainty. For Melancthon, the 
uncertainty of mixture is a kind of tool to help man build a stronger understanding of himself 
and a means to moral improvement. For Calvin, the stars have much less practical use and a 
much greater contemplative use. The contemplation of the stars helps man to affirm God’s 
presence and suggests a providential order, but they do not act as a practical tool that man 
can use to develop his own moral agency. But as William Fulke and William Perkins’s 
demand for a more empirical basis of moral knowledge shows, a belief in the moral value of 
astrology meant making certain epistemological sacrifices: it meant accepting a less than 
certain source of moral truth.  
 
III. The Brothers Harvey and the Discourses of Preternatural Phenomena   
 The moral and epistemological stakes set up in the writings of Calvin and 
Melanchthon on astrology carry into the writings in the 1580s on earthquakes, astrological 
conjunctions, and other preternatural phenomena in England that many took to be signs of 
God’s impending wrath. In an early work predating the ominous signs of the 1580s, Pierre 
Boaistuau notes that the very category of the supernatural is a function of man’s incomplete 
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knowledge: “Touching things supernaturall or aboue nature, we are to think they are not so 
cald in respect of nature, as though she had made ought by chance, whereof she was not able 
to yeld a reason, but rather hauing regard to us, whose weake understanding cannot conceiue 
her secrete meanes in working.”416  Because supernatural or preternatural phenomena 
occurred in an epistemological and hence interpretive fissure, a fissure that would to some 
degree be filled very soon by Kepler and Galileo, one’s response to them was a great moral 
test. For Thomas Churchyard, this test polarized piety and sensory knowledge. After 
exhorting his reader to reflect upon the earthquake and make himself “a new man” in his 
short discourse on the earthquake of 1580, Churchyard writes, “Let such fine wittes search 
out secretes, and sift what they can from the bottome of their senses. Yet those that feare God 
(and feele in their consciences a diuine motion from the consideration of worldly wonders) 
will take the Earthquake to be of a nother kinde of Nature: And beholding the miraculous 
manner of the same, with open armes, and humble heart, will embrace Gods visitation, and 
worthily welcome the messenger he sendeth.”417 For Churchyard, nature was either to be 
understood rationally or simply believed, and only its faithful “embrace,” he would seem to 
suggest, will lead to moral reform.  
 These two works roughly represent the two kinds of texts being produced about 
prognostication in England in the 1580s. The first kind were texts like Churchyard’s, which 
argued that preternatural phenomena were signs from God and which warned people about 
the dangers of not taking serious the business of interpreting and applying the lessons 
embedded in these signs. The second kind of text was that like Boaistuau’s, or to pick an 
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example from the decade, Henry Howard’s Defensative against the Poyson of Supposed 
Prophecies (1583), that is, texts that warned people not to take prophecies too seriously.  
The brothers Harvey—Gabriel, John, and Richard—form a triumvirate who dedicated 
much thought in the 1580s to this very question of how preternatural phenomena should be 
interpreted. Taken together, their writings exemplify the broad spectrum of discourse that 
could be used to discuss nature.  Within the larger question of man’s ignorance of the 
physical processes governing supernatural phenomenon, these men tested the relationship 
between moral and natural law.  
John and Richard wrote treatises on the conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn that 
occurred in 1583, and both were subject to the harsh ridicules of Thomas Nashe in Pierce 
Penniless, primarily because they made predictions that did not come true.418  In his 
Astrological Discourse (1583), Richard Harvey prepares people for the possibility of the 
Apocalypse and a new world.  He discusses the planets largely in moral or astrological terms 
rather than astronomical ones. For Richard, the problem of interpreting planetary motion has 
as much to do with the planet’s distance from earth as it does to do with the uncertain 
interactions of moral value. Richard discusses the conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter in moral 
terms, noting that Saturn is called Infortunum maius, and Jupiter, Fortuna maior.  “It is 
doubtless the more hard and difficult, to set downe any certaine effects and Accidents, 
thereof to ensue,” when Saturn and Jupiter conjoin, “because the Fortune [of Jupiter] and 
Infortune [of Saturn] are equally matched, and as it were, indifferentlye encountered with 
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power and strength.”419 Part of the power of a conjunction comes from the union of “starre 
beames.” Citing Hermes Trismegistus, Richard weighs the difficult philosophical and moral 
question about the relative strength of good and evil:   
An aspect can not diminish the signification of a Coniunction: but a coniunction 
diminisheth the signification of an aspect, as ther foloweth. And yet by nature it is 
simply and essentially neither good nor evill, but sometimes good and sometimes 
evil, according to the nature and disposition of the planets, which are conioyned, so 
that consequently, seeing a coniunction of good planets is fortunate, of evill 
infortunate, it is a very difficult matter to determine upon the coniunction which is 
good in respect of Iupiter, and evil in respect of Saturne.420  
 
In the end he resolves that evil will result from the conjunction of these two planets; while 
hindrance has no effect on Jupiter, when an evil planet such as Saturn is hindered it is “made 
all the worse, and [its] malice & hindrance is increased the more.” The result of the 
conjunction ranges from bad weather to the fall of kingdoms to religious persecution.421  
Read within the context of the moral disorder and civil unrest in England. according to 
Richard these omens can signify nothing less than the apocalypse.422  
In his addition to Richard’s treatise on the conjunction, John Harvey takes a strikingly 
different approach to discussing astrology—and a much more astronomical one—in his 
Astrologicall Addition (1583) that was to be “annexed” to his brother’s earlier text. Though it 
is an “addition,” it offers a fundamentally different discussion of astrology.423 Against his 
brother Gabriel, who questions the uses of judicial astrology, he argues that “the legitimation 
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of liberall sciences, and as wel of this, as of any other, is to be avowed rather by the generall 
practice of all ages, then by any such particular proofe.”424 Applying, as others had, Ramist 
method to astrological discourse, John takes a less analogical and more streamlined approach 
to astrology, arguing that Jupiter may reign over Saturn, but he refuses to “define [anything] 
morallie” and vows “only to survey the naturall causes and signes of naturall effects.”425 But 
even though his discussion downplays a moral interpretation of nature, John’s text makes a 
similar call to reform as his brother’s, if a bit of a more tempered one.  Far from making the 
extreme predictions of his brother forecasting the end of the world, John emphasizes a more 
optimistic reform message. He affirms that England is not irrevocably lost, but that the future 
punishments from God that may be indicated by the conjunction are alterable “upon humble 
signification of a contrite and reformed heart.”426  
 John Harvey’s more tepid engagement with astrology may be explained by the fact 
that he was not always so uncritical of astrology. In the same year that he published his 
corrective to his brother’s text, he also published a Discoursive Probleme Concering 
Prophecies to consider “how far they are to be valued, or credited, according to the surest 
rules, and directions in Divinitie, Philosophie, Astrologie, and other Learning.” As the title 
would suggest, the text is a highly skeptical one, and in it John seeks to  
assay problematically, and as our schoolmen term it, disputatively, what may therin 
appeare most probable. My intention is not to teach, but to learne: neither do I affect 
the credite of a deepe Artist, but am content to be reputed a reasonable Questionist. I 
would be loath to misuse any person, or disguise any matter in tearmes: and therefore 
will not presume any farther, but to put the case, and like a tractable Peripatician, or 
rather Academique, by demaunding, and arguing, to proceede tentatively, and 
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discoursively, as the foresaid schoolmen use to call it.  If percase your Pro weigh 
down my Contra, I am soone answered; and will not greatly travel to trouble, or 
entangle you with intricate replies, or reionders: but am ready ynough to yield without 
the least obstinacie, and to confesse in all philosophical, and Christian humilitie, 
Errare possum, haereticus esse nolo. In the mean time, give me leave to doubt…427  
 
The Addition shows that John does see some moral value in supernatural phenomenon; 
however, in his Discoursive Probleme he steps back from this moral value to assess it 
through a skeptical lens. Moreover, because it is methodological rather than dogmatic, he 
understands his skepticism to be in the service of, not in opposition to, Christian piety.  
Prophecies, no matter their supposed source, are called into question; foreknowledge 
whether it be gained from “chronologicall computations, Theologicall constructions, 
Cabalisticall traditionas, and Mathemeaticall speculations fall out much alike, ambiguous, 
uncertaine, fallible, erroneous, deceitful.”428 For John the problem with prophecy, and with 
astrology in particular, is its reliance on overly obscure language. Using adjectives that recall 
the courtly rogues of Skelton’s Magnyfycence, he notes how prognosticators rely upon 
rhetoric: “so pliable and convertible is the nature of such pretended prophecies, and so 
continually practicable are the imposturall conveyances, and chevisances of such busie 
cheaters and cozeners, as usually play upon the advantage of these sophisticall inventions.”429  
Astrology is a kind of rhetoric without substance, a hall of linguistic mirrors hardly worth the 
interpretive effort it would seem to demand: 
Were it not a needles, or booteles labor, to make a special Analysis, either of their 
Abcedary and Alphabeticall  Spels, or of their Characteristicall, and Polygraphical 
suttelties, or of their Acrostique, and Anagrammatistique devises, or of their 
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Steganographicall, and Hieroglyphicall mysteries, or of their hyperbolicall metaphors, 
phantasticall allegories, and heraldicall illusions, or of their ambiguous 
aequivocations, interdeur amphibologies, and aenigmaticall riddles, or finally of any 
their other colourable glosses, and hypocritically subordinations, in some like 
prestigiatory, and sophisticall veine?430 
 
In other words, the ability to be an astrologer is wholly dependent upon language and 
rhetoric. In the end, again much like Skelton, John Harvey champions the true foresight 
gained by prudence, art, and experience over these false virtues. The so-called knowledge 
gained from astrology becomes a stand-in for true virtue. Wisdom and foresight of princes 
and leaders, and wise men more generally should not be confused with that of 
prognosticators.431 
 In sum, in John and Richard Harvey we find two brothers discussing astrology in 
various ways and thereby testing its moral worth and usefulness for moral reform. The fact 
that John can, in the same year, publish a text that supports the notion of astrology’s moral 
worth and a text that questions such a notion reveals how uncertain people really were about 
preternatural phenomena as a source of moral knowledge in the late sixteenth century. With 
his skepticism, John in particular presses the question of whether it is valid to find an analogy 
for moral law in natural law.   
 The third and most notorious Harvey brother was also very interested in the 
relationship between moral knowledge and nature.  Prior to his brothers’ discussions of 
astrology, Gabriel considered similar questions about the moral value of nature in 1580 in a 
letter to Spenser on how to interpret the earthquake of that same year.432 As a fellow at 
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Pembroke Hall, Harvey was known for his interest in new learning seen mainly in his 
advocacy of Ramism against Aristotelianism and his defense of “nu fresh paradoxis,” as he 
termed them.  Many of his more adversarial colleagues feared that his “singularity in 
philosophi” would become particularly dangerous if he decided to focus his attention on 
religion.433 
Harvey uses three different rhetorical registers—one analogical, one satirical, and one 
philosophical—to discuss the causes and origins of earthquakes. The letter is essentially a 
dialogue between Harvey and two women, Madame Incredula and Mistresse Inquisitiva, who 
want to hear the verdict of a “university man” on the origin of the earthquake that they have 
just experienced. The allegorical names immediately clue us in that this is not an entirely 
serious dialogue, at least not yet.  As in his brother Richard’s exposition of astrological 
conjunction, Harvey first explains earthquakes in terms of good and evil, elemental mixture 
and balance: “The Earth you knowe, is a mightie great huge body, and consisteth of many 
diuers, and contrarie members, & vaines, and arteries, and concauities, wherein to auoide the 
absurditie of Vacuum, most necessarily, be very great store of substantiall matter, and sundry 
Accidental humours, & fumes, and spirites, either good, or bad, or mixte.” An earthquake is 
produced when “Euill” takes a “Predominaunt Course” and “working vehemently in the 
partes, and malitiously encountering the good, forcibly tosseth, and cruelly disturbeth the 
whole.” 434  Rejecting this explanation, Mistress Inquisitiva accuses Harvey of telling them a 
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“trim goodly Tale of Robinhood” and chides Harvey for an “eloquence” that “farre passeth 
[her] Intelligence.”435  
Upon second try, Harvey then produces a story about earth composed of men and 
beasts that are  
continually at variaunce and fewde with an other, evermore seeking to be revenged 
upon…so likewise within it too, it hath also some, as vengibly and forwardly bent, as 
for Example, Woormes, and Moules, and Cunnyes, and such other valiauntly 
highminded Creatures,  the Sonnes and daughters of Mars & Bellona that nurrish 
civill debate, and contrarie factions amongst them selves: which are seldome, or never 
ended too, without miserable bloodshed, and deadly warre: and then go me their 
Gunnes lustily off, and the one dischargeth his Peece couraggiously at the other: and 
there is such a Generall dub a dubbe amongst them…that the whole Earth agayne…is 
terribly hoysed.436  
 
The women, realizing they are being mocked, cut Harvey off and press him for a less 
“cunning” explanation.  
 Harvey’s two false starts highlight the ease with which one may invent fables with 
which to understand preternatural events. Though the second explanation has a greater 
degree of humor and insincerity, that it is juxtaposed against a discussion of elements and 
mixture would seem to call into question the first, seemingly more serious explanation of the 
earthquake. Harvey is very disparaging towards the women’s desire to understand the 
earthquake; indeed, he argues that while learned men are moved to understand the earthquake 
by virtue of its motus, women, and more largely the lesser educated and emotionally driven 
men that they would seem to represent for Harvey, are moved by virtue of its metus, in which 
case they will likely never be capable of understanding it.437 The women’s names, Inquisitiva 
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and Incredula, become important here—for it is only skeptical listeners like themselves that 
force Harvey beyond his fictions and move him away from the “pleasant and pitty familiar 
discourse” announced in the letter’s title to the “short, but sharpe, and learned Iudgement” 
embedded in the text.  
When Harvey does finally undertake a serious discussion of the earthquake, what he 
produces is a philosophical monologue that considers the importance of mixed causality and 
the inadequacies of current human knowledge in its attempt to understand natural phenomena 
with a mixed causality.  Harvey notes that natural phenomena may “depen[d] upon a 
supernatural Efficient Cause, and ten[d] to a Supernaturall Morall End.”438 Moral law is the 
site of a merger between the natural and the supernatural; in other words, the very existence 
of a moral meaning turns nature into something supernatural, something beyond human 
knowledge.   Despite John Harvey’s later suggestion that his brother may not approve of 
studies in astrology, here Gabriel Harvey does not reject the notions of portents:  
I denie not, but Earthquakes (as well as many other fearfull Accidentes in the same 
Number,) are terrible signes, and as it were certaine menacing forerunners, and 
forewarners of the great latter day, and therefore out of controversie the more 
reverndly to be considered upon: and I acknowledge considering the Eventes, and 
sequels, according to the collection and discourse of mans Reason, they have seemed 
to Prognosticate, and threaten to this, and that Citie, utter ruyne and destruction. 
  
But at the same time, not every preternatural event is a supernatural event. In an 
uncharacteristic display of humility, Gabriel notes that it is difficult to make generalizations 
about such phenomena, or to presume  
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as to determine precisely and peremptorily of this, or every the like singular 
Earthquake, to be necessarily and undoubtedly a supernaturall, and immediate fatall 
Action of God, for this, or that singular intent, when as I am sure, there may be a 
sufficient Naturall, eyther necessarie or contingent Cause in the very Earth it selfe: 
and there is no question, but the selfe same operation in Genere or in specie, may at 
one tyme, proceeding of one Cause, and referred to one End, be preternaturall or 
supernaturall: at another tyme, proceeding of another, or the same Cause, and referred 
to an other End, but Ordinarie, and Naturall.439 
 
The earthquake is not simply or even primarily a moral wake up call for England as it was for 
so many others, like Churchyard, who wrote about it. Rather, it is an alarum to natural 
philosophers and historians to undertake a description of “the generall Nature of Earthquakes 
by definition, and the speciall diversitie of them by division” with a “complete Induction of 
many credible and autenticall, both olde and newe, divine and prophane, Greeke, Lattine, and 
other Examples.” Harvey calls for a “Historicall Induction of particulares” in order to 
determine by “generall Experience” whether earthquakes “sine omni exceptione, are 
ominous, and significative Effectes, as they say of Comets” or whether they can be both 
natural and supernatural.440 In other words, Harvey posits that nature sometimes is just 
nature. It may be a message from God, but it is not so exclusively, and it is up to men to 
develop a more discriminating understanding of nature in order to be able to differentiate a 
portent from a bad storm.441 
 Harvey’s interpretation of the earthquake of 1580 certainly shows how it is that he 
was accused of “nu paradoxes,” for Harvey is atypical in his emphasis on the possibility of a 
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material nature. Ranging from Richard, who tends to read nature in moral terms, to John who 
questions whether or not nature should be read morally but still produces moral readings of 
nature, to Harvey who sees in nature not the call for moral reform, but the call to reform 
natural philosophy, we see a range of responses to the moral and epistemological liminality 
occasioned by preternatural phenomenon in the 1580s.    
 
IV. Nashe, Plain Dealing, and the Uncertainty about Analogical Thinking 
 What worries Thomas Nashe about preternatural phenomena for the most part is not 
their cause or meaning. In Christs Teares over Jerusalem, preternatural phenomena are very 
clearly signs sent by God to warn men that they are sinful and that if they do not reform 
immediately, they will be destroyed. That much is very clear for Nashe. The question that 
compels Nashe’s engagement with preternatural phenomena centers on why these signs do 
not work.  
A defender of normative morality against dissenters to the English Church like Martin 
Marprelate, Thomas Nashe is a figure whose sense of moral decorum and authority was 
profoundly shaped by his interest in skepticism. Much of Nashe’s work of the early 1590s 
questions the value of the human mind to the creation of moral order. A litmus test for Nashe 
of the mind’s relationship to moral order is its response to signifiers, in particular, to 
language and to nature.  Because rhetoric is a key concept for Nashe in the search for moral 
reform, his works of this period are profitably considered in relief against the prognostication 
literature of the 1580s and 90s and the movement to codify an English style and poetics. In 
part, these discourses come together in his anxiety about (mis)interpretation and analogy and 
their place in the intellectual and moral culture of the period.   
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One of the main motivations behind Nashe’s interest in skepticism would seem to be 
his sense of the hermeneutic crisis of the 1590s during which time the practice of writing, 
reading, and interpreting literature underwent a period of reassessment. Certainly Nashe’s 
involvement in the Martin Marprelate episode did nothing to set his mind at ease regarding 
Elizabethan literary culture, let alone normative morality.442  In his epistle to the printer at the 
opening of Pierce Penniless (1592), he indicates his dissatisfaction with the current state of 
moral reform: “I am grown at length to see into the vanity of the world more than ever I did, 
and now I condemn myself for nothing so much as playing the dolt in print. Out upon it, it is 
odious, specially in this moralizing age, wherein everyone seeks to shew himself a politician 
by misinterpreting.”443 In his disgust that “there is nothing that [a man] may not wrest or 
pervert,” Nashe reveals his uneasiness about the fluidity of textual meaning. However, he 
holds on to the possibility that polemics and satire are one way to reclaim moral value for 
literature. Nashe warns his reader, “Sed caveat emptor, let the interpreter beware; for none 
ever heard me make allegories of an idle text. Write who will against me, but let him look his 
life be without scandal.”444 In this moral-rhetorical economy, a faulty text, like a sinful life, is 
a text worthy of “allegory”—that is, worthy of a corrective.  
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In his Preface to Astrophil and Stella (1591), which predates Pierce Penniless by a 
year, Nashe specifically links his sense of the alarming state of Elizabethan decorum and 
hermeneutics with his interest in and admiration for skepticism. Preceding, as it does, the 
work of one of the most renowned critics of Elizabethan decorum, it seems all the more a 
commentary on Elizabethan literary culture.  In his praise of the deceased Sidney and his 
literary legacy, Nashe worries about his own style. Though he does not wish to write with a 
“rethoricke of dulnesse,” he does choose a “heauie gated” style over the empty rhetoric 
produced by “lighter” wits. Nashe justifies his choice with two important allusions, both of 
which point to skepticism as a guide to moral value. The first comes in the form of a 
quotation from the sixth book of Cicero’s Republic, more commonly known as the dream of 
Scipio:  “For my part euery man as he likes, Mens cuiusque is est quisque.”445 In Cicero, the 
quotation is set in context of an assertion of the disjunction between reality and appearance, 
the inner self and the external body: “That man whom your outward form reveals is not 
yourself; the spirit is the true self, not the physical figure which can be pointed out by a 
finger.”446 This passage reflects what Nashe perceives to be the disjunction between the style 
of the text, its meaning, and the intent of the writer.  
While Nashe’s flippant “euery man as he likes” would seem to give up on moral 
value, the overall message of the passage affirms the need for rhetorical distinctions. Perhaps 
playing off of the dream of Scipio, which is a discussion about the ideal statesman, Nashe 
uses the metaphor of an ass who is “no great statesman” of the animal kingdom to represent 
those writers who use an inflated, meaningless rhetoric. However, Nashe admits that some 
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will be fooled by the ass because he dresses himself in statesman’s clothing.  This disjunction 
of appearance and reality endemic in Elizabethan literature brings Nashe to the second 
allusion, and the one that announces his admiration for the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus: 
“Our opinion (as Sextus Empedocus affirmeth) giues the name of good or ill to euery thing. 
Out of whose works (latelie translated into English, for the benefit of vnlearned writers) a 
man might collect a whole booke of this argument, which no doubt woulde proue a worthy 
commonwealth matter, and far better than wits waxe karnell: much good worship haue the 
Author.”447  Rather than deem Sextus’s relativism a threat, Nashe finds in it a warning and a 
call to the importance of a discriminating mind for readers and writers alike. He admonishes 
that true literature is labor intensive, “a harder thing then making golde of quicksiluer.”448 
This alchemical metaphor suggests not only that literature is difficult, but that it requires a 
human ingenuity that goes beyond nature—an appropriately idealistic and complementary 
conclusion for a preface to Sidnean poetry.   
Both readers’ misinterpretations of literature and their more general inability to 
distinguish between true literature and that which is simply stylistic pomp are only 
symptomatic of the larger moral degradation of society. In his preface to Astrophil and Stella, 
Nashe crystallizes his life-long struggle between decorum and skepticism; his works of this 
period are obsessed with an examination of how to write moral literature in an age in which 
misinterpretation is the hermeneutic rule of the day. 449  As the preface to Astrophil and Stella 
suggests, for Nashe wit and its extremes, that is, wittiness as well as a dearth of wit, are a 
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central concern.  While rhetoric and wit are very important to Nashe, he also realizes how 
easily they can render a text morally useless.450   In short, at the outset of his literary career, 
Nashe questions whether or not decorum can work in the service of moral writing.451  
One place in particular where this questioning can be seen is in his recurring 
fascination with the notion of plainness. In Summer’s Last Will and Testament (1592), Nashe 
nostalgically harkens back to a day, pre-Marprelate, perhaps pre-print, when real social 
bonds, not literary ones, held society together:  
For men (meane men), the skumme & drosse of all, 
Will talke and babble of they know not what, 
Vpbraid, depraue, and taunt they care not whom: 
Surmises passe for sound approued truthes:  
Familiaritie and conference,  
That were the sinewes of societies, 
Are now for vnderminings onely vsde, 
And nouell wits, that loue none but themselues, 
Thinke wisedomes height as falsehood slily couch’t, 
Seeking each other to o’erthrow his mate.452 
When Summer laments the loss of “simplicity and plainness,” for Nashe these terms refer not 
simply or even primarily to rhetoric; they are, in fact, terms with deep cultural and moral 
meaning for him.453 
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While these two adjectives are seldom used of Nashe’s prose, there is a sense in many 
of his texts that such virtues are of the greatest value to moral reform. For Nashe, one of the 
greatest impediments to reform is excess such as that he condemns in his first moral treatise, 
the Anatomie of Absuditie (1589). At the end of his Preface to Menaphon Nashe describes his 
Anatomie as a call to the reform of literature. He advises his readers that his “Anatomie of 
Absurdities may acquaint you ere long with my skill in surgery, wherein the diseases of Art 
more merrily discouered may make our maimed Poets put together their blankes vnto the 
building of an Hospitall.”454 Moreover, the Anatomie is an important text because in alluding 
to Philip Stubbes’s Anatomy of Abuses, and in borrowing heavily throughout the text from 
Agrippa’s Vanitie of the Artes and Sciences, Nashe announces his interest in moral literature 
and in using skepticism to promote moral value. 
The Anatomie is a fairly conventional catalogue of morally dangerous persons 
masquerading as brokers of virtue. As his title page indicates, the text is intended to benefit 
those lost in moral extremes, both the “licentious” and those “addicted to a more nyce 
stoycall austeritie” equally. The court, the poet, the puritanical moralist and the facilities of 
learning are all brought to account for their respective vanities. What these brokers have in 
common are the different forms of excess that make them ineffectual. In Nashe’s estimation, 
neither popular writers nor university wits, nor moralizing pedants are particularly effective 
writers.455 
 The text begins with an interrogation of the virtues espoused in Castiglione’s Courtier 
and the courtier poets who present themselves “as the Authors of eloquence, and fountains of 
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our finer phrases, when as they sette before us, nought but a confused masse of wordes 
without matter, a Chaos of sentences without any profitable sense….[or] Morall of greater 
moment.”456 Nashe moves from the misguided rhetorical excess of the courtier poet to those 
who “make the Presse the dunghill” and, in an unmistakable allusion to the polemical 
moralist Philip Stubbes, those who “preten[d] forsooth to anatomize abuses, and stubbe up 
sin by the rootes.” In their overly-puritanical desire to censure things so greatly that no room 
is left for “lawfull use,”457 those who would style themselves the “Church militant” are 
nothing else but a dangerous lot of “Malcontents.”458 
 Nashe moves finally to epistemic excess, of which the greatest example are overly 
“curious” astrologers, “who are infected with a farther improbabilitie, challenging knowledge 
unto themselves of deeper misteries.” Like Sidney in his Defense of Poesy, Nashe cites the 
story of Thales, the ancient astrologer who ignored what was “under his feet” in order to 
“search more curiouslie into the secrets of nature” and to “foretell the tokens [of God’s] 
wrath.”  But even as he begins this passage on unsanctioned knowledge by focusing on 
astrologers, his discussion moves seamlessly from astrology back to a condemnation of 
certain kinds of English poets:  
Thus are the ignorant deluded, the simple misused, and the sacred Science of 
Astronomie discredited, and in truth what leasings will not make-shifts invent for 
money? What whyl they not faine for gaine? Hence come our babbling Ballets, and 
our new found Songs and Sonets, which every rednose fiddler hath at his fingers 
end…Be it a truth which they would tune, they enterlace it with a lye or two to make 
meter, not regarding veritie, so they may make upe the verse, not unlike to Homer, 
who cared not what he fained, so hee might make his Countrimen famous. But as the 
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straightest thinges beeing put into water, seeme crooked, so the crediblest trothes, if 
once they come with in the compass of these mens wits, seeme tales.459 
 
In short, like astrology which is also meant to dupe the simple, poetry is “an occupation [of] 
lying.”460 Probably alluding to the debate over quantitative verse raised by Gabriel Harvey, 
Spenser, Daniel, and Campion, Nashe notes the sacrifice of truth for the sake of style. Wit 
here is a distorting mechanism, so that even when man may light upon truth, that truth may 
be of very little use and entirely incommunicable.  
But Nashe walks a narrow road here since, despite his skepticism about certain 
deceptive forms of rhetoric and obscurity, he is not ready to give up the value of rhetoric 
altogether. In a reprisal of Sidney’s Defense of Poesy, Nashe argues that true poetry marries 
the relative clarity of historical evidence and experience to a certain kind of philosophical 
and moral obscurity: “I account of Poetrie, as of a more hidden and divine kinde of 
Philosophy, enwrapped in blinde fables and darke stories, wherein the principles of more 
excellent Arts and morall precepts of manners, illustrated with divers examples of other 
kindgomes and Countries are contained.” The poet, he argues citing Cicero, predates the 
philosopher in the “studie of wisdome.”  Here Nashe promotes a kind of decorous obscurity: 
“Thinges that are most profitable” should be “shrouded under the fables that are most 
obscure,” yet this obscurity should not be irresolvable, but linked to history, natural 
philosophy, or moral philosophy.461   
Despite his interest in a kind of obscurity, Nashe ends the text in a way that 
significantly complicates our understanding of his poetics. Emphasizing the greater worth of 
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experience over art and of moral value over poetry, he recommends that poets should 
“endeavour to adde unto Arte Experience, [because] experience is more profitable voide of 
arte, then arte which hath not experience. Of it selfe arte is unprofitable without 
experience.”462 Nashe ends this early text with a discussion of the difficulty of moral reform 
by citing Socrates, “who reduced all Philosophy unto the manners, [and] sayd, that thys was 
the greatest wisdome, to distinguish good & evill thinges.” Only by discriminating between 
good and evil may man attain that “unestimable iewell” termed by Nashe “ an honest 
conversation.”  But such a skill is hard to achieve, and Nashe challenges his reader: “Let 
hime that is inclined but to one extreame, secretly try by himselfe, with what facilitie or 
difficulty he may suppresse it in himselfe, and his owne practice will teach him, that he is led 
captive by his own inclinations, and overcome by his wicked cogitations. If then so difficult a 
thing in accomplishment, seemes one sins suppression, howe laborious woulde be the 
reformation of an altogether evil conversation.”463  One of the most important sites of the 
distinction between good and evil is the text itself, and Nashe ends the Anatomie by noting 
that only the right kind of learning—and by extension, the right kind of text—can help a man 
against his own “inclinations” to evil and can help him achieve the ideal of “an honest 
conuersation.”  
Clearly for Nashe, the text becomes a kind of ethical dilemma that the reader must 
answer. But Nashe’s defense of literature and its contribution to the reader’s moral identity 
are never as clear as we might like them to be.  In his defense of poetry against a “sencelesse 
stoicall austeritie,” Nashe argues that texts will not “infect the minde and corrupt the 
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manners” of a good man. Just as “Sunne beames touching the earth remaine still from 
whence they came, so a wyse mans mind, although sometimes by chance it wandreth here 
and there, yet it hath recourse in staid yeeres to that it ought.”464 Yet Nashe warns the reader 
to be “warie” and to learn “as wel to discerne thy losse as thy gaine, thy hurt as thy good, 
least being wonne to haue a faurourable like of Poets wanton lines, thou be excited unto the 
imitation of their lust.”465 We are left, then, with the sense that the text is a site of moral 
challenge, but without as clear a sense of the text as a site of moral authority.  
Nashe returns to this question of the moral authority of the text in one of his most 
religious texts, Christs Teares over Jerusalem. This text begins with the premise that man is 
surrounded by the signs of moral value, if only he could understand them. Such signs include 
the preternatural phenomena sent by God to warn man about the dangers of his sinfulness. 
For Nashe, man’s inability to read the signs of heaven is symptomatic of the inability to 
distinguish between good and evil suggested at the end of the Anatomy of Absurditie. 
Moreover, this breakdown has much to do with Nashe’s sense of the problem of analogical 
thinking, and the difficulty of making the literary text a purveyor of moral value.  
Although Christs Teares is one of Nashe’s most didactic texts, it is also, in more 
subtle ways than many of his other texts, a very skeptical text, in large part because of its 
complex engagement with experience and history. In this text, recent natural phenomena 
such as the earthquake of 1580 are set in context of a long-standing tradition of 
prognostication dating back to the biblical account of the destruction of Jerusalem.  By the 
time Nashe wrote Christs Teares, the Elizabethan audience had proved itself to be much 
more resistant to reform than Nashe had imagined in the Anatomie. Marprelate had more or 
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less come and gone, and Nashe’s battle with the Harvey brothers was in full swing. Though 
several of Nashe’s works treat fundamental moral issues facing society, Christs Teares 
stands out with an uncharacteristic sense of urgency and sincerity, so much so that Charles 
Nicholl has argued somewhat bizarrely that the text constitutes “an actual nervous 
breakdown.”466 More to the point, the text is a culmination of the sometimes productive 
sometimes unhappy merger in Nashe between skepticism and moral reform.  
Nashe was not the only person wondering about the connection between the ominous 
astrological signs and preternatural phenomena of the 1580s, the destruction of Jerusalem, 
and the current moral health of England. If anything, the signs of the 1580s were as 
reassuring as they were frightening: they at once served as evidence that the English nation 
was elect while at the same time suggesting the real possibility that England was on the verge 
of losing its chosen status.   As early as 1584, John Stockwood preached a sermon inspired 
by recent unnatural events warning the people of England about the need for repentance. His 
Sermon of the moste lamentable destruction of Ierusalem capitalized on the anxiety about 
these events and the possibility that they somehow represented the displeasure of God.  
Jerusalem was unable to heed the warnings of God. It was not their ignorance that destroyed 
them, but rather their “brutishe dulnesse, that blinded them that they coulde not see GOD 
offerynge hym selfe unto them, nor yet perceive hys favour, nor the tokens of his kindled 
wrath, so that they were the cause of theyr owne destruction.”  Almost a cloaked warning to 
England to beware of the pride of nationalism, Stockwood notes that Jerusalem was “the 
chiefe Citie of the worlde” filled with “Scribes and Pharisies” who were revered for their 
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“knowledge and virtue.” Yet despite this preeminent status and great learning, the people of 
Jerusalem failed to interpret the message of Christ.467   
The destruction of Jerusalem, as confirmed by both the Bible and historiographers, 
served as a poignant example for John Stockwood and for Thomas Nashe of what happens 
when the means to moral reform fail.468 It is essentially a parable of the breakdown of 
communication between God and man, and the breakdown of the relationship between moral 
law and human action. It is, I would argue, a lesson of some significance for the writer 
thinking both about the problem of interpretation and literary decorum in this age of 
moralizing pamphleteers.   
A long overdue continuation of an earlier flurry of pamphlets occurring in the 1580s 
following the earthquake of 1580, Christs Teares over Jerusalem significantly reinvents the 
discourse used to interpret that event.469  For many in the 1580s the significance of the 
earthquake had to do with determining its cause, but for Nashe the interpretation of the event 
and its spiritual import takes precedence over characterizing its origin. Although the 
earthquake awakened many to the possibility of God’s displeasure with England’s religious 
and moral state, many doubted whether such a sign would have any real impact.470  
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468 For a historical rendition of this story, see Edward Livelie’s True Chronologie of the Times of the Persian 
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Nashe depicts God as a kind of author trying and failing to reach his audience, 
namely the Israelites. It is fitting that Nashe should once again revisit the question of the 
relationship between style and moral discourse at the outset of this text and that once again 
he should return to the notion of “plainness.” Christs Teares was published twice, each time 
with a different preface that acknowledged Nashe’s ongoing polemical engagement with 
Gabriel Harvey.  Nashe’s prefatory remarks bring us back to the question of decorum, its 
relationship to skepticism, and its moral value. In the earliest edition, the prefatory letter 
issues an apology to Harvey and a change in Nashe’s rhetorical-moral methodology.  Nashe 
declares his “farewells to fantasticall Satirisme” wherein he had “here-to-fore misspent [his] 
spirit.” Alluding to St. Augustine’s Retractions, Nashe repudiates his former polemical career 
and announces his “unfained conuersion” to less vain kind of writing. Harvey’s response to 
Nashe’s apology was one of incredulity, and he harshly criticized Nashe for the style of 
Christs Teares, which he considered to be blasphemous.471 After receiving this bitter 
response from Harvey, Nashe abruptly changed his prefatory letter and declared himself an 
“Academick…who absolutely conclude[s] that nothing is to be affirmed” and lamented that 
this was the result of “deal[ing] plainly.” The brief, earlier renunciation of satire gives way in 
the second edition to a longer meditation on the problem of misinterpretation.  Nashe 
condemns those men who have misinterpreted the Unfortunate Traveller by finding topical 
analogies where none exist. These “new decipherers,”472 as Nashe terms them, lack “honest 
plain meaning” because they create an “infinite number of these phantastical strange 
hieroglyphs….and stretch words on the tenter hooks so miserably, that a man were as good 
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considering every circumstance, write on cheuerell as on paper.”473 Elizabethan literary 
culture is bankrupt of the plainness so valued in Summer’s Last Will and Testament.   
Dealing plainly is a concept that goes hand-in-hand with Nashe’s tense relationship to 
skepticism. As before, the concept has less to do with rhetoric, and more to do with stabilized 
textual meaning. For Nashe morally useful writing necessitates persuading readers to forgo 
the attraction of “probabile” to their imagination and encouraging them instead to embrace 
“manifeste verum.”  Indeed, Christs Teares is highly rhetorical, and Nashe spends much time 
in his preface to the reader in the second edition defending his rhetorical choices. In a sense, 
plain dealing represents an attempt to escape a nominalist notion of words as signifiers; it is 
about breaking away from the moral uncertainty offered by mere analogy and striking the 
reader to the “marrow,” as he says.  
The address to the reader in the second edition of Christs Teares reveals the true 
complexity of decorum and the conflicted ways in which Nashe sought to deal with it.   The 
conflict between rhetoric and plain speaking becomes even more apparent in the invocation 
to the text. Nashe begins very self-consciously with an invocation that questions what kind of 
style to use for this text that is to be London’s “looking glasse.” As a kind of prophet, Nashe 
hopes to be God’s “pure simple Orator” and to “transform [him]self from [him]self, to be thy 
unworthy Speaker to the World.” Leaving behind “any ambitious hope of the vain merite of 
Arte,” Nashe “disinherit[s] [his] wit” and asks instead that “fiery Cloven-tongued 
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inspiration” be his muse and give his words “the forcible wings of the Lightnings, that they 
may pierce vnawares into the marrow and reynes of my Readers.”474   
It is important to recognize that Nashe wrote Christs Teares just after the completion 
of Terrors of the Night, a wild dream vision that examines divination and by extension, the 
moral agency of the mind.  Nashe shows the mind to be a place where distinctions simply 
cannot survive, a characteristic which directly affects the nature of literature.475 Night is the 
stomping ground of the guilty conscience, where “the table of our heart is turned to an index 
of iniquities, and all our thoughts are nothing but texts to condemn us.”476  And just as 
thoughts are texts, so too are texts dreams, as Nashe declares that “this whole tractate is but a 
dream,” and not the transcendent golden vision of Sidnean poetics, but an entirely “leaden 
dream” mired in the realities of human limitation.477  The key to this text is not so much that 
the literary text is an expression of the mind so much as it is the degree to which, for Nashe, 
the literary text becomes a kind of synecdoche of the mind and thereby reveals its natural 
state of chaos: “No such figure as the first chaose whereout the world was extraught, as our 
dreams in the night. In them all states, all sexes, all places, are confounded and meet 
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together. Our cogitations run on like heaps like men to part a fray where every one strikes his 
text fellow….they confound in one gallimaufry.”478 Though an Anatomy of Absurditie 
highlights the importance of social and moral distinctions to Nashe, in Terrors of the Night 
he confronts the reality that the mind is an unreliable ethical agent and in need of much 
ordering itself. 
Again returning to the threat of a willful and subjective hermeneutics, Nashe modifies 
the proverbial “everyone shapes his own fortune as he lists” to the more pessimistic 
“everyone shapes his own fears and fancies as he list.” But this sense of control quickly 
evaporates as he describes the mind. The mind is wholly physical and, a kind of preternatural 
phenomenon itself, in a constant state of bad weather: “In all points our brains are like the 
firmament, and exhale in every prespect like gross mistempered vapours and meteors: of the 
more foeculent combustible airy matter whereof, affrighting forms and monstrous images 
innumberable are created, but of the slimy unwieldier drossy part, dull melancholy or 
drowsiness.” Weather is an apt metaphor for Nashe’s picture of the mind; not only is it 
prodigious, but it is in constant motion: “And as the firmament is still moving and working, 
so uncessant is the wheeling and rolling on of our brains, which every hour are tempering 
some new piece of prodigy or other, and turmoiling, mixing and changing the course of our 
thoughts.” Crucially Nashe ends this passage not with an affirmation that “there are no true 
apparitions or prodigies” but rather “to show how easily we may be flouted if we take not 
great heed with our own antique suppositions.”479 In other words, the purpose of Terrors of 
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the Night is not simply to reveal the nature of the mind, but to teach the reader to doubt the 
mind’s ability to perceive, interpret, and order.   
Though vastly different in style, Christs Teares struggles with similar questions about 
the ethical agency of the human mind.  Indeed, because it is a much more morally didactic 
text, the stakes of this struggle are even higher. As the text opens with questions about 
decorum, its content only reinforces the problems of rhetoric, language, and human 
communication. After his invocation, Nashe immediately emphasizes the great and varied 
means by which God attempted to communicate with the people of Jerusalem prior to its 
destruction. In the very first line of the text itself, he notes that “It is not vnknown, by how 
many & sundry waies GOD spake by Visions, Dreames, Prophecies and Wonders, to his 
chosen Ierusalem, onely to move his chosen Ierusalem wholie to cleaue vnto him.” Too 
reassured by their own sense of election, the people of Jerusalem ignored the preternatural 
signs sent by God and looked instead to their “own inuentions.”480  In response to the 
people’s ignorance, God ups the ante, as it were, and sends in his second line of 
communication, the prophets. Despite the fact that God sends several battalions of them, they 
are all successively either beaten, killed, or stoned.481 Somewhat naively believing that the 
prophets must have been mistaken for “seducers and deceiuers,” God finally decides to send 
what seems to him to be a full-proof form of communication, Christ. To make Christ 
identifiable as his son, God gives him not royal robes, but the power to work “miracles aboue 
the imagination of man.” After Christ sufficiently proves who he is to the Jews so that “they 
should have no credible or truth-like exception to them,” he “went into their 
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Assemblies…freely deliuered his message, declared from whence he came, gentlie 
expostulated their ill dealing, desired them to haue care of themselues, told them the danger 
of their obstinancie, and wooed them (with many fayre promises) to repent and be 
conuerted.” Though Nashe emphasizes here the many ways in which Christ spoke to the 
Jews (“freely deliuered…declared…gentlie expostulated…” etc.), his message of reform has 
absolutely no effect. When all these other means of communication fail, Christ’s “last refuge 
was to deale plainly with them, and explane to them full what plagues and warres were 
entering in at their gates for their disloyaltie and doggednesse.” 482  
Christ is the example, par excellence for Nashe, of plain dealing. The savior is 
essentially God’s last ditch effort to try to save Jerusalem from its own sinfulness, and 
crucially, he is God’s most open, unanalogical form of communication. What we see here, 
then, is a spectrum ranging from the highly signified (earthquakes, prophets, and even 
Christ’s miracles) to the direct (Christ preaching openly), not entirely unlike the one Nashe 
has struggled with throughout his literary career. Prior to the imagined oration Nashe is about 
to present, Christ had spent thirty years “reprou[ing], preach[ing], exhort[ing] with al the 
wooing words [he] could, endeuouring to mollify, melt & pierce [the Israelites’] harts” in an 
attempt to heal the “malady of [Jerusalem’s] incredulity.”483  Nashe emphasizes not only the 
problem interpreting God, but quite the contrary, the problem that man may fully understand 
God and yet not heed him. Nashe’s God is hardly a mysterious, Calvinist God, and in some 
ways would seem to be quite powerless in his ability to reform man or society.  Not only can 
man not read divine signs: he cannot accept plain truth.  
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That this is a text about orthodox moral reform for Nashe becomes clear in Christ’s 
oration, where his single theme is the need for Jerusalem to “gather together.” Israel, like 
England, has been a country filled with strife, warfare, and contention. Christ has been sent 
to “gather [the Israelites] to repentance and amendment of life,” as if such amendment 
required a unified whole, not the land of sectarianism that currently defines the English 
religious landscape: “All my Fathers Angels stand gathered together about his Throne; No 
bread is made, but of graines of Corne gathered together: no building is raysed, but a number 
of stones glued and gathered together. There is no perfect society or Citty, but of a number of 
men gathered together…”484 There is no doubt that for Nashe unity is the hallmark of a 
morally strong society.  
 After giving the oration of Christ to Jerusalem, Nashe casts off that persona to begin 
to give his account of the marvelous astronomical signs and monstrous births that Jerusalem 
witnessed. But before getting too far, he questions his own method: “what should I ouer-
blacke mine Inke, perlex pale Paper, rumatize my Readers eyes, with the sad tedious recital, 
of all the prognosticating signes of their ruine. Stories have lost and tyred themselves in this 
Story. Should I but make an Index to any one Writer of them, it would aske a Booke alone. 
Some few abbreuiated alleagements I will content my selfe with, and so passe on-ward to 
more necessary matter.”485  It would seem that neither the miracles of Christ nor the portents 
of God nor their retelling have been successful in reforming England. Nashe moves, then, to 
the “more necessary matter,” that is the history of the destruction of Jerusalem and more 
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importantly to its direct application to London which “deserve[s] as great a desolation as 
Jerusalem.”486 
The last portion of Christs Teares stylistically and thematically revisits the Anatomy 
of Absurditie, almost as if Nashe realizes that his somewhat preliminary moral sketch is not 
up to task of moral reform; conversely, such a revisitation in this context suggests that Nashe 
also does not trust the audience for Christs Teares, as by tacking on a reprisal of the 
Anatomie he would simply seem to be spelling out the analogy for his audience in order to 
prevent any misinterpretation. He circles back once again to a condemnation of pride and its 
various manifestations such as the usurer’s avarice, the poet’s vain-glory, the atheist’s 
curiosity and doubt, the discontent of the court and heretics. Among the social and religious 
ills he revisits, the most extended treatment is given to atheism, in which he warns people in 
particular of the “Pironiks, whose position and opinion it is, that there is no hel or misery but 
opinion,” and who fall into two categories, inward and outward atheists. The inward atheist is 
Nashe’s version of an over-zealous reformer; he appears to be godly and “makes conscience 
and the spirit of God, a long side-cloake, for all his oppressions and policies.” The outward 
atheist is the rationalist who needs concrete proof for the existence of God.  Like Christ, 
Nashe tries to gather his audience, to unify them in forgetting about “sects and forraine 
opinions” and in focusing them so that “Atheisme be the onely string you beate on: for there 
is no Sect now in England so scattered as Atheisme.”487 Particularly troubling for Nashe, 
though, is the weakness with which this group has been combated: “I am at my wits end 
when I view how coldly, in comparison of other Countrimen, our Englishmen write. How in 
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their bookes of confutation, they show no wit or courage, as well as learning.” The “Leade 
and Tinne Muses”488 and the “brown-bread dorbellisme” of the English will not be sufficient 
to counteract “the superaboundance of wit” that characterizes atheists. To be effective, one 
needs “antique histories…philosophers confession or opinion of God…[and] an infinite 
laborinths of books” in order to overcome the “sloth-fauoring innovation” of atheists489: 
“Christ when hee sayd you must forsake all and follow him, meant not you should forsake all 
artes and follow him.” Nashe affirms human art as “steppes and degrees” that allow men “to 
climb vp to heauen.”490 
Although the repudiation of atheism and the skepticism that was often the byword for 
it was becoming conventional at about this time, it is still a little surprising to see Nashe 
name Pyrrhonism as such an evil when he would seem to affirm it both only two years earlier 
in the preface to Astrophil and Stella and even in the reference to Academic skepticism in the 
preface to this very text. Clearly the skepticism he means here involves the dangers of 
sectarianism and it is surely true that sectarianism is much more dangerous in a religious 
context with which we end this text than in a rhetorical context with which we begin.  
Strikingly, Nashe reaffirms the value of literature as something that allows men “to climb vp 
to heauen” precisely at this moment of the repudiation of skepticism.  And yet we might 
wonder too, if it is the case that with the failure of analogy and with rhetoric more generally, 
the threat of skepticism becomes simply too much for Nashe the moralist to bear?  Is it 
possible that with the failure of analogy, skepticism must be repudiated and an idealist sense 
of the moral value of literature restored?  As valuable a guide as skepticism serves for Nashe 
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in thinking about the human mind and the importance of decorum, it would seem, the skeptic 
must be kept at bay when it comes to the spiritual state of England. 
Even though Harvey thought Nashe blasphemous for putting words into the mouth of 
Christ, Nashe may simply be trying to subvert historical precedent. If God’s first line of 
communication is portents, England has already received those in the 1580s. By taking on the 
role of prophet and by putting words into the mouth of Christ, Nashe may simply be trying to 
use literature to get around the occurrence of the second coming, at least to put it off for a 
while. Fiction and analogy may be the only line of defense man has left, but as Nashe shows 
in his prefatory remarks, his revival of the Anatomie at the end of Christs Teares, and his 
doubts about the mind as a moral agent in Terrors of the Night, he is not at all assured of the 
effectiveness of this means.   
 In Christs Teares there are many signes and tokens of God’s wrath to come. But they 
are not found, as astronomers argue, in the “regiment and operation of Planets” nor in 
“strange Prophetical reports.” Rather, “if we would hunt after signes and tokens, wee should 
ominate from our hardnesse or heart, and want of charitie amongst brethren, that Gods iustice 
is hard entering. No certainer coniecture is there of the ruine of any kingdome, then their 
revolting from God.”491  “The blazing starre, the Earth-quake, the dearth and famine some 
fewe years since” have not sufficiently frightened the people of London to repent. It is 
Nashe’s hope that the most startling and unnatural of prodigies, human sin, may act to inspire 
men to gather to repent in “one united intercessionment.”492 
In sum, I would argue that this text questions the value of analogy for moral reform, 
and in fact, may even indicate the breakdown of analogical thinking on a number of levels.  
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First, there is the breakdown noted in the prefatory materials—that is, the sense that analogy 
cannot work because misinterpretation is the rule of the day. We see this manifested in 
Gabriel Harvey’s misreading of Nashe’s “plain dealing” style of apology; in the misreadings 
of the Unfortunate Traveller Nashe cites; and in people’s criticisms and misinterpretation of 
Nashe’s stylistic choices in Christs Teares. On another level, we also see that human 
misinterpretation has historical precedent in the Israelites who ignored or misunderstood both 
God’s signs (omens, prophets, and miracles) and his plain dealing (Christ’s preaching).  It 
should be remembered, too, that the very occasion of Nashe’s text is what Nashe perceives as 
the moral depravity of Elizabethan society that has not heeded the portents of the 1580s 
indicating that the real divine message has fallen on deaf ears.  Finally, there is a breakdown 
in the text itself, I think, in Nashe’s choice to link the first part of Christs Teares (the oration 
of Christ) with a fuller reprisal of the Anatomy of Absurditie. Nashe notes that the destruction 
of Jerusalem has often been told. Josephus, an oft read historian for example, tells the story 
quite well. But it is almost as if history, and the analogy the reader should be able to draw to 
it, are not enough for Nashe. By tacking on this Anatomy of Absurditie style discourse, Nashe 
would seem to attempt plain dealing—that is, not trusting his audience to draw their own 
conclusions from what had to be, by 1593, a fairly obvious equation, that is, that England 
was, for better or for worse, the New Jerusalem.  
 
V.  Conclusion: John Chamber and Christopher Heydon: Fashioning Morality against the 
Skeptical Critique of Astrology 
 
The Skeptick (c. 1590), the translation of Sextus Empiricus Nashe is believed to be 
referring to in his preface to Astrophil and Stella, emphasizes skepticism’s struggle to come 
to terms with diversity of human experience it confirms. Not only is there variety among the 
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senses of any one individual, but also each individual’s senses differ from another’s.  
Moreover, even the object of apprehension would seem to add unaccountable variety: “If it 
be replied [to this problem of the variety of sense experience] that nature hath ordained as 
many instruments of sense as there are sensible objects, I demand what nature? For there is a 
confused controversy about the very essence of nature, some affirming it to be one thing, 
others another, few agreeing. So that what the quality of an apple is, or whether it hath one 
quality or many, I know not.”493 As it is in a state of flux between empirical and analogical 
methodologies of apprehension, astrology is an example of the skeptic’s dilemma in 
Elizabethan culture.  
The disagreement over preternatural phenomena—both their cause and their 
signification—is an episode in Elizabethan history that similarly shows men attempting to 
make sense of nature’s diversity and to translate this diversity into moral terms. As I said at 
the outset, traditionally, moral discourses about astrology are polemical in character, the most 
famous of these in the Renaissance being that of Pico della Mirandola.494 The ancient 
precedent for this tradition was Sextus Empiricus’s Adversus astrologos, which was a text 
directed specifically against nativities rather than all astrological knowledge full stop. For 
Sextus, the main problem was not that astrology contained nothing morally useful, and 
certainly not that man was wrong for prying into the secrets of God.  It was not that astrology 
was wrong, but that it was imperceptible. Sextus had argued that if man could avoid bad 
weather and have a perfect apprehension of the planets, he “could find in [astrology] 
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substantial truth; but when there exists some obstacle to the accurate perception of celestial 
objects, it is far otherwise.”495  To draw a nativity correctly, one had not only to be able to 
see the stars, but one had to know the exact moment and place of conception and generation.  
Sextus’s arguments were revitalized in a polemical exchange at the turn of the 
seventeenth century between a clergyman of the Church of England, John Chamber, who 
published a treatise against judicial astrology in 1601, and a soldier named Christopher 
Heydon, who responded to Chamber with a defense in 1603.496 Though John Chamber only 
mentions Sextus Empiricus once, his text includes, as Heydon frequently reminds his reader, 
large portions translated directly from the Adversus astrologos. What is crucial about this 
episode is that for both these men, the value of astrology was predicated on its relationship to 
the senses.  
According to Chamber, it is not possible for man to apprehend fully the movements 
and natures of the astrological bodies;497 hence, custom is a much more compelling 
explanation for moral diversity for him: “Next to our bringing up come our actions, desires, 
and businesse, in which is chiefly to be considered the custome of countries, which we know 
to be guided not by any naturall necessity or power of stares; but by lawes, customes, 
examples, discipline, by the quality and oportunitie of the place, of by a mans owne 
consultation and opinion.” For Chamber, moral identity is determined by the moral norms 
that have govern it, for “where there is no punishment, there even the better sort will offend: 
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but where there is sharp and due correction, even the naturally bad will refrain from offence.” 
It is by “imitation” of the good and the evil that men observe on a daily basis that creates 
their moral habits: “By imitation of the good many daily become good; and ill by imitation of 
the ill, what starre soever they be borne under. So for occasion and opportunitie, no starre 
maketh fishers and hunters, where there is no occasion of fishing and hunting.  Againe, what 
starre soever men be borne under, they will fall to fishing and hunting, if occasion serve, and 
need force them.”498 For Chamber, there is no sense of an ethics based on man’s 
correspondence with the heavenly bodies; nor is morality based on an analogy between 
natural and moral law. Ethics is determined by experience and chance; it is not essential, but 
cultural.  
For Heydon, the hallmark of astrology is its ability to make the best use of the 
knowledge of the senses. In comparison to medicine, astrology is a more empirically stable 
science; whereas a physician reasons by effects and signs which can often play him false, “on 
the contrarie, the Astrologer iudgeth neither by signes, nor effects, but by causes. Whereof 
the motions, configurations, and positions of the heauenly bodies, are all grounded vpon 
Mathematicall demonstration. And the properties, or virtue of the heauenly influence, vpon 
the obseruation, and knowne experience, of great learned men, euen from the beginning of 
the world.” The knowledge of “knowne causes” relied upon by the astrologer “is more 
demonstratiue & infallible” than the “signes or effects” depended upon by the physician.499 
Heydon criticizes both Sextus and Chamber for ignoring the “precise demonstration” and the 
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“painefull industrie of the learned” that has allowed astrology “to haue growne to as exquisite 
a perfection, as the practice of any art whatsoeuer.”500  
It on the basis of astrology’s perfection that Heydon insists on its importance to moral 
philosophy: “What more proper ende hath morall philosophie, then felicitie? And what arte 
in the world in this respect, is comparable to Astrologie?”501  In Heydon’s mind astrology is 
just an extension the more commonly accepted humoral theory, for it teaches man “matters, 
which pertaine to the goods of the bodie, and minde, by vnderstanding the constitution of the 
bodie, and direct[s] him to moderate those affections, whose violence naturally doth carrie 
him from the meane, wherein virtue consists.”502 It not only offers man the knowledge of his 
what he can reasonably hope “to haue by his owne naturall constellation” with regard “to 
outward goods of fortune,” but it also “instructeth him how to encrease the same, by what 
meanes, and at what time he may aptliest applie his owne industrie, to attaine unto it, by his 
naturall constitution.”503  In other words, astrology both offers man the knowledge of himself 
as he is, and as he should be.  
But even as astrology has the moral authority to instruct man in his own particular 
virtues, Heydon admits that it still houses several unknowns that indicate the imperfection of 
man. Astrology attests to the fallen world in which man lives, for it is symptomatic of 
original sin and representative of man’s place within a broken analogy, Before the fall, man 
and nature formed the two halves of what Heydon terms “a iust Analogie”:  
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Had the nature of man neuer beene corrupted by the fall of our first parents & so 
maimed and depriued of those graces wherewith he was indued at the first; this diuine 
light had still shines vnto him, as the guide and direction of all our powers: the inward 
faculties had still agreed in an exact harmonie, to the good constitution of the outward 
partes: and the nature of all superiour and inferiour things would haue answered to 
our temperature in a iust Analogie: the elements and all elementary things beeing at 
the first exquisitely prepared to agree with the perfect constitution of our bodies, 
would have stil remained conformable vnto them; and in their constant stabilitie and 
vnchangeablenesse, not onely not haue annoyed our bodies, with any superfluous or 
excrementall matter, out of kind or hurtfull vnto vs, but still haue maintained the 
naturall heate and radicall moister intire and vnspent. 
 
He stresses the symmetry and stability of nature that is reflected in man’s own constitution—
presumably both in moral and physical health—before the fall. After the fall, both man and 
nature fall into disrepair. But perhaps because of the multiplicity of evil as compared to the 
unity of good, they no longer uphold an analogy, even in their similar states of depravity.  
Instead of being two halves of an analogy, they become “unproportionable to each other”: 
But afterward, when (as the word of God testifieth) the deprauation of mans nature by 
sinne, had not onely dissolued this former goodly agreement of our inward powers, 
by soule discord, and vnfitnesse, but besides, by meanes hereof, further depraued and 
disordered the durable temperature of the other members, with an vnproportionable 
distemper: The symmetrie also, and consent of other partes of nature, were likewise 
changed with mans condition, and became vnproportionable vnto him. In so much 
that the earth itselfe, through the curse of God for our sinne, was depriued of the 
former vigour, and brought forth thornes; that is euery thing more troublesome, and 
vnkindly then before. The action of the stares, in this vncleannesse of our corrupted 
nature, became vnluckie and improsperius: the light of reason whereby we should 
haue guided the other faculties, was, almost totally eclipsed: and the power of our will 
which should rule the rest was now growne feeble and faint, and all our other powers 
whatsoeuer became disobedient, sauadge, and irregular.504  
 
Hence, after the fall nature still may offer moral information, but it is not a moral model for 
man. It is a not a model for man, but a mirror: it reflects not a perfect ideal, but only the 
imperfections of man himself. In other words, it is moral knowledge in that it is self-
knowledge. Moreover, subject to the empiricism that Heydon champions, the heavens are 
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problematic exemplars of moral value because such observation may only reveal how unruly 
they really are.   
Taken together, these various engagements of Elizabethan writers with the moral 
value of preternatural phenomena reveal a moral philosophy in transition.  As the knowledge 
of preternatural phenomena becomes increasingly natural, it causes these writers to consider 
the character of moral knowledge and the methods by which it should be attained. Though 
Don Cameron Allen has argued that the interest in prognostication was particularly strong in 
the sixteenth century because of a “growing skepticism about the verity of Christian 
doctrine,”505 I would argue that this interest is due as well the ways in which empiricism was 
rapidly reshaping the jurisdiction of moral knowledge. Even someone like Heydon, who 
affirms the moral value of preternatural phenomena on the basis of its apprehensibility, 
shows us that empiricism cannot repair the lost analogy between man and nature but only 
register their unruly and unclassifiable divergences from goodness.  Moral knowledge, then, 
becomes less a standard to achieve, or one half of an analogical relationship that man hopes 
to complement, than an index of human moral limitation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
MINDS INDIFFERENT: THE VALUE OF ADIAPHORA ON THE EVE OF THE 
ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 
 
I. Redefining Adiaphora 
 On the eve of the Civil War, England witnessed a debate over religious reform 
perhaps unparalleled since the effects of the Reformation had redrawn the channels and 
boundaries of religious authority. In the climate of increasing political and religious tensions 
as the personal rule of Charles I came to a close, the search for religious truth began to be 
measured against an ideal of a national religion unified by doctrine and practice with a new 
complexity and intensity. The claims of the Laudian bishops alongside the monarch to an 
unrestricted jurisdiction based on divine right crowded in on the privilege of Parliament and 
the moral authority of the individual conscience. In varying degrees, members of Parliament, 
ministers of every religious faction, and pamphleteers weighed the consequences of 
restructuring the Church in order to diminish the bishops’ influence upon the monarch, civil 
affairs, and religious doctrine and practice.   
 Between 1638 and 1642, the debate over Episcopacy acted as a calculus for the 
value of historical traditions, human judgment, and the imagination to salvation. At the center 
of this debate was the doctrine of adiaphora, a point of epistemological uncertainty that 
blocked any easy resolution to this conflict. The Canons of 1640 defined adiaphora as “of its 
own nature indifferent, neither commanded nor condemned by the Word of God, either 
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expresly, or by immediate deduction,” and they argued “therefore that no Religion is to be 
placed therein, or scruple to be made thereon.”506 But in practice religion was “placed 
therein” and scruples were “made thereon.” On the surface, the Episcopal controversy 
scrutinized polity, but at its core the conflict was over the validity of man-made moral law. 
For English Protestants just before the Civil War, adiaphora threatened not so much a dearth 
of moral value as an instability, even a failure of moral knowledge. Those favoring 
Episcopacy clung to the peace and epistemological consistency they found in the truths of 
historical tradition. Reformers, however, invited the peace of toleration that allowed the 
seemingly paradoxical—religious certainty and epistemological diversity. Looking variously 
to divine, canon, natural and civil law, writers engaged in this debate were connected by their 
interest in finding a moral law that maintained both truth and peace without sacrificing the 
integrity of either one.   
In 1638 in his Religion of the Protestants, William Chillingworth articulated a new 
kind of toleration that questioned the desirability of a fixed standard by which to measure the 
individual conscience. This introduction of skepticism signified a clear development of 
Richard Hooker’s investigation into the usefulness of doubt in his discussion of orthodoxy in 
the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, though by comparison, Hooker’s doubt was much more 
closely tied to his confidence in the importance of a unified orthodoxy than the idea of 
toleration. Between 1638 and 1642 England watched as the Laudian impositions on the 
Scottish Kirk in the late 1630s culminated in the Bishops’ Wars in 1640, as Ireland erupted in 
rebellion in 1641, and as its own civil war commenced in 1642. Controversialists of all 
stripes in the Episcopal debate—from moderate Episcopalians mildly examining the 
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jurisdiction of the Church, to Presbyterians who would replace bishops with presbyters, to 
Independents who had a clear interest in an increased space for religious liberty, to more 
radical opponents of any national church—found themselves reassessing the reform measures 
undertaken by the Elizabethan Church that had brought them to this uncertain point in 
ecclesiastical history. Amid the political and religious strife of the early 1640s, as civil war in 
England became increasingly probable, both Hooker’s confidence and Chillingworth’s 
skepticism proved insufficient models for either moderate or radical nonconformists who 
were themselves torn by their commitment to the freedom of conscience and toleration on the 
one hand, and a sense of moral duty and a call to the active resistance of the Caroline Church 
on the other. In 1641 and 1642, the eminent Parliamentarian Robert Greville, Lord Brooke 
and the emerging pamphleteer John Milton proposed that reforms be grounded in an active 
conscience. For both, the doctrine of adiaphora proved to be crucial to their justifications for 
and limitations of freedom of conscience as they steered between the moral absolutism and 
moral relativism indifferency could generate. Although Brooke accepted and Milton rejected 
the doctrine of adiaphora, both offered a reinterpretation of it that differed from what it had 
been during the not-so-distant “reforms” of the Elizabethan Church. Rather than encourage 
an unlicensed conscience, in the struggle for religious liberty the moral uncertainties posed 
by adiaphora provoked arguments for new standards by which to justify moral action and 
betokened significant changes in moral and religious discourse.  
 
II. The Artificial Peace of Forced Conformity 
On the eve of the Civil War, normative morality crumbled as the security of a 
coherent national church gradually gave way to the “cutting...squaring…hewing… 
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schisms…[and] many dissections” necessary “ere the house of God [could] be built.”507 
Adiaphorism complicated moral decision-making because it was flexible enough to 
encompass a variety of moral judgments, yet it could generate absolutist and rigid moral 
hierarchies.508 Because of its ambiguity and the readiness with which religious reformers and 
orthodox divines interpreted indifferency, the term could be used to argue virtually any 
position in the Episcopal controversy.509     
An important ally of Queen Elizabeth in her conservative manipulation of church 
reforms, adiaphora allowed her to assert a nearly absolutist control over her bishops while 
seeming to lend them a degree of freedom.510 With little resolved by the Elizabethan 
Settlement and the modest changes that the Thirty-Nine Articles made in the ceremonies and 
traditions of the Church, the limitations of Elizabethan church reform resurfaced in the 
1630s.511 Article 20 in particular carried an ambiguity that haunted the Laudian Church. 
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Corroborated during Elizabeth’s reign by the 1563 Convocation, the Articles as printed under 
Edward limited the Church’s authority by stating that the “church must not ordain anything 
contrary to God’s word written.” But the 1571 Convocation amended the article to give “the 
Church…power to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith,” 
effectively changing it from a negative to positive law.512 This change was a contentious 
point for Archbishop Laud during a 1637 speech censuring John Bastwick, Henry Burton, 
and William Prynne for their “innovations” in religion. The latter argued for the Articles as 
interpreted by Edward VI, but Laud declared these void and offered to produce multiple 
editions of the Thirty-Nine Articles from different years in both English and Latin—a 
necessary piece of evidence since this alteration in the article mysteriously appeared and 
vanished from the printed page throughout the reign of Elizabeth.513  
The unfinished reforms of the Elizabethan Church opened the door for a critical re-
evaluation of the Caroline Church.514 The Root and Branch Petition of 1640 unequivocally 
demanded that church polity “with all its dependencies, roots and branches, may be 
abolished, and all laws in their behalf made void, and the government according to God’s 
Word may be rightly placed amongst us.”515 Prior to 1643 and the adoption of the Solemn 
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League and Covenant, the controversy extended beyond ecclesiology to question the very 
role of the Church in the composition of corporate religious worship and its influence on 
individual faith and salvation. Reformers rejected the Church’s power to legislate things 
indifferent, concluding that any attempt to do so trampled religious freedoms and endangered 
their very salvation. While Elizabethan reform measures centered on polity, by the 1640s, the 
line between ecclesiology and soteriology was being relocated, for some vanishing 
altogether.516 Along with the merger of ecclesiological and soteriological reforms came the 
internalization of indifferency. The ambiguity of things indifferent called into question 
Episcopal authority, but at the same time its vulnerability to diverse interpretations 
challenged assumptions about the reliability of conscience. Its interpretive breadth altered the 
nature of true faith from something that existed absolutely, to something that existed in 
degrees.  
In his Religion of the Protestants, William Chillingworth recalled Richard Hooker’s 
distinction between a “certainty of adherence” and a “certainty of evidence” in matters of 
faith, which Hooker used to assure men that doubt caused by human weakness was not 
faithlessness.517 Chillingworth, however, used this distinction to introduce and legitimize 
levels of faith not in order to grant assurance to the doubtful, but to promote toleration. Like 
opinion, faith could be “an assent…built upon lesse evidence then that of sense or 
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science…[that] admits degrees.”518 Though God granted man all things necessary for 
salvation, this provision did not guarantee an end to religious controversy. According to 
Chillingworth, religious controversy was an essential part of religion and should not be 
dismissed as mere doubt that, with God’s grace, would be overcome. Disagreement could 
exist even in fundamental points without necessitating damnation.519 Indeed, the catalogue of 
fundamentals called for by many of Chillingworth’s contemporaries would only codify error 
because the “variety of circumstances” made it as easy to create an exact list of fundamental 
points of religion as “to make a coat to fit the Moon in all her changes.”520 The search for 
truth alone—the very acceptance of controversy—assured man of God’s favor.521 The only 
certainty gained by artificial measures was the certainty of human error.  
Chillingworth’s expansion of faith to encompass degrees signals a significant change 
in early modern religious culture from one that felt threatened by epistemological flexibility 
in religious matters to one that could turn to this flexibility as a source of assurance. In the 
place of a static category of indifference emerged a newly dynamic category of individual 
right that demanded that spiritual assurance be accompanied by an active search for the 
means to attain one’s salvation. But if adiaphora could promote the freedom of individual 
conscience, the emerging dogmatism of separatists made it clear that the freedom of the 
individual conscience might invent a new kind of religious tyranny. The fight to remove 
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adiaphora from the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical control to private law highlighted the 
question of whether and to what degree individual conscience was any more valid, tolerant, 
or reasonable than the willfulness of ecclesiastical legislation.522 Both the unity of moral 
absolutism and the toleration of religious pluralism threatened to sacrifice truth for the sake 
of peace.  
The degrees of faith welcomed by Chillingworth made the scrutiny and censure of the 
human mind’s involvement in religion all the more important. Like Hooker, Joseph Hall 
defended Christian orthodoxy by associating adiaphorism in the hands of the individual with 
a misspent curiosity. Under the laity’s control, adiaphorism loomed as a kind of skepticism 
that disrupted religious unity by questioning the limits of established religious truth. 
According to Hall, intellectual liberty in religious matters tore down important distinctions 
between lawful and unlawful kinds of knowledge. Those that “would know only that they 
may know” possessed a “fond curiosity” and “a vicious disposition of the soul.” The “vicious 
disposition” to which Hall referred was the desire to know matters unnecessary without an 
honest motivation. Only “things, which are necessary and useful, can be no other than praise-
worthy.”523 Juxtaposed against the laudable pursuit for “necessary and useful knowledge,” 
Hall’s denunciation of curiosity became a plea against the laity’s search to determine things 
indifferent. His sense that there was a spectrum of knowledge ranging from the permissible 
to the damnable represented the position of many bishops of the Church of England on the 
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issue of adiaphora in the hands of the laity. Though the bishops recognized indifferency as a 
kind of knowledge, a multiplicity of judgments on things indifferent was expendable for the 
sake of a national church.  
But one of Hall’s most notorious and persistent opponents, the group of pamphleteers 
called “Smectymnuus,”524 favored religious toleration and worried that the peace of 
orthodoxy would compromise the search for religious truth. “We well know,” Smectymnuus 
wrote in the second of their treatises denouncing Hall, “that peace is that Helena, that all are 
suitors unto; and wee know as well, that peace without truth is as a painted Jezabell, and to 
be thrown down by all those who are on the Lords side.”525 Hall defended the post-Apostolic 
Church, despite its mistakes. Certainty should be prized over skepticism in matters of 
religion, for even “if there were some errours” Hall asked, “shall we suspect all truths?”526 
Looking in 1640 to the volatile situation in Scotland, Hall cautioned his “Northern Brethren” 
not to be carried away by “mis-zealous teachers, who have…over-run the truth in a 
detestation of errour: and have utterly lost peace in an inconsiderate chace of a fained 
perfection.”527 Hall feared that the certainty many found in their conscience would make an 
“ignis fatuus” out of moral judgment altogether.528  
Adiaphora’s relationship to truth became more complex on the eve of the Civil War 
because it forced an examination of the relative value of religious truth and civic peace to the 
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English Church. It was hoped—but by no means certain to anyone involved in the debate 
over Episcopacy—that the two could coexist. Despite their differences, both Hall and 
Chillingworth attacked the myth of perfect religious knowledge. Hall warned that religious 
harmony based on toleration was an ideal “more fit to be expected in Platonical speculation, 
than in a true reality of existence.”529 Godly perfection seemed to demand a world without 
adiaphora, that is, a world doomed to conflict. In the context of the intensifying 
dissatisfaction with ecclesiastical and civil hierarchy, the heated debates over the doctrine of 
adiaphora increased its moral weight and exposed the shallow veneer of its neutrality. Once 
reformers of the Laudian Church began to appeal to adiaphora as a way of legitimizing 
individual judgment against the corporate judgment of the Church, adiaphora became a 
critical kind of knowledge with an undecided epistemology. It opened up the possibility that 
true religious knowledge could be both inspired by, yet separate from, the evident truths of 
things necessary found in the scriptures. Because the reformers considered things indifferent 
as “burthens” the bishops imposed upon the laity that could affect individual salvation, the 
knowledge of adiaphora was a knowledge not just of virtue, but of salvation.    
At its core, the shifting nature of indifferency was more than an ecclesiological or 
soteriological quagmire: it pinpoints a historical moment of linguistic failure. In a speech 
given to the Parliament in 1641, Lord Say and Seal pleaded against the Church’s control over 
the liturgy, arguing that nonconformists were afflicted by “ceremonies and things indifferent 
to you [the Laudian bishops],” which to them were “but burthens, which without offence to 
the State, or prejudice to the Churches, you may take off if you will.”530 But in his response 
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to Lord Say and Seal’s speech, Laud rightly indicated the paradox of nonconformity. 
According to Lord Say and Seal, if something is truly indifferent, it is not worth legislating. 
But Laud countered, “First, my Lord but a very little before tells ‘of yokes of bondage and 
gross corruptions.’ And are they so soon become but ‘ceremonies and things indifferent?’ If 
they be more than ‘ceremonies and things indifferent,’ then my Lord delivers not the whole 
truth; and if they be but ‘ceremonies and things indifferent,’ then his Lordship and all other 
Separatists ought rather to yield to the Church in such things, than for such things to separate 
from it.”531 For Lord Say and Seal indifferency was inseparable from moral truth, while for 
Laud its meaning was determined by moral legislation; but for neither one was it morally 
neutral. 
The exchange between Laud and Lord Say and Seal, the concerns of Hall over 
intellectual liberty in religion, and the skeptical toleration of Chillingworth indicate that 
indifferency had outgrown its definition. Those involved in the debate over Episcopacy, then, 
participated in a process of inventing an adequate discourse to accommodate indifferency’s 
transformation. In the Elizabethan Church adiaphora were intended to ease the Church’s 
“intolerable burden” on the individual lay person or bishop, but in the atmosphere of open 
religious rebellion in the early 1640s, things indifferent were not a point of compromise. 
Instead, adiaphora freighted the individual conscience with the weight of its salvation as it 
demanded, rather than averted, a value judgment. How this judgment was best attained 
became a focal point for those interested in religious reform and those opposed to it. 
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III. Adiaphora and the Rationalist’s Rebellion   
In 1644 in Areopagitica Milton lauded the prominent Parliamentarian Robert 
Greville, Lord Brooke for his contribution to the debate over Episcopacy. Milton summarized 
Brooke’s 1641 parliamentary address entitled A Discourse Opening the Nature of Episcopacy 
as a work composed with the most “mild and peacefull” words that “[exhort] us to hear with 
patience and humility those, however they be miscall’d, that desire to live purely, in such a 
use of Gods Ordinances, as the best guidance of their conscience gives them, and to tolerat 
them, though in some disconformity to ourselves.”532 As Milton affirms, Brooke is notable 
for his sustained attempt to articulate a fully rational explanation of how to resolve the 
conflict between moral certainty and the toleration of religious pluralism.533 Keenly aware 
that the moral category that indifferency once represented was obsolete, he exposed 
adiaphora for what it was in 1641: a convention of religious rhetoric. Playing absolutist 
notions of good against the subjectivity of human perceptions of good, in his Discourse, 
Brooke took a stand against Episcopacy that declared adiaphora to be a positive form of 
knowledge that could guide moral behavior at a time when moral codes were increasingly 
shifty. By accepting indifferency’s rigidity and its relativity instead of arguing one 
interpretation over the other, Brooke pursued the moral perfectionism feared by Hall and 
Chillingworth without sacrificing his commitment to toleration.  
On the eve of the Civil War, Brooke’s indifferency posed the question of how to 
overcome the imperfections of the mind. Both Episcopacy and the individual conscience 
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were imperfect sources of moral truth because they were equally apt to act selfishly and 
threatened civic harmony and certain moral judgment. Brooke discussed adiaphora with the 
intention of limiting the authority of Episcopal judgment, though not with the hope of 
abolishing moral authority altogether. According to Brooke the mark of a true church was its 
rationality and its interest in the common good. Only “right reason,” not a national 
catechism, “must be [the] Judge” of what was indifferent or necessary to salvation.534 In his 
censure of the bishops Brooke targeted their irrationality, both arguing that their claim that 
“the Church hath power…in Indifferent things” was unreasonable and underhandedly 
implying that individual right reason had a significant role to play in the development of 
standards for things indifferent.535 Though Brooke sharply criticized the practices of the 
bishops, who sought to control “not onely Indifferent things in the Church [but]… All 
Indifferent things,” encompassing in their “Net of Indifferencie” the people’s civil and 
religious liberties,536 he perceived the need for a unifying standard for indifferency. Even 
allowing that “the Church hath all power in Indifferents,” which Brooke did not, “who hath 
made the Church a Judge (beyond appeale) what is Indifferent?.” “If the Church shall judge 
indifferent things to be necessary, and necessary to be indifferent,” moral distinctions were 
leveled “under one notion.”537 Because the commonplace definition of indifferency—
something neither commanded nor forbidden in the scriptures—lacked positive value, as it 
explained “onley what ‘tis not, and Negatives make no Definition,” Brooke redefined 
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adiaphorism for the benefit of those seeking the right way to respond to civil and religious 
conflict.538  
Read in context with his earlier views on truth, Brooke’s discussion of adiaphora in 
his parliamentary address challenges the necessity of moral uncertainty even as it admits the 
limitations of human perception. In The Nature of Truth (1640) written a year prior to his 
Discourse, Brooke revealed his doubts about the human apprehension of moral truth. Moral 
truth in its “universall nature, and in the particular actings of it,” was just as difficult to 
discern as “sacred mysteries.” Often the pursuit of moral truth only fueled moral degeneracy. 
“Truth is that golden apple,” Brooke warned, that even “the most refined wits, the most high-
raised fancies of the world, have courted…in vaine, these many ages.” Using a “Palsie hand,” 
or “the perspective of thicke reason,” men have “either mounted too high, and confounding 
the Creator with the creature, [made] her God: or descend[ed] too low, and deserting the 
universal nature, have confined their thoughts to some individuall Truth, and restrained her 
birth to severall parcels within the Chaos.”539 The mind habitually leveled value through 
abstraction or cordoned off value into idiosynchratic notions of truth unconnected to the 
world around it.  
But despite these weaknesses, man also possessed a more ideal form of reason that 
was an “ample Sphere of Truth.”540 Collapsing the line between understanding good and 
being good, Brooke attempted to unite truth, being, and morality because such unity might 
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foster tolerance.541 However, ontological unity was often undercut by epistemological 
variety. Man created a “Maze” of divisions and distinctions in categories of knowledge and 
existence because “the very knowledge of the Being of things, is more than we are capable 
of,” but ultimately all things are “of one nature, variegated only in our apprehension.”542  
The mathematician John Wallis responded to Brooke’s theory of unity in Truth tried: 
or, Animadversions on…The Nature of Truth (first published, 1642). He argued that 
ontological, epistemological, and moral good and evil by nature were very different. While 
being and nonbeing permitted no middle term in Wallis’ view, moral good and evil as well as 
logical truth and falsehood were relative. However, even morality and epistemology were not 
unified because there could be a category of indifference between moral good and moral evil, 
but “there [cannot] be a Medium between Truth and Falsehood, as there is between Good and 
Evill; For though there may be an Indifferent Action, which is neither Good (positively) nor 
Evill; yet is there not an Indifferent Proposition which is neither True nor False.”543 In other 
words, moral goodness and truth were disconnected so that the one could be no guarantor of 
the other. Individualized notions of morality, though they may be good, were not a stand-in 
for religious truth.  A year later Brooke confronted this same conclusion in his discussion 
of adiaphora in his Discourse.544 His philosophical discussion of this doctrine within a 
parliamentary address attests to the urgent fear occasioned by the possibility that human error 
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made concinnity between moral truth and peace unlikely, if not impossible. Brooke looked to 
“Right Reason,” premised on a “certaine constant Rule, taken from the Nature of Things,” to 
“dictate” what was morally best.545 But the extremes in natural law and moral law differed 
significantly. In the natural world, indifferency was “neither of the Two Extremes, yet 
participates of Both” just as “Lukwarme, as Warme, Differeth not from Hot, yet differeth as 
Coole; and therefore is Indifferent.” In nature indifferency was unproblematically composite. 
But heterogeneity was easier to accept in nature than it was in morality. “I conceive,” Brooke 
wrote, “such Indifference, will not, cannot be found in Morals, as it is in Naturals. The 
reason is, because the two extremes are not here (as in many Naturals) Both Positive Beings; 
so that [in Naturals] a Medium may really participate of Both. White and Blacke indeed are 
Both positives, but so is not Evill; but only the privation of Good, which is the other 
extreme.”546 Because good had a positive and evil a negative value, indifferency was at once 
an absolute and relative category. If moral indifferency followed natural indifferency, the 
result, as Brooke saw it, was a monstrous hybrid of good and evil.  
As contrary to logic as it might seem, Brooke found relativity not in evil, but in the 
absolute notion of good. Brooke submitted to one of “Tullies Paradoxes” that “omnia 
peccata [sunt] paria” because he accepted the Stoic belief in absolute good.547 Anything 
tainted with any amount of evil can never be good, regardless of circumstances. However, 
Brooke would not allow the same kind of leveling to occur in his understanding of moral 
good, and it is in this category that he reintroduced moral distinctions, but did so without 
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undermining the integrity of absolute goodness. On some level, he wanted to have his cake 
and eat it too: on the one hand, he needed indifferency to be morally neutral so that it could 
be a source of peace, but at the same time, he needed indifferency to have value so that it 
could guide moral action. Despite the characteristic relativity of indifferency, Brooke 
believed that a standard of judgment could be developed in a way that might afford some 
reconciliation to truth and peace.  
One way that Brooke attempted to resolve his desire for a neutral indifferency and an 
indifferency charged with goodness was by acknowledging circumstance to create what he 
termed an “equality of Use.” Emphasizing the importance of individual reason, he argued 
that the standard of pure good could not be determined by only its object and end alone, but 
“every Morall circumstance, of time, place, &c. [must] rightly concurre.”548 Rather than a 
self-defeating mixture of moral values, indifferency was lawful, wholly good, and had an 
equality of use all premised on reason’s evaluation of circumstance. In his claim for 
indifferency’s equality of use, Brooke confronted two complications concerning the 
components of moral action. First, he questioned “whether in two contraries (as Doing, not 
doing) one must not needs be Better than the other,” and second, “whether in this case I am 
not tyed to take, and doe the Best, but am equally Indifferent to Both.”549 
Brooke was clearly not a radical; he believed that the church should control 
indifferency provided that its legislation did not raise the suspicions of individual conscience. 
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However, when the “least scruple” arose in the individual conscience, Brooke advised men to 
become skeptics, suspending all action until reason united circumstantial and universal good 
or until some form of expedience emerged.550 Right reason could prioritize indifferents by an 
expediency that respected civic harmony, while at the same time dictating what was best 
based on individual circumstance. As long as circumstance was tied to reason, it was a 
reliable indicator for moral judgment. Although Brooke feared that moral absolutism would 
undermine his goals of toleration, he was equally anxious that an uncompromising 
skepticism could be dangerous to moral truth and action.  He discouraged the endless 
examination of rationality, lest it “turne all practice into bare and nice Speculation,” for by 
1641, there was little time for “nice Speculation.”551   
Brooke’s admittance of moral distinctions provided access to a certain moral truth, 
but more importantly, it provided an accountability for the doctrine of things indifferent. 
Such stability combined with a dynamic hierarchy yielded a variable, but tolerant, morality in 
the face of an ascending Christian liberty that fostered a de-valuing of moral truth.  Brooke 
placed “all the Indifference (in the world)…in our Understandings, and the Darkenesse 
thereof, (which makes them wavering sometimes, and doubtfull whether to doe or not, so that 
in them seemes some Indifference to either extreme)” but no thing or action is ever 
indifferent “in Re, in Se; but to our Understanding some things seeme so, for want of Good 
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light.”552 Indifferency was a phantom of the mind and an indicator of its limits. Used 
willfully, indifference argued a world ordered by contingency rather than providence. 
Though treated as a means to accommodate the faultiness of man’s knowledge of truth, in 
reality it was a flaw characteristic of the human mind, which could never apprehend that 
“every thing is either True or False, Certainely to Be, or not to Be.” Ontological and 
epistemological good—being and truth—always elude man because of the limitations of 
understanding; morality, though an imperfect science that can only aspire to perfection, is the 
closest man can come to these truths.553 By confining the reality of indifferency to the mind, 
Brooke made the mind more fallible, but moral truth more certain.   
Rather than forfeit the individual search for truth to forced conformity, Brooke 
asserted that even in a world of adiaphora, men could act with conviction and with certainty. 
The institutionalized legislation of indifferency made a right knowledge of things themselves 
all the more difficult because ecclesiastical law particularized and politicized indifferency by 
dividing it into categories of lawful and unlawful. Legislation, another indicator of the 
mind’s weakness, could only rule over perceptible “seeming indifferents,” not true moral 
action, which was beyond the province of a human mind that is entirely subjected to 
circumstance, the canons of a national church, the prerogative of a monarch, and most 
importantly, its own limitations.554 
 For Brooke, true liberty of conscience admitted neither contingency nor moral choice 
without accountability. It allowed man the freedom to search for God’s truth in “seeming” 
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indifferents, but the necessity of that search did not undermine the value of moral choice. But 
most importantly, even in a universe that admitted adiaphora as a moral crutch for the sake 
of toleration, true moral action could still take place: truth and peace could coexist. The 
difficulty of adiaphora in the mid-seventeenth century was that, in order for it to be a valid 
moral category, it had to have an origin independent of the human mind—whether it be the 
individual mind or the collective mind of the church—yet if it possessed such an origin, it 
was no longer a thing indifferent, but something more akin to divine knowledge. Such a coup 
on the unreliability of human perception was possible if reason was grounded in “the Thing 
itselfe” and unified the good of circumstance with absolute good.555  Brooke’s willingness to 
accept both an absolute and relative model of indifferency freed it from its moral privation 
and reoriented it as an object of divine truth, without leading to dogma. However, as a 
philosophical category indifferency always would beg the question of whether truth need be 
moral, while as a theological category it called into doubt whether morality need be true. 
 
IV. Replacing the Moral Guidance of Adiaphora: Miltonic Discipline and Style 
Lord Brooke’s rationalism demonstrates why, on the eve of the Civil War, adiaphora 
came to represent powerful soteriological truths that motivated action. Like Lord Brooke, 
John Milton sought to determine how and why the individual conscience was a better guide 
than the bishops to what he called “saving knowledge.” William Riley Parker has argued that 
in his anti-prelatical tracts Milton’s “fervent theory of spiritual and poetical illumination led 
him to damn Episcopacy for destroying the dignity of the individual; but it never occurred to 
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him that this involved the principle of freedom of conscience.”556 On the contrary, liberty of 
conscience is not only integral to Milton’s anti-episcopal stance, but it supersedes church 
polity as the key focus of these tracts. Though the tracts vary radically in style, their common 
denominator is their emphasis on the importance of the individual layman acquiring moral 
knowledge without the imposition of law and censure. Legislated morality overlooked the 
importance of conviction.   
Crucial to Milton’s early views on the liberty of conscience was his doubtful attitude 
towards invention in any form. In the course of his five anti-episcopal tracts of 1641 and 
1642, Milton weighed the value of the passions, of education, of persuasion, and of literary 
style as answers to indifferency. Brooke had suggested that the concept of adiaphora, while 
an index of the weakness of reason, could be modified to become a valid moral guide. But 
for Milton in these early pamphlets, indifferency embodied the human mind’s creative rather 
than perceptive faculties, a knowledge submitted only to will and never to reason. 
Indifferency was particularly vulnerable to error because it relied upon the imagination, will, 
historical contingency, and rhetorical obscurity; moreover, it implied that the individual 
conscience was inadequate to formulate moral truths.557 In his attempts to replace 
indifferency with a more certain moral guide, Milton redefined the imagination’s role in 
forming morality by admitting room for the imagination through religious discourse and 
discipline. Subsequent to his anti-prelatical tracts Milton drifted away from the corporate but 
less hierarchical authority of Presbyterianism to test the epistemological flexibility of 
indifferency, but in the anti-prelatical tracts indifferency served as an example of a religious 
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imagination gone awry and as a foil against which he measured the individual conscience. In 
his attack upon an ingenuity that worked against religious truth and liberty, Milton sought to 
develop a discourse to motivate, rather than undermine, England’s moral reformation.       
In Milton’s first two anti-episcopal works, Of Reformation (May, 1641) and Of 
Prelatical Episcopacy (June/July, 1641), he exposed the inadequacy of history as a source of 
moral knowledge. Indeed, these two treatises show how for Milton the Episcopal debate was 
not over church polity, but over the moral superiority of the conscience as an alternative to 
the customs of doctrine and discipline rooted in church history.558 In Milton’s attack on the 
bishops’ patristic arguments for Episcopacy, he posited that the arbitrariness of history 
undermined its validity as a source of moral knowledge. In all likelihood written no more 
than a month apart, these treatises were juxtaposed to reinforce his argument: while in Of 
Reformation Milton exposed the inconsistencies in the works of the Church Fathers, in Of 
Prelatical Episcopacy he turned these same sources against the Archbishop James Ussher in 
a point-by-point refutation stylistically reminiscent of the scholastic pedantry he constantly 
mocked. The ready manipulation of these sources called into question the certainty of a 
church that founded its identity on the sandy shores of history and tradition.   
 Because it was based in history and custom, the bishops used indifferency to justify 
the moral grab-bag they deemed church doctrine and practice. In the very beginning of Of 
Reformation, Milton criticized the Church of England for attempting to use the “weak and 
fallible office of the Senses, to be either the Ushers, or Interpreters, of heavenly Mysteries” 
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because using “deceivable traditions…attribute[s] purity, or impurity, to things indifferent, 
[so] that [the bishops] might bring the inward acts of the Spirit to the outward, and customary 
ey-Service of the body, as if they could make God earthly, and fleshly, because they could 
not make themselves heavenly, and Spirituall.”559  Adiaphora was sensory knowledge—if it 
could be called knowledge at all—and the bishops’ reliance on adiaphora for moral law 
proved them feeble authorities on the principles of moral living. Such a dependency 
dampened Milton’s hopes for nothing less than a perfect reformation in England. Though 
England had been given a “Precedencie” by God “to be the first Restorer of buried Truth” 
and should have already “attain’d Perfection,” the “purity of [its] Doctrine” had been 
weakened by the lack of “Discipline, which is the execution and applying of Doctrine.”560 
Because of their tendency indiscriminately to accommodate the pure and impure, at best 
things indifferent stalled the progress of a national spiritual reformation. 
 Neither history nor the traditional indifferency founded upon it offered the perfect 
reformation Milton sought. Just as the bishops mixed the pure with the impure, so too the 
historian mingled the certain with the uncertain. Milton inveighed against the “Fathers, 
Martyrs, [and] Christian Emperors” not out of spite, but out of the “meere necessity to 
vindicate the spotlesse Truth from an ignominious bondage, whose native worth is now 
become of such a low esteeme, that shee is like to finde small credit with us for what she can 
say, unlesse shee can bring a Ticket from Cranmer, Latimer, and Ridley; or prove her selfe a 
retainer to Constantine, and weare his badge.”561 In their study of the scripture and antiquity, 
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the Church Fathers matched the certain word of God to the uncertain knowledge of history, 
making the two collide “as accidentally and absurdly, as Epicurus his atoms to patch up a 
Leucippean Ignatius, enclining rather to make this phantasme an expounder, or indeed a 
depraver of Saint Paul, then Saint Paul an examiner, and discoverer of this impostorship.”562 
“Truth” according to Milton, “is the daughter not of Time, but of Heaven, only bred up heer 
below in Christian hearts, between two grave & holy nurses the Doctrine, and Discipline of 
the Gospel.”563  
In his first two anti-prelatical tracts, Milton grounded his hope for a national 
reformation on the assumption that scripture was the sole source of moral truth, offering a 
plain and necessitous truth in place of an uncertain, if traditional, indifferency. In Of 
Reformation he was altogether skeptical of the continuity of truth over time, which is why 
history, like the senses, was an unacceptable guide to normative moral values. Because 
“succession of truth may fail,” truth must be “renew[ed]” by having “recourse to the 
fountaines.”  “If a Channel, or Conduit pipe” that has “brought in water plentifully before, 
suddenly fail,” that is, if truth became obscured by time as, in Milton’s eyes, the Apostolic 
Church had, then “doe we not goe to the fountaine to know the cause…thus ought we to doe, 
keeping Gods precepts, that if in ought the truth shall be chang’d, we may repaire to the 
Gospel.”564 Milton allowed that reform of the Church, a change in perceived truth, may exist, 
but it could be found only in scripture, not in human invention.   
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 “Repair[ing] to the Gospel” to correct a corrupted church polity or policy required 
the right interpretation of the gospel. The bishops had emphasized the obscurities of the 
gospel in order to justify withholding it from the laity. But Milton argued that although some 
books of the Bible were “clouded,” “yet ever that which is most necessary to be known is 
most easie; and that which is most difficult, so farre expounds it selfe ever, as to tell us how 
little it imports our saving knowledge.” The bishops insisted on a “generall obscurity over all 
the text [of Scripture]” in order to “disswade men from reading it.” But the bishops, “[men] 
of Power amongst us,” distorted the message of God and lacked “gentlenesse” and “fair 
dealing” when they “require[d] strict, and punctual obedience, and yet [gave] out all [their] 
commands ambiguous and obscure, [so that] we should think [they] had a plot upon us, 
certainly such commands were no commands, but snares.” When the bishops claimed that 
darker more obscure passages were necessary for salvation, they transformed things that 
“little…[import]…saving knowledge” into necessities.565 Obscurity and indifferency for 
Milton went hand in hand with the bishops’ domination over the layman’s conscience. 
Despite truth’s “plainnesse, and brightnes,” which was hidden only by “the darknes 
and crookednesse” of the human mind, determining necessities was not a simple matter.566 
The truth of scripture had not changed, but the certainty of human apprehension had. This 
vexed certainty is evident in Milton’s seemingly paradoxical vision of truth as plain necessity 
and platonic abstraction. But ironically, truth’s mysticism as much as its plainness allowed 
Milton freely to invest all men and women with the abilities to perceive moral knowledge. “If 
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we will but purge with sovrain eyesalve that intellectual ray which God hath planted in us,” 
Milton wrote, “then we would beleeve the Scriptures protesting their own plainnes, and 
perspicuity, calling them to be instructed, not only the wise, and learned, but the simple, the 
poor, the babes, foretelling an extraordinary effusion of Gods Spirit upon every age, and 
sexe, attributing to all men, and requiring from them the ability of searching, trying, examing 
all things, and by the Spirit discerning that which is good.”567 Any inability to perceive truth 
derived from man’s faulty understanding, the dross that covered the “intellectual ray” within 
all men. Man’s “darknes and crookednesse” obstructed human apprehension but only insofar 
as men attempted to define things beyond the plain and necessary truths God willingly 
allowed men. 
According to Milton, “the Wisdome of God created understanding, fit and 
proportionable to Truth the object, and end of it, as the eye to the thing visible.” But even if 
the mind did misapprehend truth, it did not threaten truth’s autonomy, for if “our 
understanding have a film of ignorance over it, or be blear with gazing on other false 
glisterings, what is that to Truth?” Because real moral truth was without the taint of human 
law, adiaphora created more epistemological problems than it solved. “Truth,” Milton wrote 
quoting Athanasius “wants no humane lore, as being evident in it selfe, and by the preaching 
of Christ now opens brighter then the Sun”; the “effusion of Gods Spirit’ upon ‘all men’ 
occurred independent of the strictures of the Church, though clearly not independent of 
individual human endeavor.568 All that was necessary for the perfect English reformation to 
occur, then, was that the confusion the bishops caused by maintaining the traditions of 
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indifferency be cleared by encouraging all men to actively search the scripture for moral 
knowledge.    
 In Of Reformation and Of Prelatical Episcopacy, Milton appropriated historical 
discourse in order to explode the myth that it could provide any certainty for church doctrine. 
In his next two anti-prelatical works, Milton engaged very different prose styles in his quest 
to free conscience from the bishops, from church history, and from indifferency. Although 
one is a satire in the vein of Cartwright and the other an eloquent and moderate exposition in 
the style of Hooker, the Animadversions (July, 1641) and the Reason of Church Government 
(January/February, 1642) attempted to compensate for the history that Milton had rendered 
so useless in his first works against the bishops. With history lacking certainty and the 
scripture plain but abstract, Milton needed a means by which individual conscience could 
overcome the inconsistencies of time and chance. At home Milton faced the failure of the 
Short Parliament in 1640 and the undecided outcome of the Long Parliament; abroad he 
watched as the rapidly deteriorating relationship between England and Ireland culminated in 
the notoriously bloody Irish Rebellion in October of 1641.569 By the time Milton wrote the 
Reason of Church Government, he possessed a real fear that the Irish might invade—and that 
such an invasion might be an indication of God’s displeasure with England’s failed attempts 
at reform. Perhaps because of the uncertain directions in which English religious and civil 
liberties were heading, Milton became more tolerant of error in an effort to push forward 
reforms. 
 Rather than stress the ability of the common layman to comprehend the divine truths 
of scripture, Milton began to concentrate on ways in which the present laity were in danger 
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of passing by their opportunity for reform. In both the Animadversions and the Reason of 
Church Government Milton retrenched his demands for moral perfection and introduced 
degrees of moral knowledge. Rather than give abstract definitions of truth, in these works 
Milton instead articulated two complementary definitions of reason. Most striking is the 
emphasis in both definitions on the role of the passions in cognition. In his first prose satire, 
Milton linked passion to reason. The “grim laughter” that appeared in Animadversions, 
Milton cautioned, “cannot be taxt of levity or insolence,” for laughter is “oft-times a strong 
and sinewy force in teaching and confuting”; nor should “indignation and scorne” come 
under censure, for anger and laughter are the “two most rationall faculties of humane 
intellect.”570  
Similarly, in the Reason of Church Government Milton replaced the abstract 
“intellectual ray” of Of Reformation with a more material examination of the operations of 
the mind. Because truth must encounter the passions, it had an “unhappinesse fatall to her.” 
Before it could reach “the triall and inspection of the Understanding,” truth was forced “to 
passe through many little wards and limits of the severall Affections and Desires” where to 
gain a hearing it “must put on such colours and attire, as those Pathetick handmaids of the 
soul please to lead her in to their Queen.” If the affections accepted truth on its own merits, 
they “let her passe in her own likenesse,” but Milton was more interested in the process by 
which the mind rejected truth. In cases of an unpalatable truth, the passions brought truth to 
the understanding “habited and colour’d like a notorious Falsehood.” When faced with a 
pleasing “Falsehood” the passions “[were] so artfull to counterfeit the very shape and visage 
of Truth, [so] that the Understanding” no longer recognized either truth or falsehood and 
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“sentenc[ed] for the most part one for the other at the first blush, according to the suttle 
imposture of these sensual mistresses that keep the ports and passages between her and the 
object.”571 At the mercy of the operations of the mind, truth could be dominated by affection 
so that human perception became invention.   
In the midst of a religious culture that had accepted the mingling of the pure and 
impure, saving knowledge and uncertainties, Milton sought to explain why truth and 
falsehood were so readily interchanged in the mind and what that meant for the legitimacy of 
what men called conscience. But unlike the plain, independent, and necessary truth of Of 
Reformation that remained unaffected by “the film of ignorance” covering human 
understanding, by 1641 truth seemed to Milton to be in a precarious position. Because 
England appeared to be slipping further away from its role as “Restorer of buried Truth,” 
Milton admitted that truth required “colours and attire” to move beyond the affections and to 
reach the more deeply buried faculty of reason. But in dressing up truth—whether it be with 
ceremony or language—the inventor always risked compromising its nature.  
In Of Reformation and Of Prelatical Episcopacy Milton had asserted that the Church 
had dressed indifferencies as soteriological necessities and vice versa. Building on this 
conclusion, in the Reason of Church Government Milton noted that the Church’s tendency to 
mix-and-match certain truths with invented fictions was the tendency of the human mind in 
general. As in the art of sculpture “seldome any elegance is wrought without a superfluous 
wast and refuse in the transaction,” so too in the art of moral reformation truth and falsehood 
must have a “fierce encounter.” The clash of these contraries would produce “many fond 
errors and fanatick opinions,” but once the “reformation shall be perfeted” these opinions 
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would be but simple examples of ‘the exercise of our knowledge, not the disturbance, or 
interruption of our faith.”572 After the perfect moral reformation had been completed, error 
would become innocuous. But during the process of reformation—as Milton believed 
England was, or should be in 1642—the mind’s ability to alter the face of truth was much 
more dangerous. To admit indifferencies as a moral category only destabilized the perception 
of truth and encouraged men to mistake fictitious invention for the mandates of conscience.   
Milton could not dismiss the role of the passions in the perception of moral truth 
because it allowed the possibility that education could be a more reliable guide to moral truth 
than legislation. With the introduction of passion into man’s spiritual life, Milton began to 
examine the influence of the external world and to consider more seriously the possibility 
that the external forces above and beyond but ultimately based in scripture could be 
significant to moral development. The greatest guide to moral development was discipline. 
Though an external application of doctrine and the “very visible shape and image of virtue,” 
and the most likely “visible shape [that] can be given of divine things,” discipline could resist 
chance and human invention. Discipline, “if it be at all the worke of man…must be of such a 
one as is a true knower of himselfe, and himselfe in whom contemplation and practice, wit, 
prudence, fortitude, and eloquence must be rarely met, both to comprehend the hidden causes 
of things, and span in his thoughts all the various effects that passion or complexion can 
work in mans nature.”573 For the man who possessed the knowledge to formulate it, 
discipline was an external indicator of internal virtue. But, for the man who was not yet 
regenerate, discipline was an aid. The admonishment of shame combined with the inner 
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“self-knowledge” Milton termed “esteem” worked together to increase the force and 
accuracy of conscience even as they regulated moral knowledge. The regenerate man who 
possessed esteem and could apply discipline and shame was not only a skilled minister who 
possessed a great knowledge of human nature, but also a man with the capacities of a great 
orator who could use the passions to encourage moral development.   
But while discipline was a function of the understanding rather than the imagination, 
in the Animadversions and the Reason of Church Government Milton also suggested the 
benefits of the union of knowledge and invention. Poetry and satire could stand as a kind of 
discipline that punished and affected the inner man without force and without restricting 
religious freedoms.574 Both his role in the Smectymnuuan debate and his as-yet-unrealized 
poetic vocation embodied “the enforcement of conscience.”575 In contrast to the bishops’ 
moral innovations, in the Reason of Church Government Milton declared that his poetic 
aspiration to create virtuous fictions was “the inspired guift of God.”576 Like discipline, satire 
required self-knowledge and a knowledge of others; it evidenced regeneracy and guided the 
unregenerate, even though it was neither restrictive nor compulsive. Unlike the imposition of 
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adiaphora, discipline and satire required the transference of knowledge from the regenerate 
to the unregenerate in order to be effective.  
Milton’s justification of the authority of conscience both limited the moral innovation 
of bishops and reasserted the validity of moral fiction at the same time. Even as he criticized 
the bishops’ “tyrannical duncery,” under which “no free and splendid wit [could] flourish,”577 
he began to reclaim human invention. But the nature of truth had changed. It was no longer 
an abstract mystical entity found only by reading scripture; rather these two tracts suggest 
that the process by which truth was found was by no means a pure or linear one. At least 
temporarily, the absolutism and idealism of moral perfection evident in Of Reformation and 
Of Prelatical Episcopacy had to be sacrificed for liberation and progress in the 
Animadversions and the Reason of Church Government. A perfect reformation was still on 
the horizon, but the road to it was not as simple or as straightforward as it had once seemed.    
In his final contribution to the Smectymnuuan debate, Milton undertook a forceful 
defense of the satirical language he had used to censure Joseph Hall in the Animadversions. 
The Apology (April, 1642) constitutes a passionate meditation on the decorum of religious 
discourse. Milton’s pamphlet was a response to Joseph Hall’s Modest Confutation (January 
[?], 1642), itself a response to the Animadversions. In the Reason of Church Government 
Milton had invoked the language of martyrdom by contrasting the exemplary behavior of 
Christ who evidenced “strength by suffering, dignity by lowlinesse” against the pomp and 
pride of the bishops.578 But in the Apology, Milton invoked the same language yet again, this 
time to announce to the world that though “silence and sufferance” had been the best means 
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of refuting his enemies, silence was no longer an act of moral valor. Against the charge of 
Hall that he espoused a selfish religion that disregarded the common good,579 Milton declared 
that he no longer viewed himself as “mine own person, but as a member incorporate into that 
truth whereof I was perswaded”: he defended his earlier silence as he now defended his 
outspokenness.580   
The debate between Milton and Hall over satire found its inspiration in their attitudes 
towards the laity. Hall argued that religion should not be judged by the people; Milton, he 
claimed “against the command of God himself, dare[d] bring not the Congregation onely, but 
the very beasts of the people, within the borders of the Mount.”581  Set forms of liturgy were 
the “most expedient” way of dealing with the people because they used the “subsidiary helps 
of invention, disposition, memory, [and] language” in order to “accommodate the capacity of 
the people.”582 Milton objected to the liturgy on the grounds that it corrupted the relationship 
between matter, style, and audience. As early as the Animadversions Milton had argued that 
something may in “substance…savor of something holy, and ancient, this is but the matter.” 
Just as important was “the forme and end of the thing [which] may yet render it either 
superstitious, fruitlesse, or impious.”583 Form was not just something external, but “an 
essence” that affected substance, something resembling intention more than action.584 But 
ironically, just as Milton had accused the bishops of unnecessarily obscuring saving 
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knowledge in Of Reformation, Hall claimed that “honest and simple Christians would no 
more know how to understand” Milton’s extemporaneous prayers than they would “a Scene 
out of Johnsons Cataline.”585 Hall believed that a set form was just as likely to kindle the 
affections of the laity towards god as a private prayer, but Hall’s greatest fear of 
extemporaneous prayer was that it “will set such a fire on your Spirits, that they will need 
quenching, or the whole Kingdome will burn with them.” “Weigh these circumstances,” Hall 
admonished, “and you will see that there is an expediency of set forms in a nationall 
Church,”586 for the “authority is lawfull and just; the thing in it self indifferent, and in the 
circumstance, expedient.”587 
In the Reason of Church Government Milton had claimed that he “hath neither envy 
nor gall,” but rather the motivation for his pamphlets lay in the “enforcement of 
conscience.”588 Because even a sincere conscience could invent as well as perceive truth 
without recognizing the difference, Milton felt that it was important to differentiate between 
different types and sources of passion. But clearly his discourse in the Animadversions was 
more inflammatory than Hall thought appropriate for religious discourse. In his arguments 
against Milton’s style, Hall appropriated the arguments of Francis Bacon in his Wise and 
Moderate Discourse Concerning Church-Affaires, first published only in 1641. Though 
written in the 1590s, Bacon’s work was quite at home in the climate of the pamphlet wars of 
1641 and 1642.589 Attributing the disunity in the English Church to the current controversy 
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“about Ceremonies, and things indifferent,” Bacon had attacked the “unmodest and deformed 
kinde of writing lately entertained, whereby matters of religion are handled in the stile of the 
stage.” “To turne religion into a Comedy or Satyr, to search and rip up wounds with a 
laughing countenance, to intermix Scripture and Scurrility sometime in one sentence,” 
according to Bacon, “is a thing farre from the devout reverence of a Christian, and scant 
beseeming the honest regard of a sober man.”590 Far from being a subject open for the 
scrutiny of man, when the Church was under the administration of pious and dutiful bishops, 
it should be “situate, as it were, upon an hill.”591 As it did for Hall, so too for Bacon 
indifferency protected the Church from scrutiny because it attempted to make controversy 
unnecessary in order to keep the Church out of public religious discourse.   
In the aggressive attacks of the Animadversions, Milton had first claimed the 
usefulness of a ‘toothed’ satire. He reveled in “now this permission of free writing,” which 
“were there no good else in it, yet at some times thus licenc’t, is such an unripping, such an 
Anatomie of the shiest, and tenderest particular truths, as makes not only the whole Nation in 
many points the wiser, but also presents, and carries home to Princes, and men most remote 
from vulgar concourse, such a full insight of every lurking evil, or restrained good among the 
Commons.”592 Milton, Bacon, and Hall acknowledged the role passion played in religion and 
were concerned about the confusion that seemed responsible, if not for generating, then for 
maintaining the current level of controversy—that is, the confusion between valid and invalid 
motives for action. Bacon characterized the confusion as one between love and zeal. “[The] 
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character of love,” Bacon claimed, “is more proper for debates of this [religious] nature, than 
that of zeale.”593 Hall tried to moderate satire’s vitriol by emphasizing its history.  Satire 
“signified anciently any kind of miscellaneous writing, which we now term Essayes,” and 
even when satire did become a moral discourse “it came to be restrained to such kind of 
writings, as contained the vices of the times” but not of the people.594 In the Animadversions 
Milton attacked Hall for using ineffectual discourse for moral reformation. Hall worried 
about “zeal” that lacked “discretion” even if it did derive from “knowledge.”595 To Milton, 
the extremes of passionate zeal, on the one hand, and Hall’s “toothlesse satires” on the other, 
seemed equally inappropriate for moral discourse—the former were too fanciful to be valid 
and the latter were too dull to be effective, either as education or as punishment: “Let me 
informe you, a toothlesse Satyr is as improper as a toothed sleekstone, and as bullish.”596 
In the Apology Milton defended his use of satire as an instrument of moral 
instruction, an instrument, which, he noted, Old Testament prophets and martyrs had used 
effectively.597 He observed that a kind of decorum restrained written religious discourse that 
did not apply to the minister’s sermons. Writing, Milton argued, should be allowed the same 
passion as the minister’s oratory because the writer as much as the orator must consider the 
different passions and humors of his audience to be effective. Though some writers have 
been “indu’d with a staid moderation, and soundnesse of argument to teach and convince the 
rationall and sober-minded,” yet such discourse was not “the only expedient course of 
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teaching.”  “In times of opposition…against new heresies arising, or old corruptions to be 
reform’d” when “coole unpassionate mildnesse of positive wisdome is not anough” to 
overcome opposition, “then (that I may have leave to soare a while as the Poets use) then 
Zeale whose substance is ethereal” is necessary.598 The zeal that the bishops used to enforce 
conformity was equally useful to the cause of religious liberty.   
In his attempt to justify satire as a valid form of religious discourse, Milton claimed 
that style and morality were inseparable. Eloquence never finds its source in anger, but in the 
“regenerate reason” of the man whose art “returnes and approaches neerest to nature from 
whence it came; and they expresse nature best, who in their lives least wander from her safe 
leading.”599 Composition itself became for Milton a metaphor for virtue: “He who would not 
be frustrate of his hope to write well hereafter in laudable things, ought him selfe to bee a 
true Poem, that is, a composition, and patterne of the best and honourablest things.”600 Like 
discipline and the minister’s oratory, satire displayed one man’s virtues while it censored 
another’s. Far from undercutting the certainty of conscience, Milton found that if religion 
accepted aid from certain forms of discourse, passion and understanding could meet without 
damaging the integrity of each other. Satire remedied “lukewarmness,” allowed passionate 
conviction, and replaced indifferency as a moral guide. The moral censure of satire—and 
eventually, Milton projected, his poetry—while not possessing the certainty of the gospel for 
moral truth, offered guidance without restricting or depriving men of their liberties.   
As an important part of the Episcopacy’s programme of forced conformity, adiaphora 
compelled Milton to recommend an alternative means to moral supervision. Doing so helped 
                                                
598 Apology 900. 
 
599 Apology 874. 
 
600 Apology 890. 
263 
to define his own convictions about moral discourse and the role of the poet as he began his 
career. Rather than highlighting rational action, as Lord Brooke had, Milton focused on 
developing a discourse that possessed the rhetorical force of preaching to encourage 
reformation. Considered as a form of discipline, the moral discourse of satire could overcome 
the need for indifferency without replacing it with other forms of moral restrictions or 
compulsions—that is, it could replace moral absolutism without introducing skepticism.601 
While education provided a compelling alternative to forced conformity, Milton’s early prose 
questioned not just the value of ecclesiastical legislation nor simply the potential for the 
human mind to apprehend divine truth, but rather the ability of the human mind to invent—
not just perceive—moral distinctions, categories, and fictions.                                                                     
 
V. Conclusion: The Language of Religious Toleration and the Language of Moral Action  
The vigorous debate over Episcopal jurisdiction and the nature of things indifferent 
signals a sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit search for a discourse adequate to formulate 
valid moral codes amongst the disorienting expansion religious liberty in the early 1640s. In 
the war between religious freedom and the Caroline Church, “indifferency” did not suggest 
neutrality for anyone involved. The bishops were not indifferent to “things indifferent” 
because their legislation demanded obedience; the reformers, on the other hand, were not 
indifferent because of the problematic union of ecclesiology and soteriology.  
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In The Nature of Truth, Brooke questioned the gap between philosophical and 
religious truth. “Why doe wee make Philosophy and Divinity two Sciences?,” Brooke asked, 
“What is True Philosophy but Divinity? And if it be not True, it is not Philosophy.”602 For 
Lord Brooke, the merger of religion and philosophy aided him in his struggle to redefine 
adiaphora and to establish a standard of judgment for moral values that averted absolutism 
and relativism. Those defending the practices of the Church of England often condemned the 
use of philosophical discourse in religious matters. Joseph Hall perhaps most markedly 
banished philosophy from theology.603 Philosophical discourse jeopardized the stability of 
the Church as it offered an alternative means of examining truths, even those beyond rational 
proof. Brooke’s rationalism and Milton’s satire stretched the decorum of moral discourse as 
they sought a method of interpreting the perplexities of moral knowledge that the Church so 
happily swept under the legislative carpet.604 Neither orthodoxy nor reform was immune to 
error. The difference lay in the willingness of the reformers to jeopardize peace for the sake 
truth, and the hesitance of the bishops to risk national unity for religious freedom.   
In short, adiaphora was a highly contested space in the negotiation between truth and 
peace. Both Brooke’s acceptance of adiaphora as a means to promote moral action and 
religious toleration as well as Milton’s attempt to replace adiaphora with the moral guidance 
of satire measured the value of a positive religious discourse against a skeptical one. As an 
important component of the debate over Episcopacy prior to the English Civil War, 
adiaphora’s significance lies in its engagement in a larger process of acclimating moral 
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judgment and discourse to a new culture of religious and political liberty, for it was unclear 
whether such a climate would allow normative morality to exist at all.  
Significantly, Milton did not, finally, leave adiaphora completely behind. In 1644, 
two years after his final anti-prelatical tract, Milton published Areopagitica, in which he 
reclaimed some value for certain kinds of adiaphora. Though still scathing in his attitudes 
towards a legislated truth that threatened to turn all truth “into all shapes except her own,” 
Milton considered the possibility of an indifferency based on charity rather than 
oppression.605 In contrast to “tolerated Popery, and open superstition,” Milton defined a 
category of “neighboring differences, or rather indifferences…whether in some point of 
doctrine or of discipline, which though they be many, yet need not interrupt the unity of 
Spirit.” As long as the idea persisted that there was a single, unknown Truth, England could 
find unity in the collective search for moral truth, if not in individual conviction. This 
reformation, Milton averred, though perhaps not perfect, could encompass truth, difference, 
and concord “if”—and it was a considerable and ultimately a fatal “if”—those involved in 
the religious strife of civil war “could but find among [themselves] the bond of peace.”606 
Unfortunately, the “bond of peace” proved to be the most elusive truth of them all.   
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